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This thesis aims to contribute to research in management accounting and control systems 
(MACS) in a developing country context: that of Fiji.  It seeks to gain a theoretical 
understanding of how MACS reflect the social and political contexts in which they 
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operate by using a case study of Telecom Fiji Limited (a major supplier of telephone 
communications in Fiji).  The definition of “MACS” for the purpose of the thesis is 
broad- a social constructivist perspective is adopted in which systems are used to align 
employee behaviour with organisational objectives and to assist external relationships 
(with the State, Commerce Commission, aid agencies and customers).  The thesis draws 
on institutional theory while raising questions as to how to refine and extend institutional 
theory.  This theory has often been associated with institutional embeddedness (stability).  
The social constructivist approach helps to incorporate agency and cultural issues 
normally missing in conventional applications of institutional theory to accounting 
change.   
 
Telecom Fiji Limited (TFL) was restructured under the Fiji government‟s public sector 
reforms.  Such reforms were insisted upon by the international financial agencies of the 
World Bank, the Asian Development Bank and the International Monetary Fund.  Under 
the reform policy, TFL was transformed from a government department into a 
corporatised organisation and was subsequently privatised.  The MACS changes which 
eventuated helped to change TFL management and employees‟ interpretive schemes. 
However, employees resisted initial changes to commercial business routines and it took 
some years for TFL actors to assimilate commercial practices.  While the literature 
dealing with MACS changes has mostly portrayed changes as occurring with little 
resistance, MACS changes at TFL took several years to become institutionalised, partly 
because of cultural and political factors specific to Fiji. 
 
The study has practice implications as it shows that management accountants can act as 
institutional entrepreneurs in organisations, shaping new accounting technologies in 
reformed entities, and changing actors‟ interpretive schemes.  The study has implications 
for policy makers, consultants and other stakeholders in terms of promoting a need for 
better understanding of the sensitivity to cultural and political circumstances in Less 
Developed Countries (LDC‟s) like Fiji in relation to the introduction of MACS changes.  
The study has implications for other recently corporatized/ privatised and state-sector 
organisations in Fiji and elsewhere.  It also has implications for other researchers as 
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Accounting practice is seen as being an integral part of organizational culture and the wider 
social and institutional context in which it functions (Hopwood, 1983, 1999; Alam, 1997; 
Hoque & Hopper, 1997; Hoque & Alam, 1999; Euske & Riccaboni, 1999; Brignall & 
Modell, 2000; Perera, McKinnon & Harrison, 2003; Hussain & Hoque, 2002).  The 
accounting literature has recognized the importance of culture and politics.  For example, 
Alawattage, Hopper and Wickramasinghe (2007) and Wickramasinghe and Hopper (2005) 
point out that accounting researchers, particularly in less developed countries, need to address 
the issues of culture and politics and how accounting is intertwined within these influences. 
 
This thesis seeks to gain a theoretical understanding of how management accounting and 
control systems (MACS) are a part of the social and political context in which they operate 
by using a case study in Telecom Fiji Limited (a major supplier of telephone communications 
in Fiji).  The thesis draws on institutional theory.  It raises questions as to how to refine and 
extend institutional theory since this theory has often been associated with institutional 
embeddedness (stability) rather than change.  A social constructivist approach is followed 
which helps to incorporate agency and cultural issues normally missing in conventional 
application of institutional theory to accounting changes.   
 
The definition of “MACS” for the purpose of this thesis is broad- a system used to align 
employee behavior with organizational objectives and to assist external relationships (with 
the State, Commerce Commission, aid agencies and customers).  The cultural and political 
forces are relevant to accounting in a developing country context in a Fijian Telecom 
company which was initially a government department and was subsequently corporatised 
and privatized.  The thesis focuses on analysing the management accounting and control 
system changes at Telecom Fiji Limited (TFL) and examines how TFL was restructured 
under Fiji government‟s public sector reform policy insisted upon by the international 
financial agencies of the World Bank, the Asian Development Bank and the International 
Monetary Fund.  Initial change to commercial MACS routines was resisted and it took some 
years for TFL actors to assimilate commercial MACS routines when the organization was 
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corporatised.  The literature dealing with MACS changes has mostly portrayed changes as 
occurring without much resistance (Abernethy & Chua, 1996; Busco, Riccaboni & Scapens, 
2006).  However, MACS changes at TFL took several years to be institutionalized, partly 
because of cultural and political factors specific to Fiji.   
 
The development in the public sector in Fiji led the researcher to study accounting as part of 
social and organizational change in a telecommunication company in Fiji, Telecom Fiji 
Limited (TFL).  MACS is considered to be part and parcel of changes affecting public sector 
enterprises.  MACS provides a useful means of recording, communicating and interpreting 
daily activities. 
 
Accountants were proactive at TFL and were instrumental in designing new accounting and 
control tools for management such as budgeting, net present value analysis and economic 
value added analysis for projects.  Such techniques were absent when TFL was a government 
department.  Expenditure for projects was then based on the needs of the public rather than 
accounting techniques to justify the maximization of wealth for shareholders.   
 
The thesis also focuses on analysing the changes surrounding the introduction of a 
management control technique: Total Quality Management (TQM) within TFL.  TQM is 
related to MACS in that incentive pay, for example, can have an impact on TQM practices on 
customer and quality performance (Sim & Killough, 1998; Chenhall, 2003).  Chenhall (2003) 
notes that TQM practice is associated with MACS including timely externally focused 
information and close interaction between strategy and non-financial performance 
measurement.  The literature on TQM practices tends to be outcome oriented and only a few 
studies employ a processual approach to TQM practice implementation.   
 
Accounting researchers have been inspired to investigate accounting in action by utilizing 
interpretive and critical perspectives grounded in the works of social theorists such as 
Habermas and Giddens (Laughlin, 1988; Lawrence, 1990, 1999).  Such studies have, 
however, mainly focused on the western industrialized societies as their empirical focus with 
the exception of some case studies in developing countries (e.g., Hoque & Hopper, 1994; 
Rahaman & Lawrence, 2001; Sharma & Lawrence, 2005; Alawattage et al., 2007; Mimba, 
Helden & Tillema, 2007; Awio, Lawrence & Northcott, 2007; Kattan, Pike & Tayles, 2007; 




By employing a social constructionist approach based on an interpretive methodology in a 
developing country context, this study enhances the understanding of accounting in a 
developing country context.  In interpretive methodology, the author is part of the reality he 
or she records.  The researcher interacts with the researched and attempts to capture their 
understanding of reality.  It is on such understandings that interpretations of individual 
actions are based.   
 
Burns and Scapens (2000), Burns (2000), Soin et al. (2002) and Scapens (2006) have posited 
that scholars have paid little attention in accounting to the micro processes of 
institutionalization.  A focus on organizational actors is essential to understand the 
contradictions that trigger the creation of new practices (Seo & Creed, 2002; Lounsbury, 
2008).  The current study attempts to identify institutional contradictions that trigger MACS 
changes within a privatized TFL.  The next section briefly discusses the institutional theory 
utilized for the study. 
 
1.2.0  Institutional Theory 
 
Institutional theory, according to Lounsbury (2008), is one of the most dominant perspectives 
in organizational analysis.  The use of institutional theory applied to MACS has been 
popularized by Scapens (1994), Burns and Scapens (2000), Soin et al., (2002) and Scapens 
(2006).  In this perspective, accounting is not simply a technical device applied neutrally to 
assist management with decision making but is the product of a particular organizational 
culture which, in turn, is embedded in and influenced by a broader set of institutional 
arrangements. 
 
Management control practices are often institutionalized to gain legitimacy from external 
constituents such as government (Kloot & Martin, 2000; Modell, 2001; Collier, 2001; 
Carpenter & Feroz, 2001).  Studies of the institutionalization of organizational practices tend 
to explain isomorphism, that is, similarity in accounting rules and routines which become 
accepted unquestioningly by organizational participants.  However, the emphasis of this 
thesis is on a study of organizational actors and the micro processes of institutionalization 
which encompass concepts of rules and routines in the actors‟ social interactions.  Rules are 
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formalized ways in which things ought to be done while routines demonstrate the patterns of 
thought and action habitually adopted by groups of individuals (Burns & Scapens, 2000).  
The next section sets out the aims and objectives of the study. 
 
1.3.0  Aims and Objectives of the Study 
 
The thesis raises questions as to how to refine and extend institutional theory which has often 
been associated with institutional embeddedness (stability).  Beckert‟s (1999), Burns and 
Scapens‟ (2000), Seo and Creed‟s (2002) and Dorado‟s (2005) theorization is followed which 
claims that institutional theory encompasses a dialectical and processual view of 
organizational change.  The thesis examines how MACS changes are a function of external 
change agents and institutional entrepreneurs (internal change agents within an organization).  
The term „institutional entrepreneur‟ is used to refer to a person internal to an organization 
that may bring about necessary change in organizational practices and includes members such 
as management team, steering committee, CEO, Finance Team and so on.  The term change 
agents normally refers to external change agents who are external to an organization such as 
consultants.  They come from outside, as non-participants of the old culture and carriers of a 
new one and are looked upon as external agents.  The external agents such as consultants try 
to make people within the organization envision alternative modes of thinking.  These 
carriers of new ideas, whose professional task is to translate general ideas into local settings, 
might be understood as “merchants of meaning” (Czarniawska-Joerges, 1990).   
 
The study is a longitudinal study encompassing a period of 1989 to 2006.  As such it is a 
study on corporatized Fiji Posts and Telecommunications Limited (FPTL) (from 1989 to 
1996), and TFL (from 1996 onwards).  The Post Fiji Limited was separated from FPTL in 
1996 and the latter changed its name to Telecom Fiji Limited (TFL) since then. 
 
1.3.1  Research Question 
 
The objectives noted above can be restated in the form of the following research questions: 
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“If institutions are defined by their stability, how is it possible to explain MACS 
change in a developing country context?
1
  If actors’ behaviour is influenced by 
institutionalized MACS rules and routines, how is it possible for actors in a 
developing country organisation to change those MACS rules and routines?” 
 
To address these questions, the following sub-questions are formulated: 
1. How were new MACS practices institutionalised at TFL? 
2. Which people were involved in developing and implementing changes? 
3. Were the changes undertaken for the purpose of external legitimation?  If so, to what 
extent did they affect internal operations and “efficiency”? 
4. How can institutional theory be extended to the level of actors, that is, how can the theory 
explain the actors‟ response to the MACS change process?  
5. Was any resistance to MACS change apparent? 
 
1.4.0  The Choice of the Empirical Site: Telecom Fiji Limited 
 
Telecom Fiji Limited (TFL) was chosen as it was one of the first public sector enterprises in 
Fiji to be fully privatised and listed on the South Pacific Stock Exchange through its parent 
company, Amalgamated Telecom Holdings Limited (ATH).   
 
TFL was chosen for the study as it had MACS changes in place and management agreed to 
participate in the study.  The next section discusses the background information on TFL. 
 
1.4.1  Background Information on TFL 
 
TFL is the sole provider of local and national (trunk) telephone services in Fiji.  The 
company owns the only public switched telephone network in Fiji.  TFL‟s network 
constitutes 55 telephone exchanges throughout Fiji, connecting more than 101,000 customers 
(Telecom Fiji website, www.telecomfiji.com.fj, 2004).   
 
With regards to international telecommunications, the services were in the hands of the 
British-owned Cable and Wireless Limited until 1976 (Commerce Commission, 2005).  The 
                                                          
1
 An institution is a way of thought or action of some prevalence and permanence, which is embedded in the 
habits or customs of people (Hamilton, 1932). 
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government acquired 51 percent of shares in this company which is managed by 
Amalgamated Telecom Holdings Limited (ATH). 
 
In 2002, the government floated its stock in ATH to the general public at an IPO of $1.06 per 
share.  The general public owns almost 7.2% of shares in the ATH, while the government 
holds 34.6% shares.  The Fiji National Provident Fund has increased its shareholding to 
58.2%.
2
  ATH was formally listed on the South Pacific Stock Exchange in Fiji on 18 April, 
2002 (Telecom Fiji website, 2004).  Amalgamated Telecom Holdings fully owns TFL.  TFL 
describes its vision statement as “Telecom Fiji, bringing the best of telecommunications to 
the Pacific” (TFL website, 2004).  The mission statement of the company is to: 
 
 “- provide telecommunication products and services that our customers  
      value; 
- strive for excellence in everything we do; 
- develop a capable workforce by rewarding superior performance and 
- grow shareholder value” (ATH annual report, 2005). 
 
In April 2002, Internet Services Fiji Ltd (operating as Connect) was set up to take over 
internet service provision at the retail level from TFL.  TransTel Limited was formed on 
April 2003 to market and sell prepaid calling and internet cards and manage all public booths 
on behalf of TFL. 
 
Vodafone Fiji Limited (Vodafone) was incorporated in 1993 in the form of a joint venture 
between Vodafone Europe BV Holdings (49%) and TFL.  The latter has assigned part of its 
domestic licence which deals with mobile communication to its subsidiary in which it has 
51% shareholding.  Xceed Pasifica was formed in April 2003, taking over from TFL all 
customer premises equipment and related activities such as cabling.  Fiji Directories Limited 
was set up as a joint venture between FPTL (90%), and Edward O‟Brien Ltd (10%) in 1993 
moved to ATH in December 2002 (Telecom Fiji website, 2004).  Appendix 1 provides the 
corporate ownership structure of ATH. 
 
                                                          
2
 The Fiji National Provident Fund is a superannuation scheme for workers in Fiji.  Both the employer and the 
employee each contribute 8% of gross wages to the Fiji National Provident Fund. 
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TFL had a total of 849 staff as at the end of 2007, including salaried, contract and 
unestablished (casual) employees.  Its annual turnover was approximately F$130 million 
(NZ$104 million) with a net profit after tax of F$24 million (NZ$19.2 million) (ATH annual 
report, 2007). 
 
1.5.0 The Structure of the Study 
 
The thesis is presented in ten chapters as follows: 
Chapter One:  An Overview of the Thesis 
Chapter one introduces the study by providing the nature and background of the research.  It 
also elaborates upon the research objectives and the importance of the study.  This chapter 
discusses the contribution of the thesis to the developing country and institutional theory 
literature. 
 
Chapter Two: Literature Review 
Chapter two provides a review of the literature on accounting and control changes, including 
that from developing countries.  The chapter categorises the literature into four themes, 
including works dealing with emerging economy literature on accounting and control, 
management accounting change at organizational level and at organizational field level, Total 
Quality Management, and resistance to accounting change.
3
  The chapter aims to clarify the 
rationale for the thesis by indicating its location in management accounting and control 
system change literature in both developed and developing countries. 
 
Chapter Three:  Methodology, Theory and Methods 
Chapter three outlines the methodology, theory and method of research.  The chapter argues 
that methodological choices are inevitable in any research endeavour and it is important for 
researchers to clarify up-front their methodological orientation.  The chapter argues for the 
relevance of institutional perspectives to help in providing a holistic understanding of the 
organizational and control changes at TFL.  It outlines the exploratory case study method that 
forms the principal tool for empirical evidence interpretation and theorization in this project.  
                                                          
3
 Organisational field level includes constituents such as the government, sources of funding, professional and 
trade associations, special interest groups and the general public.  Scott (1991) conceives organisational field as 
any constituent which imposes a coercive, normative or mimetic influence on the organisation.  Organisational 
level refers to the study of actors‟ actions within an organisation. 
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The chapter also discusses the specific evidence collection procedures which were employed 
to accomplish an empirical understanding of TFL‟s accounting and control changes; these 
include interviews and document analysis. 
 
Chapter Four:  Background to the Cultural, Political and Economic Systems of Fiji. 
Chapter four discusses the overview of the wider structures and their historical significance 
within which TFL is embedded.  It notes that Fiji has been facing political crisis since the 
military coups of 1987.  The chapter also examines Fiji‟s cultural context in accordance to 
Hofstede‟s (1980) four distinct dimensions, and reports that Fijian culture exhibits some 
features suggestive of large power distance, collectivism, femininity and strong uncertainty 
avoidance.  The rigid codes of beliefs and behaviour are maintained although members are 
intolerant towards deviant persons and ideas.  Ethnic Fijian individuals can expect their 
relatives, clan or other social groups to look after them in exchange for unquestioning loyalty 
within their tightly knit social framework.  Whilst the Indo-Fijians are characterized by a 
loose knit social framework when compared to Fijians, they (Indo-Fijians) are still devoted to 
their ancestral and customary practices to support (either financially or socially) their 
individual family members.  The Indo-Fijians society is characterized by high uncertainty 
avoidance and is embedded with a culture of silence like that of the Fijians.  The aim is to 
examine whether the cultural forces impedes/ promotes change within TFL. 
 
Chapter Five:  Public Sector Reform in Fiji  
Chapter five examines the public sector reform in Fiji.  It was in the 1980s that the Fiji 
government began to dismantle state controls in Fiji vis-a-vis its public sector reform policy.  
The government‟s expectation was that the restructuring of enterprises would improve 
performance.  Reformed entities would add more revenue in the government‟s coffers in the 
form of 31% corporate taxes and dividends which would escalate government revenues.  
Institutional theories suggest that a determinant of organisational structure is the pressure 
exerted on the organization by external constituencies such as the State to conform with a set 
of expectations in order to gain legitimacy and to secure access to vital resources and long 
term survival.  The chapter demonstrates that the Department of Public Enterprises was set up 
in Fiji to monitor activity in public sector enterprises and to influence public enterprises to 
adopt commercial practices.  Some changes to the policy of reforms occurred because of 
change in governments and the associated political instability.  Nevertheless, the current 




Chapter Six: Legislative and Regulative Framework for Fiji Posts and Telecommunications 
Limited (TFL now) 
Chapter six examines the background information on the legislative and regulatory 
framework introduced by the Fijian government to corporatise Fiji Posts and 
Telecommunications Limited (FPTL).  The background outlined in this chapter is essential 
for understanding the empirical evidence outlined in the later chapters.  The chapter attempts 
to use institutional theory to identify the exogenous and endogenous institutional forces 
which influence FPTL‟s operations.  The chapter considers the Posts and 
Telecommunications Decree of 1989, the corporatisation of the Posts and 
Telecommunications Department (P&T) in 1990, the appointment of a new board of directors 
with business expertise in 1991, a review undertaken by consultants in 1992, and the 
formation of the Commerce Commission.  The chapter delineates the social and institutional 
influences within which FPTL is embedded.  For example, the corporatisation of Post and 
Telecommunications Department (P&T) was invoked by the state on the advice of the World 
Bank which was a source of coercive pressure on the government to accelerate public 
enterprise reforms. 
 
Chapter Seven: New Public Sector Environment and Resistance to Change at FPTL 
This chapter explores the changes that FPTL actors made which were stimulated by an 
external “jolt” (Laughlin, 1991) from the Fiji government‟s public sector reform policy.  The 
focus of the chapter is to examine some of the intra-organisational or micro changes that took 
place at FPTL.  The chapter aims to identify changes in institutional routines, using a 
framework based on the notion of institutional contradiction (Seo & Creed, 2002).   
 
These changes have been in line with the new public management initiatives introduced 
elsewhere.  The chapter discusses the chain of events from 1990-1996, which encompasses 
P&T‟s corporatisation and some resistance that was expressed by employees due to cultural 
and political rationalization that affected the pathway to change.  Once the resistance eased, 
separation of Post Fiji from FPTL came about.   
 
Empirical evidence collected suggests that during pre-corporatisation, P&T offered postal 
and telecommunications services as a public service in order to appear legitimate to the state 
and the public.  However, with corporatisation the public service norms were replaced with 
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business norms.  Resistance was expressed during the process of change to commercial 
norms.  Those accepting changes received rewards in the form of bonuses and salary 
increases.  The management and directors became influential while those who resisted 
change eventually became silent.  The evidence of the chapter suggests that the process of 
change was implemented as a response to pressure for a managerialist or corporate culture. 
 
Chapter Eight:  The Role of Accounting in the Corporatisation and Privatisation of TFL 
This chapter focuses on the role of MACS in the corporatization and privatization of TFL.  
Changes in accounting at TFL stemmed from the Fijian government‟s public sector reform 
policy.   
 
The exposure of institutional contradiction with the government‟s cash-based accounting 
paved the way for commercial accounting practices.  As institutional entrepreneurs, the 
Finance Manager and the Finance Strategic Business Unit team were involved in the crafting 
of new commercial business accounting.  Some external change agents such as overseas 
based consultants were also involved in the change process.  Decisions were made based on 
measures of net present value, economic value added, pay back period amongst others. 
 
Changes in the accounting systems were a consequence of institutional contradiction and 
isomorphic response to pressures from the parent company and consultants.  ATH is a source 
of coercive pressure on its subsidiaries, including TFL.  The chapter addresses the role of 
agents in shaping accounting practices and routinising institutional change. 
 
Chapter Nine:   Routinisation of TQM practices at TFL 
This chapter focuses on the introduction of TQM practices at TFL and traces the development 
of TQM over the period of 1994 to 2006, in order to explore the effectiveness of TQM 
practices within TFL.  TQM illustrates MACS change in that incentive pay, for example, can 
have an impact on TQM practices on customer and quality performance (Sim & Killough, 
1998).  Chenhall (2003) notes that TQM practices is associated with MACS including timely 
externally focused information and close interaction between strategy and non-financial 
performance measurement.  TFL employees were granted quarterly bonuses on achievement 
of TQM related targets like customer satisfaction.  The aim of adopting TQM practices was 
to promote change within TFL that would improve performance in terms of both efficiency 
and effectiveness.  However, the effect of TQM practices would depend on the level of 
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perceived acceptance and routinised use by organizational members.  The chapter draws on 
concepts from institutional theory to explicate the institutionalization of TQM practices by 
organizational members within TFL. 
 
Cultural issues played a pivotal role in TQM introduction and the silent cultural patterns and 
large power distance exhibited by Fijian society were used by management to introduce TQM 
practices.  There was subtle resistance to the TQM innovation.   
 
TQM routines were enacted and reproduced by organisational members.  The encoding, 
enactment, reproduction and institutionalization process of TQM practices by TFL members 
describes TQM routinisation at TFL based on institutional conformity.  The encoding, 
enactment, reproduction, and institutionalization framework describes the process through 
which TQM routines enter TFL, organizational members use TQM routines, and the 
managers describe the organisational use of TQM routines.  TQM routines have been 
conceptualized as institutional change.  DiMaggio and Powell (1991), Tolbert and Zucker 
(1996), Johnson, Smith and Codling (2000) and Burns and Scapens (2000) underscore the 
claim that scholars have paid little attention to the micro processes of institutionalization.  
TQM routinisation in this chapter contributes to ways of addressing the omission. 
 
Chapter Ten: Discussion/Conclusion 
This chapter discusses the empirical evidence collected in relation to institutional theory and 
the contribution the thesis makes to the literature.  It identifies the limitations of the study and 
the institutional theory and identifies future research possibilities.  The chapter eventually 
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This thesis aims to contribute to research in management accounting and control systems 
(MACS) in a developing country context: that of Fiji.  It seeks to gain a theoretical 
understanding of how MACS reflect the social and political contexts in which they 
operate by using a case study of Telecom Fiji Limited (a major supplier of telephone 
communications in Fiji).  The definition of “MACS” for the purpose of the thesis is 
broad- a social constructivist perspective is adopted in which systems are used to align 
employee behaviour with organisational objectives and to assist external relationships 
(with the State, Commerce Commission, aid agencies and customers).  The thesis draws 
on institutional theory while raising questions as to how to refine and extend institutional 
theory.  This theory has often been associated with institutional embeddedness (stability).  
The social constructivist approach helps to incorporate agency and cultural issues 
normally missing in conventional applications of institutional theory to accounting 
change.   
 
Telecom Fiji Limited (TFL) was restructured under the Fiji government‟s public sector 
reforms.  Such reforms were insisted upon by the international financial agencies of the 
World Bank, the Asian Development Bank and the International Monetary Fund.  Under 
the reform policy, TFL was transformed from a government department into a 
corporatised organisation and was subsequently privatised.  The MACS changes which 
eventuated helped to change TFL management and employees‟ interpretive schemes. 
However, employees resisted initial changes to commercial business routines and it took 
some years for TFL actors to assimilate commercial practices.  While the literature 
dealing with MACS changes has mostly portrayed changes as occurring with little 
resistance, MACS changes at TFL took several years to become institutionalised, partly 
because of cultural and political factors specific to Fiji. 
 
The study has practice implications as it shows that management accountants can act as 
institutional entrepreneurs in organisations, shaping new accounting technologies in 
reformed entities, and changing actors‟ interpretive schemes.  The study has implications 
for policy makers, consultants and other stakeholders in terms of promoting a need for 
better understanding of the sensitivity to cultural and political circumstances in Less 
Developed Countries (LDC‟s) like Fiji in relation to the introduction of MACS changes.  
The study has implications for other recently corporatized/ privatised and state-sector 
organisations in Fiji and elsewhere.  It also has implications for other researchers as 
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Accounting practice is seen as being an integral part of organizational culture and 
the wider social and institutional context in which it functions (Hopwood, 1983, 
1999; Alam, 1997; Hoque & Hopper, 1997; Hoque & Alam, 1999; Euske & 
Riccaboni, 1999; Brignall & Modell, 2000; Perera, McKinnon & Harrison, 2003; 
Hussain & Hoque, 2002).  The accounting literature has recognized the 
importance of culture and politics.  For example, Alawattage, Hopper and 
Wickramasinghe (2007) and Wickramasinghe and Hopper (2005) point out that 
accounting researchers, particularly in less developed countries, need to address 
the issues of culture and politics and how accounting is intertwined within these 
influences. 
 
This thesis seeks to gain a theoretical understanding of how management 
accounting and control systems (MACS) are a part of the social and political 
context in which they operate by using a case study in Telecom Fiji Limited (a 
major supplier of telephone communications in Fiji).  The thesis draws on 
institutional theory.  It raises questions as to how to refine and extend institutional 
theory since this theory has often been associated with institutional embeddedness 
(stability) rather than change.  A social constructivist approach is followed which 
helps to incorporate agency and cultural issues normally missing in conventional 
application of institutional theory to accounting changes.   
 
The definition of “MACS” for the purpose of this thesis is broad- a system used to 
align employee behavior with organizational objectives and to assist external 
relationships (with the State, Commerce Commission, aid agencies and 
customers).  The cultural and political forces are relevant to accounting in a 
developing country context in a Fijian Telecom company which was initially a 
government department and was subsequently corporatised and privatized.  The 
thesis focuses on analysing the management accounting and control system 
changes at Telecom Fiji Limited (TFL) and examines how TFL was restructured 
under Fiji government‟s public sector reform policy insisted upon by the 
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international financial agencies of the World Bank, the Asian Development Bank 
and the International Monetary Fund.  Initial change to commercial MACS 
routines was resisted and it took some years for TFL actors to assimilate 
commercial MACS routines when the organization was corporatised.  The 
literature dealing with MACS changes has mostly portrayed changes as occurring 
without much resistance (Abernethy & Chua, 1996; Busco, Riccaboni & Scapens, 
2006).  However, MACS changes at TFL took several years to be 
institutionalized, partly because of cultural and political factors specific to Fiji.   
 
The development in the public sector in Fiji led the researcher to study accounting 
as part of social and organizational change in a telecommunication company in 
Fiji, Telecom Fiji Limited (TFL).  MACS is considered to be part and parcel of 
changes affecting public sector enterprises.  MACS provides a useful means of 
recording, communicating and interpreting daily activities. 
 
Accountants were proactive at TFL and were instrumental in designing new 
accounting and control tools for management such as budgeting, net present value 
analysis and economic value added analysis for projects.  Such techniques were 
absent when TFL was a government department.  Expenditure for projects was 
then based on the needs of the public rather than accounting techniques to justify 
the maximization of wealth for shareholders.   
 
The thesis also focuses on analysing the changes surrounding the introduction of a 
management control technique: Total Quality Management (TQM) within TFL.  
TQM is related to MACS in that incentive pay, for example, can have an impact 
on TQM practices on customer and quality performance (Sim & Killough, 1998; 
Chenhall, 2003).  Chenhall (2003) notes that TQM practice is associated with 
MACS including timely externally focused information and close interaction 
between strategy and non-financial performance measurement.  The literature on 
TQM practices tends to be outcome oriented and only a few studies employ a 
processual approach to TQM practice implementation.   
 
Accounting researchers have been inspired to investigate accounting in action by 
utilizing interpretive and critical perspectives grounded in the works of social 
theorists such as Habermas and Giddens (Laughlin, 1988; Lawrence, 1990, 1999).  
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Such studies have, however, mainly focused on the western industrialized 
societies as their empirical focus with the exception of some case studies in 
developing countries (e.g., Hoque & Hopper, 1994; Rahaman & Lawrence, 2001; 
Sharma & Lawrence, 2005; Alawattage et al., 2007; Mimba, Helden & Tillema, 
2007; Awio, Lawrence & Northcott, 2007; Kattan, Pike & Tayles, 2007; Kholeif, 
Abdel-Kader & Sherer, 2007; Tambulasi, 2007).   
 
By employing a social constructionist approach based on an interpretive 
methodology in a developing country context, this study enhances the 
understanding of accounting in a developing country context.  In interpretive 
methodology, the author is part of the reality he or she records.  The researcher 
interacts with the researched and attempts to capture their understanding of 
reality.  It is on such understandings that interpretations of individual actions are 
based.   
 
Burns and Scapens (2000), Burns (2000), Soin et al. (2002) and Scapens (2006) 
have posited that scholars have paid little attention in accounting to the micro 
processes of institutionalization.  A focus on organizational actors is essential to 
understand the contradictions that trigger the creation of new practices (Seo & 
Creed, 2002; Lounsbury, 2008).  The current study attempts to identify 
institutional contradictions that trigger MACS changes within a privatized TFL.  
The next section briefly discusses the institutional theory utilized for the study. 
 
1.2.0  Institutional Theory 
 
Institutional theory, according to Lounsbury (2008), is one of the most dominant 
perspectives in organizational analysis.  The use of institutional theory applied to 
MACS has been popularized by Scapens (1994), Burns and Scapens (2000), Soin 
et al., (2002) and Scapens (2006).  In this perspective, accounting is not simply a 
technical device applied neutrally to assist management with decision making but 
is the product of a particular organizational culture which, in turn, is embedded in 
and influenced by a broader set of institutional arrangements. 
 
Management control practices are often institutionalized to gain legitimacy from 
external constituents such as government (Kloot & Martin, 2000; Modell, 2001; 
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Collier, 2001; Carpenter & Feroz, 2001).  Studies of the institutionalization of 
organizational practices tend to explain isomorphism, that is, similarity in 
accounting rules and routines which become accepted unquestioningly by 
organizational participants.  However, the emphasis of this thesis is on a study of 
organizational actors and the micro processes of institutionalization which 
encompass concepts of rules and routines in the actors‟ social interactions.  Rules 
are formalized ways in which things ought to be done while routines demonstrate 
the patterns of thought and action habitually adopted by groups of individuals 
(Burns & Scapens, 2000).  The next section sets out the aims and objectives of the 
study. 
 
1.3.0  Aims and Objectives of the Study 
 
The thesis raises questions as to how to refine and extend institutional theory 
which has often been associated with institutional embeddedness (stability).  
Beckert‟s (1999), Burns and Scapens‟ (2000), Seo and Creed‟s (2002) and 
Dorado‟s (2005) theorization is followed which claims that institutional theory 
encompasses a dialectical and processual view of organizational change.  The 
thesis examines how MACS changes are a function of external change agents and 
institutional entrepreneurs (internal change agents within an organization).  The 
term „institutional entrepreneur‟ is used to refer to a person internal to an 
organization that may bring about necessary change in organizational practices 
and includes members such as management team, steering committee, CEO, 
Finance Team and so on.  The term change agents normally refers to external 
change agents who are external to an organization such as consultants.  They 
come from outside, as non-participants of the old culture and carriers of a new one 
and are looked upon as external agents.  The external agents such as consultants 
try to make people within the organization envision alternative modes of thinking.  
These carriers of new ideas, whose professional task is to translate general ideas 
into local settings, might be understood as “merchants of meaning” (Czarniawska-
Joerges, 1990).   
 
The study is a longitudinal study encompassing a period of 1989 to 2006.  As such 
it is a study on corporatized Fiji Posts and Telecommunications Limited (FPTL) 
(from 1989 to 1996), and TFL (from 1996 onwards).  The Post Fiji Limited was 
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separated from FPTL in 1996 and the latter changed its name to Telecom Fiji 
Limited (TFL) since then. 
 
1.3.1  Research Question 
 
The objectives noted above can be restated in the form of the following research 
questions: 
“If institutions are defined by their stability, how is it possible to explain 
MACS change in a developing country context?
1
  If actors’ behaviour is 
influenced by institutionalized MACS rules and routines, how is it possible 
for actors in a developing country organisation to change those MACS 
rules and routines?” 
 
To address these questions, the following sub-questions are formulated: 
1. How were new MACS practices institutionalised at TFL? 
2. Which people were involved in developing and implementing changes? 
3. Were the changes undertaken for the purpose of external legitimation?  If so, to 
what extent did they affect internal operations and “efficiency”? 
4. How can institutional theory be extended to the level of actors, that is, how can 
the theory explain the actors‟ response to the MACS change process?  
5. Was any resistance to MACS change apparent? 
 
1.4.0  The Choice of the Empirical Site: Telecom Fiji Limited 
 
Telecom Fiji Limited (TFL) was chosen as it was one of the first public sector 
enterprises in Fiji to be fully privatised and listed on the South Pacific Stock 
Exchange through its parent company, Amalgamated Telecom Holdings Limited 
(ATH).   
 
TFL was chosen for the study as it had MACS changes in place and management 
agreed to participate in the study.  The next section discusses the background 
information on TFL. 
 
                                                          
1
 An institution is a way of thought or action of some prevalence and permanence, which is 
embedded in the habits or customs of people (Hamilton, 1932). 
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1.4.1  Background Information on TFL 
 
TFL is the sole provider of local and national (trunk) telephone services in Fiji.  
The company owns the only public switched telephone network in Fiji.  TFL‟s 
network constitutes 55 telephone exchanges throughout Fiji, connecting more than 
101,000 customers (Telecom Fiji website, www.telecomfiji.com.fj, 2004).   
 
With regards to international telecommunications, the services were in the hands 
of the British-owned Cable and Wireless Limited until 1976 (Commerce 
Commission, 2005).  The government acquired 51 percent of shares in this 
company which is managed by Amalgamated Telecom Holdings Limited (ATH). 
 
In 2002, the government floated its stock in ATH to the general public at an IPO 
of $1.06 per share.  The general public owns almost 7.2% of shares in the ATH, 
while the government holds 34.6% shares.  The Fiji National Provident Fund has 
increased its shareholding to 58.2%.
2
  ATH was formally listed on the South 
Pacific Stock Exchange in Fiji on 18 April, 2002 (Telecom Fiji website, 2004).  
Amalgamated Telecom Holdings fully owns TFL.  TFL describes its vision 
statement as “Telecom Fiji, bringing the best of telecommunications to the 
Pacific” (TFL website, 2004).  The mission statement of the company is to: 
 
 “- provide telecommunication products and services that our customers  
      value; 
- strive for excellence in everything we do; 
- develop a capable workforce by rewarding superior performance and 
- grow shareholder value” (ATH annual report, 2005). 
 
In April 2002, Internet Services Fiji Ltd (operating as Connect) was set up to take 
over internet service provision at the retail level from TFL.  TransTel Limited was 
formed on April 2003 to market and sell prepaid calling and internet cards and 
manage all public booths on behalf of TFL. 
 
                                                          
2
 The Fiji National Provident Fund is a superannuation scheme for workers in Fiji.  Both the 




Vodafone Fiji Limited (Vodafone) was incorporated in 1993 in the form of a joint 
venture between Vodafone Europe BV Holdings (49%) and TFL.  The latter has 
assigned part of its domestic licence which deals with mobile communication to 
its subsidiary in which it has 51% shareholding.  Xceed Pasifica was formed in 
April 2003, taking over from TFL all customer premises equipment and related 
activities such as cabling.  Fiji Directories Limited was set up as a joint venture 
between FPTL (90%), and Edward O‟Brien Ltd (10%) in 1993 moved to ATH in 
December 2002 (Telecom Fiji website, 2004).  Appendix 1 provides the corporate 
ownership structure of ATH. 
 
TFL had a total of 849 staff as at the end of 2007, including salaried, contract and 
unestablished (casual) employees.  Its annual turnover was approximately F$130 
million (NZ$104 million) with a net profit after tax of F$24 million (NZ$19.2 
million) (ATH annual report, 2007). 
 
1.5.0 The Structure of the Study 
 
The thesis is presented in ten chapters as follows: 
Chapter One:  An Overview of the Thesis 
Chapter one introduces the study by providing the nature and background of the 
research.  It also elaborates upon the research objectives and the importance of the 
study.  This chapter discusses the contribution of the thesis to the developing 
country and institutional theory literature. 
 
Chapter Two: Literature Review 
Chapter two provides a review of the literature on accounting and control 
changes, including that from developing countries.  The chapter categorises the 
literature into four themes, including works dealing with emerging economy 
literature on accounting and control, management accounting change at 
organizational level and at organizational field level, Total Quality Management, 
and resistance to accounting change.
3
  The chapter aims to clarify the rationale for 
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 Organisational field level includes constituents such as the government, sources of funding, 
professional and trade associations, special interest groups and the general public.  Scott (1991) 
conceives organisational field as any constituent which imposes a coercive, normative or mimetic 




the thesis by indicating its location in management accounting and control system 
change literature in both developed and developing countries. 
 
Chapter Three:  Methodology, Theory and Methods 
Chapter three outlines the methodology, theory and method of research.  The 
chapter argues that methodological choices are inevitable in any research 
endeavour and it is important for researchers to clarify up-front their 
methodological orientation.  The chapter argues for the relevance of institutional 
perspectives to help in providing a holistic understanding of the organizational 
and control changes at TFL.  It outlines the exploratory case study method that 
forms the principal tool for empirical evidence interpretation and theorization in 
this project.  The chapter also discusses the specific evidence collection 
procedures which were employed to accomplish an empirical understanding of 
TFL‟s accounting and control changes; these include interviews and document 
analysis. 
 
Chapter Four:  Background to the Cultural, Political and Economic Systems of 
Fiji. 
Chapter four discusses the overview of the wider structures and their historical 
significance within which TFL is embedded.  It notes that Fiji has been facing 
political crisis since the military coups of 1987.  The chapter also examines Fiji‟s 
cultural context in accordance to Hofstede‟s (1980) four distinct dimensions, and 
reports that Fijian culture exhibits some features suggestive of large power 
distance, collectivism, femininity and strong uncertainty avoidance.  The rigid 
codes of beliefs and behaviour are maintained although members are intolerant 
towards deviant persons and ideas.  Ethnic Fijian individuals can expect their 
relatives, clan or other social groups to look after them in exchange for 
unquestioning loyalty within their tightly knit social framework.  Whilst the Indo-
Fijians are characterized by a loose knit social framework when compared to 
Fijians, they (Indo-Fijians) are still devoted to their ancestral and customary 
practices to support (either financially or socially) their individual family 
members.  The Indo-Fijians society is characterized by high uncertainty avoidance 
and is embedded with a culture of silence like that of the Fijians.  The aim is to 




Chapter Five:  Public Sector Reform in Fiji  
Chapter five examines the public sector reform in Fiji.  It was in the 1980s that the 
Fiji government began to dismantle state controls in Fiji vis-a-vis its public sector 
reform policy.  The government‟s expectation was that the restructuring of 
enterprises would improve performance.  Reformed entities would add more 
revenue in the government‟s coffers in the form of 31% corporate taxes and 
dividends which would escalate government revenues.  Institutional theories 
suggest that a determinant of organisational structure is the pressure exerted on 
the organization by external constituencies such as the State to conform with a set 
of expectations in order to gain legitimacy and to secure access to vital resources 
and long term survival.  The chapter demonstrates that the Department of Public 
Enterprises was set up in Fiji to monitor activity in public sector enterprises and to 
influence public enterprises to adopt commercial practices.  Some changes to the 
policy of reforms occurred because of change in governments and the associated 
political instability.  Nevertheless, the current interim government remains 
committed to the reforms. 
 
Chapter Six: Legislative and Regulative Framework for Fiji Posts and 
Telecommunications Limited (TFL now) 
Chapter six examines the background information on the legislative and 
regulatory framework introduced by the Fijian government to corporatise Fiji 
Posts and Telecommunications Limited (FPTL).  The background outlined in this 
chapter is essential for understanding the empirical evidence outlined in the later 
chapters.  The chapter attempts to use institutional theory to identify the 
exogenous and endogenous institutional forces which influence FPTL‟s 
operations.  The chapter considers the Posts and Telecommunications Decree of 
1989, the corporatisation of the Posts and Telecommunications Department (P&T) 
in 1990, the appointment of a new board of directors with business expertise in 
1991, a review undertaken by consultants in 1992, and the formation of the 
Commerce Commission.  The chapter delineates the social and institutional 
influences within which FPTL is embedded.  For example, the corporatisation of 
Post and Telecommunications Department (P&T) was invoked by the state on the 
advice of the World Bank which was a source of coercive pressure on the 




Chapter Seven: New Public Sector Environment and Resistance to Change at 
FPTL 
This chapter explores the changes that FPTL actors made which were stimulated 
by an external “jolt” (Laughlin, 1991) from the Fiji government‟s public sector 
reform policy.  The focus of the chapter is to examine some of the intra-
organisational or micro changes that took place at FPTL.  The chapter aims to 
identify changes in institutional routines, using a framework based on the notion 
of institutional contradiction (Seo & Creed, 2002).   
 
These changes have been in line with the new public management initiatives 
introduced elsewhere.  The chapter discusses the chain of events from 1990-1996, 
which encompasses P&T‟s corporatisation and some resistance that was 
expressed by employees due to cultural and political rationalization that affected 
the pathway to change.  Once the resistance eased, separation of Post Fiji from 
FPTL came about.   
 
Empirical evidence collected suggests that during pre-corporatisation, P&T 
offered postal and telecommunications services as a public service in order to 
appear legitimate to the state and the public.  However, with corporatisation the 
public service norms were replaced with business norms.  Resistance was 
expressed during the process of change to commercial norms.  Those accepting 
changes received rewards in the form of bonuses and salary increases.  The 
management and directors became influential while those who resisted change 
eventually became silent.  The evidence of the chapter suggests that the process of 
change was implemented as a response to pressure for a managerialist or 
corporate culture. 
 
Chapter Eight:  The Role of Accounting in the Corporatisation and Privatisation 
of TFL 
This chapter focuses on the role of MACS in the corporatization and privatization 
of TFL.  Changes in accounting at TFL stemmed from the Fijian government‟s 
public sector reform policy.   
 
The exposure of institutional contradiction with the government‟s cash-based 
accounting paved the way for commercial accounting practices.  As institutional 
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entrepreneurs, the Finance Manager and the Finance Strategic Business Unit team 
were involved in the crafting of new commercial business accounting.  Some 
external change agents such as overseas based consultants were also involved in 
the change process.  Decisions were made based on measures of net present value, 
economic value added, pay back period amongst others. 
 
Changes in the accounting systems were a consequence of institutional 
contradiction and isomorphic response to pressures from the parent company and 
consultants.  ATH is a source of coercive pressure on its subsidiaries, including 
TFL.  The chapter addresses the role of agents in shaping accounting practices and 
routinising institutional change. 
 
Chapter Nine:   Routinisation of TQM practices at TFL 
This chapter focuses on the introduction of TQM practices at TFL and traces the 
development of TQM over the period of 1994 to 2006, in order to explore the 
effectiveness of TQM practices within TFL.  TQM illustrates MACS change in 
that incentive pay, for example, can have an impact on TQM practices on 
customer and quality performance (Sim & Killough, 1998).  Chenhall (2003) 
notes that TQM practices is associated with MACS including timely externally 
focused information and close interaction between strategy and non-financial 
performance measurement.  TFL employees were granted quarterly bonuses on 
achievement of TQM related targets like customer satisfaction.  The aim of 
adopting TQM practices was to promote change within TFL that would improve 
performance in terms of both efficiency and effectiveness.  However, the effect of 
TQM practices would depend on the level of perceived acceptance and routinised 
use by organizational members.  The chapter draws on concepts from institutional 
theory to explicate the institutionalization of TQM practices by organizational 
members within TFL. 
 
Cultural issues played a pivotal role in TQM introduction and the silent cultural 
patterns and large power distance exhibited by Fijian society were used by 
management to introduce TQM practices.  There was subtle resistance to the 




TQM routines were enacted and reproduced by organisational members.  The 
encoding, enactment, reproduction and institutionalization process of TQM 
practices by TFL members describes TQM routinisation at TFL based on 
institutional conformity.  The encoding, enactment, reproduction, and 
institutionalization framework describes the process through which TQM routines 
enter TFL, organizational members use TQM routines, and the managers describe 
the organisational use of TQM routines.  TQM routines have been conceptualized 
as institutional change.  DiMaggio and Powell (1991), Tolbert and Zucker (1996), 
Johnson, Smith and Codling (2000) and Burns and Scapens (2000) underscore the 
claim that scholars have paid little attention to the micro processes of 
institutionalization.  TQM routinisation in this chapter contributes to ways of 
addressing the omission. 
 
Chapter Ten: Discussion/Conclusion 
This chapter discusses the empirical evidence collected in relation to institutional 
theory and the contribution the thesis makes to the literature.  It identifies the 
limitations of the study and the institutional theory and identifies future research 
possibilities.  The chapter eventually ends the thesis by providing a summary of 
















Chapter 2:   Literature Review: Management Accounting 
and Control System Changes  
 
2.1.0   Introduction 
 
This chapter provides a discussion of the relevant literature in order to situate the 
thesis.  It aims to provide a descriptive account of literature on MACS.  The 
intention here is to point out the views of various researchers in the field and to 
point out omissions in terms of themes, methodologies and methods.  The chapter 
categorises the literature into four themes: emerging economy literature on 
MACS; MACS change at the organisational level and at the organisational field 
level
4
; Total Quality Management which was introduced at TFL; and resistance to 
accounting change. The chapter clarifies the rationale for the thesis by indicating 
its location in management accounting and control system change literature on 
both developed and developing countries.  The next section discusses the MACS 
literature in less developed countries. 
 
2.2.0  Theme One: Literature on  Management Accounting and 
Control Systems in Less Developed Countries 
 
As this research stems from an interest in management accounting and control 
system changes in developing countries, this section reviews such literature on 
this topic.  According to Perera (1989), accounting in developing countries has 
been inherited from the developed countries, rather than unfolding within their 
local circumstances.  As a result, accounting reports of developing countries tend 
to replicate those of industrially advanced countries (Samuels, 1990). 
 
The financial reporting systems of developing countries are often based on models 
of international accounting standards which are compatible with circumstances 
where there is a well organised and efficient capital market.  Such circumstances 
are seemingly absent from developing countries (see Abdul-Rahaman, Gallhofer, 
                                                          
4
 Organisational field level includes constituents such as the government, sources of funding, 
professional and trade associations, special interest groups and the general public.  Scott (1991) 
conceives organisational field as any constituent which imposes a coercive, normative or mimetic 
influence on the organisation.  Organisational level refers to the study of actors‟ actions within an 
organisation.   
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Haslam & Lawrence, 1997).  Samuels (1990) notes that there are imperfections in 
the market place in developing countries as the prices of products seem not to 
reflect the relative scarcity of factors of production.  The private sector is 
responsible for only a small proportion of investment decisions, whilst the public 
sector is inefficient (Samuels, 1990).  While some developing countries have 
stock exchanges, they are inefficient, only influence a small sector of the 
economy, and have not been shown to be an adequate means of allocating 
resources (Samuels, 1990).  Although Samuel‟s (1990) and Perera‟s (1989) 
literature are dated, they are still valid as developing country‟s capital market is 
developing and the accounting practices has evolved from developed countries 
rather than unfolding in their own circumstances. 
 
For the purpose of this thesis, “developing countries” mean countries that do not 
belong to the Western World centred on the U.S.A. or the Eastern World with 
former USSR, currently Russian Federation as its centre.  These developing 
countries are referred to as the Third World or Emerging Economies.  Developing 
countries or emerging economies are mostly found in Africa, Asia, Latin America, 
the Middle East and Oceania (see Wallace, 1990).  According to Ali (1998) most 
of the developing countries gained independence from the late 1950s when 
decolonisation became a global phenomenon.  A common feature of this group is 
they are ridden with poverty, whilst there are wider disparities in level and rate of 
development.  Compared to the developed countries, Samuels (1990) elaborates 
on the problems developing countries face such as those of poverty, unequal 
wealth distribution, regional imbalance, insufficient domestic savings, large 
foreign debts and low level of technology.  Alawattage, Hopper and 
Wickramasinghe (2007) point out that accounting research in less developed 
countries needs to address issues of poverty reduction, corruption, culture and 
politics in a wider spectrum of organisations. 
 
In terms of management accounting information, several scholars have carried out 
case studies on management accounting and control in emerging economies so as 
to understand the mechanisms of how MACS operates effectively.  These scholars 
include Hoque and Hopper (1994, 1997), Alam (1997), Uddin and Hopper (2001), 
Rahaman and Lawrence (2001), Tambulasi (2007) and Awio, Lawrence and 




Rahaman and Lawrence (2001) examine the claimed deficiency of public sector 
accounting and financial management in developing countries through a case 
study of the Volta River Authority (VRA) in Ghana.
5
  The authors suggest that 
one needs to endeavour to utilise “critical” and “interpretive” frameworks to assist 
in comprehending this (deficient) area of research.  Their research found that 
while the accounting systems at the VRA are adequate and very well operated, 
they tend to disguise “deficiencies” which become visible through an appreciation 
of the socio-political context in which VRA operates.  While the technical-rational 
perspective shows that the accounting system at VRA is sound, deficiency claims 
still hold once the system is examined from other perspectives such as socio-
historical and socio-economic development dimension.  The VRA‟s objective was 
to improve the socio-economic development of Ghana and its people, but locals 
had complaints about escalating electricity prices.  VRA had to operate as a 
commercialized organisation with different ends than serving the poor citizens of 
Ghana.   
 
Hoque and Hopper (1994) consider the case of the operations of the management 
control system in a large nationalised jute mill in Bangladesh.  The mill had 
continually faced an uncertain environment with respect to markets, resource 
constraints, operations, politics, state interference and demands from aid agencies.  
Labour unrest and violent demonstrations, inter-group rivalry and conflicts were 
common in the mill studied.  Also, the World Bank, which provided the major 
source of funds for the mills, dominated the form of control over and within mills.  
The study revealed that the external aid agencies and the state were major 
influences on management control systems.   
 
Alam (1997) explored how the budgetary process was used to manage technical 
and institutional environments.  The research was conducted in two 
commercially-oriented state-owned enterprises in Bangladesh, where the overall 
socio-economic situation was characterised by resource scarcity, uncertainty and 
political instability.  Organizations operating in such a condition of uncertainty 
                                                          
5
 Deficiency claim refers to the inadequacy of accounting and financial management in public 
sector organizations in developing countries.  This is partially attributed to problems such as 
recruitment and retention of qualified accountants in these countries as well as disparities of salary 
between the private and public sectors. 
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may be expected to operate differently and possibly to different ends than those 
prevailing in Western countries (Alam, 1997).  Like Alam‟s (1997) study, this 
study intends to explain how culturally-specific influences in a developing 
country are different from those that prevail in Western countries. 
 
In a similar vein, Uddin and Hopper (2001) report on a case study of a soap 
manufacturing company in Bangladesh that was nationalised upon Bangladesh‟s 
independence in 1971 and later privatised in 1993.  New owners through 
privatization destroyed the internal labour market and, following redundancies, 
the workers were hired through internal subcontracting.  This specific change, 
hiring workers through internal subcontracting, was an impetus to divide workers 
and rendered workers powerless to resist.  Like Fiji, subsequent coups, changes of 
military governments, and the restoration of democracy reflect the turbulence of 
Bangladesh politics.  Pressure for privatization came from external sources, 
especially the World Bank‟s recommendation for economic liberalisation 
programmes.  After privatisation, workers were terrified of losing their jobs for 
participating in trade union activities and placed little trust in trade unions.  Uddin 
and Hopper (2001) elaborate that high unemployment, weak trade unionism and 
the State‟s dependence upon external capital can render workers powerless and 
unprotected.   
 
Uddin and Hopper (2001) conclude that trans-national institutions such as the 
International Monetary Fund (IMF) and World Bank promote global capitalism by 
forcing developing countries into market-based policies.  This has devastating 
consequences on the poor and underprivileged in the society, despite the trans-
national institutions‟ rosy predictions.  Many studies follow a narrow perspective, 
that is, an economistic view of accounting information, as a vital functional 
ingredient for “rational” organisational decision-making (Solomons, 1991).  
While Uddin and Hopper‟s work emphasised a political economy view of 
accounting, this thesis utilises institutional theory to view accounting control 
innovations within a Fijian Telecommunication company. 
 
Zahra, Ireland, Guitierrez and Hitt (2000) report that over $700 billion in assets 
have been privatized in the world‟s economies in the last decade of which 
approximately 40 percent has occurred in emerging economies.  Often 
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privatization in emerging economies has taken place as a response to demands 
from trans-national institutions such as the World Bank and IMF.  Governments 
of emerging economies normally seek loans from these organizations to support 
economic development.  As a precondition to loans, the trans-national institutions 
require the emerging economies to introduce substantial economic liberalisation 
policies (Hoque & Hopper, 1994; Zahra et al., 2000; Uddin & Hopper, 2001).  
Privatisation and associated accounting practices reflect the recent vogue of public 
sector reforms in developing and underdeveloped economies.   
 
Tambulai (2007) examines the introduction of accounting methods associated 
with new public management in Malawi‟s local government.  Tambulasi‟s (2007) 
study disputes the effectiveness of public sector accounting currently imposed by 
aid agencies like the World Bank that emphasises private sector methods and 
strengthening the role of managers.  In Malawi, the reforms increased managerial 
autonomy at the expense of political control.  The government policies sought 
devolution of control to local communities.  Tambulasi (2007) points out that 
managers did not behave bureaucratically as predicated but responded to 
politicians‟ sabotage of systems and corruption by either colluding with 
corruption or seeking control intervention.  Rather than efficiency, dysfunctional 
rivalries ensued.  Awio, Lawrence and Northcott (2007) examine new public 
management after studying Uganda‟s HIV/AIDS initiative and argue that 
community led responses may improve public sector accountability in LDC‟s 
better than NPM methods. 
 
In brief, this section reviewed less developed country literature as the research 
stems from an interest in MACS changes in such a setting.  Researchers in LDC‟s 
have pointed out that the accounting research needs to address issues of culture 
and politics in a wider spectrum of organisations.  Also in LDC‟s, the external aid 
agencies and state were major influences on management control systems.  LDC 
literature underscored that culture-specific influences in developing countries are 
different from those that persist in western countries.  This thesis raises issues in 
the literature reviewed on LDC‟s and aims to extend the literature on cultural and 
political context in relation to Fiji‟s situation using a case study of TFL.  The next 





2.2.1  Theme Two: Management Accounting and Control System 
Change at the Organisational Field Level and Organisational 
Level 
 
The thesis is based on management accounting and control system (MACS) 
change in a Fijian context.  The definition of MACS for this study is broad: a 
system used to align employee behaviour with organisational objectives and to 
assist external relationship (with the State, Commerce Commission, aid agencies 
and customers) (see Euske & Riccaboni, 1999; Efferin & Hopper, 2007).  Both 
academic and professional literature have carried commentaries on the changing 
nature of management accounting practice (Bhimani, 1993; Shields, 1997; Vaivio, 
1999a, 1999b; Bjoornenak & Olson, 1999; Burns & Vaivio, 2001; Soin et al., 
2002).  According to Quattrone and Hopper (2001), consultants argue that firms 
need to adopt new accounting acronyms such as ABC/M, EVA and TOC.  Many 
firms have responded by adopting these techniques with varied results.  
Academics, on the other hand, have used various theoretical frameworks to 
explain these accounting changes; for example, Briers and Chua (2001) utilise 
Actor Network theory whilst Burns and Scapens (2000) commend institutional 
theory.  The ensuing section considers the MACS change at the extra-organisation 
level. 
2.2.2  Management Accounting and Control System Change at Extra-
Organisational Level 
 
The literature on MACS changes in new public management considers external 
agencies‟ demand for change and reflects that MACS are often institutionalised to 
gain legitimacy from external constituents such as the government (Alam, 1997; 
Modell, 2001; Collier, 2001).  Various authors (Granlund & Lukka, 1998; Euske 
& Riccaboni, 1999; Granlund, 2001; Covaleski, Dirsmith & Samuel, 2003 and 
Tsamenyi, Cullen & Gonz‟alez, 2006) demonstrate how three isomorphisms, 
normative, mimetic and coercive, interact with organisations and influence 
accounting changes.
6
  Coercive isomorphism occurs in response to political and 
                                                          
6
 The concept of isomorphism used by DiMaggio and Powell (1983; 1991) is similar to 
Abrahamson‟s (1991) concept of fad and fashion where Abrahamson refers to “forced selection 
perspective” as similar to coercive isomorphism while “fashion” is where management consultants 
19 
 
regulative influences, and mimetic isomorphism occurs when organisations seek 
to copy practices of other organisations that are considered to be legitimate.  
Normative isomorphism occurs where societal norms and professional bodies 
influence the practices of organisations, for example, the adoption of GAAP by 
government entities. 
 
Cobb, Helliar and Innes (1995) report on a longitudinal case study of changes in 
management accounting systems in a division of a large multinational bank.  
Pressures such as new competitors, development in information technology, bad 
debts experience and reducing profit margins provided the impetus for changes in 
the management accounting system.  Changes such as a new cost allocation 
method, new cost reports, competitive benchmarking and participative budgeting 
were evident in the organisation that increased the communication between 
managers and management accountants.  The accountants and managers were 
aware that environmental pressures were the rationale for varied changes in the 
organisation.  The study utilised the Innes and Mitchell (1990) model of change .  
Laughlin‟s (1995) middle range approach was also adopted for the study.  
Llewellyn (1993, p. 242), however, has emphasised that the process of accounting 
change as a social accomplishment through human agency remains unexplained in 
the Innes and Mitchell (1990) change theory.   
 
Bhimani (1993) focuses on the manner in which an enterprise‟s accounting 
system is affected by a complexity of independent and disparate external factors 
and how these factors interacted with internal forces to create a sustained dynamic 
of change within the French organisation of Renault.  This French motor car 
manufacturer is studied over the 40 year period prior to the Second World War.  
Bhimani uses an historical enquiry technique to view the accounting changes at 
Renault.  His study explores the political culture in France which had made 
appeals to scientific rationalisation and statistical reasoning as techniques of 
control.   
 
Controlling costs became a prime concern for Renault as it was facing intense 
competition within the French market for automobiles and was also in 
                                                                                                                                                               
induce organizations to adopt the latest technology or administrative technology.  “Fad” is where 
an organisation adopts an innovation as it sees competitors or comparable organizations doing so. 
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competition with Ford for international and European markets.  Renault‟s attitude 
to the application of scientific management prompted labour unrest which was 
widely publicised in 1912 and 1913.  The labour market had somewhat slowed 
down the use of scientific management in French industry.  Bhimani‟s study has 
implications for this thesis as there were some resistance from trade unions to 
MACS changes as well. 
 
Euske and Riccaboni (1999) report on one of the first large state-owned banks in 
Italy to be privatised.  The privatisation altered external interdependencies.  Much 
more attention was given to profitability and the return to shareholders.  Euske 
and Riccaboni (1999) call for more studies that focus on the role of external 
interdependencies influence on the organisation.   
 
Using institutional theory, Collier (2001) presents a longitudinal study of the 
implementation of budgeting systems in a UK police constabulary.  The theory 
illustrates how the police constabulary coped with external pressures for increased 
accountability.  Collier claims that the institutional demands for improved 
effectiveness suggested that institutional theory (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983; 
1991) could provide a valid theoretical framework from which to see how the 
organisation coped with external pressures to change alongside the strong ethos of 
policing towards more crime fighting and law enforcement.  Collier‟s case study 
examines how devolved budgets were introduced into a police force.  Financial 
pressures impacted on the police coupled with cash limited budgets that had been 
imposed on them.  The New Public Management (NPM) (Hood, 1991, 1995; 
Parker & Guthrie, 1993) affected the police after the introduction of the Financial 
Management Initiative in 1982.  The cash budgets and the requirement for each 
police force to prepare a local policing plan supported by performance targets 
were all implemented.  West Mercia is a clear demonstration of shifting power 
over resource allocations, but within the constraints of a cash-limited budget 
imposed by Headquarters on divisions.  Like Collier‟s study, this thesis intends to 
study MACS changes at Telecom Fiji through institutional theory, reflecting on 
the adequacy of its explanatory power. 
 
Modell (2001) illustrates how managers designed and implemented new systems 
for performance measurement within the Norwegian public sector in the face of 
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public sector reforms.  His paper draws from Oliver‟s (1991) conceptual 
framework relating managerial responses to institutional processes.  Oliver‟s 
framework is based on a continuum of responses and is characterised by varying 
degrees of proactive choice.  Modell‟s paper explores how managers make 
proactive choices and decisions in the face of strong institutional pressures rather 
than following a path of passive compliance.   
 
In Modell‟s study, the Norwegian hospital experienced changes emanating from 
the State‟s public sector reform policies.  Continuous financial performance 
evaluation within divisions was undertaken on a monthly basis and focused on 
budgetary deviations.  Alongside this, varied DRG (diagnostic related groups) - 
based indicators have been developed since the 1990s and increasingly utilised for 
evaluating clinical operations.  A divisional structure eventuated in 1995, which 
led to decentralisation of budgetary control vis-a-vis the appointment of divisional 
controllers who worked closely with the operating departments.  Quality 
improvement efforts were also put in place, primarily inspired by private sector 
practices.  Modell concludes that the adoption of DRG-based performance 
measurement could be ascribed to both legitimacy seeking and efficiency 
enhancing rationales which formed part of senior management‟s choices.  Further, 
the approach on quality improvement efforts which reflect some mimicking of 
private sector practices (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983, 1991) was also resisted by 
physicians on the basis that such practices were alien to clinical realities.  Such 
resistance is also relevant to this study. 
 
Covaleski and Dirsmith (1988b) show that the process of institutionalisation 
within a university budget submission process is infused with human agents and 
their interests both within the organisation and the extra-organisational relations.  
The authors conclude that the case university survived by conforming to those 
interests that are hierarchically superior, for example, the State, which was the 
provider of resources.  Despite Covaleski and Dirsmith‟s (1988b) study, little 
attention has been focused on issues of interests and human agents in accounting 
change literature.  While Covaleski and Dirsmith (1988b), Euske and Riccaboni 
(1999), Collier (2001), and Modell (2001) focused at an organisational field level 
and utilised institutional theory, this study intends to expand on institutional 
theory, using institutional contradictions and institutional entrepreneurs (internal 
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change agents) as those that shape change (Beckert, 1999; Seo & Creed, 2002; 
Dorado, 2005) to explicate the empirical evidence at both organisational and 
extra-organisational levels. 
 
New institutional sociology theory (NIS) has been adopted in the accounting 
literature to explicate accounting choices in both the public and private sectors 
and has studied MACS changes at extra-organisational level (e.g., Whitley, 1999; 
Carpenter & Feroz, 2001; Hussain & Hoque, 2002; Modell, 2002; Tsamenyi et al., 
2006; Kholeif et al., 2007; Modell, Jacobs & Wiesel, 2007).  Institutional studies 
have emphasised, amongst other things, identifying and explaining the sources of 
isomorphic pressures on the adoption of accounting and control systems (Alam, 
1997; Granlund & Lukka, 1998; Brignall & Modell, 2000; Carpenter & Feroz, 
2001; Granlund, 2001; Hussain & Hoque, 2002), the interplay between 
institutional and technical environments (Hoque & Hopper, 1994, 1997; Modell, 
2002; Hoque, Arends & Alexander, 2004) and the power of actors to respond to 
institutional pressures (Covaleski & Dirsmith, 1988b; Beckert, 1999; Collier, 
2001; Seo & Creed, 2002; Modell, 2002). 
 
While new institutional sociology theory has made a significant contribution to 
the analysis of accounting practices, it has been criticised as failing to capture 
human agencies and intra-organisational power relations (Abernethy & Chua, 
1996; Seo & Creed, 2002; Dillard, Rigsby & Goodman, 2004).  New institutional 
sociology theory needs to be expanded to capture human agents in the change 
process and this can be done through studying ongoing contradictions that carve 
changes through institutional entrepreneurs and external change agents (Seo & 
Creed, 2002).  The ensuing section discusses the prior literature on organisational 
level changes. 
 
2.2.3   Management Accounting Change at Organisational Level 
 
Studying management accounting at the organisational level is an important issue 
to which this thesis intends to contribute.  Scholars such as Dent (1991), V‟amosi 
(2000), Burns and Scapens (2000), Burns (2000), Soin et al. (2002), Zilber (2002), 
Johansson & Baldvinsdottir (2003), Siti-Nabiha & Scapens (2005), Burns & 
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Baldvinsdottir (2005), Busco et al. (2006), Nor-Aziah & Scapens (2007) and 
Lukka (2007) have made vital contributions to understanding changes at the 
organisational level.  The rationale behind the thesis is to utilise their work as it 
raises issues for consideration in this research.   
 
Dent (1991) demonstrates how accounting was implicated differently in “railway” 
and “business” cultures, and looks at the dynamics of transition.  Dent‟s research 
was undertaken in a major railway company.  Initially the railway was a public 
service with the rationale to run trains.  In fulfilling its role, profitability was 
considered secondary by the railway.  The railway seemed to be under pressure to 
change stemming from the State‟s action to privatise the industry, and in response 
to this the railway business introduced new managers with business 
responsibilities.  In Dent‟s study, separate classes of activity were uncoupled from 
the railway culture and recoupled to the business culture.  Dent utilises an 
interpretive methodology for the study.  Commercial business routines became the 
dominant norm amidst the senior management.  As Dent elaborates, traditions 
established over more than a century related to the concept of railway as a social 
service were overthrown by the business management. 
 
The business managers‟ accepted rationale for the railway was to make a profit.  
The customers were seen as those who generate revenue whilst the significance of 
operations such as trains, infrastructure and staff was that they were costs.  Like 
Dent‟s study, this research examines MACS changes using interpretive 
methodology in another environment and explores whether there was resistance to 
change due to Fiji‟s cultural and political context.  Fiji‟s cultural and political 
context has potential both to resist and support change. 
 
A study by V‟amosi (2000) examines the interpretation of (new) concepts and 
ideas and how these affected management accounting in a previously Hungarian 
government-owned company, Budapest Chemical Works (BCW).  The article 
considers how the concept of market economic rationality was adapted in BCW 
which had to follow business practices.  The study employs Berger and 
Luckmann‟s (1967) notion of social construction as the theoretical framework 
which focuses on institutionalisation of practices in selected parts of management 
accounting in the case company.  V‟amosi‟s study mentions that little emphasis 
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has been placed on studying organisations in transition.  His study attempts to 
examine how micro-social system management accounting in the company is 
constructed, institutionalised and changed in the face of macro institutional and 
social changes in the company‟s environment.  In V‟amosi‟s study, an American 
consulting firm acted as a change agent to introduce new market rules.  This thesis 
also explores how management accounting in the subject company is constructed, 
institutionalised and changed in the face of macro institutional and social change.   
 
Soin et al. (2002) use institutional theory to interpret the role of management 
accounting in organisational change.  Their paper reports on a longitudinal 
empirical study of the implementation of an Activity Based Costing (ABC) 
system in a UK Bank.  Tensions were identified between the need to establish 
ABC as an organisational routine with less routinised but more revolutionary 
aspirations of ABM.  The ABC team was successful in institutionalising a less 
radical version of ABC which revealed new links between costs and products (see 
Soin et al., 2002).   
 
Scapens (1994, 2006), Burns and Scapens (2000), and Lukka (2007) offer old 
institutional economics theory as a framework for researchers interested in 
studying management accounting change.  Through such approaches, the authors 
believe, the framework can be extended or refined.  The framework is intended to 
inform interpretive case studies of the processes of MACS change.  Burns and 
Scapens (2000) illustrate the framework, using two previously published case 
studies of Roberts and Scapens‟ (1990) - Ferac Plastics and Scapens and Roberts‟ 
(1993) case of Omega Plc.  Ferac Plastics illustrates a situation where 
management accounting routines are institutionalised and become a taken-for-
granted part of the management process.  At Ferac Plastics, the managers spoke 
the language of accounting, such as the bottom line, variance and profitability 
measures.  They exhibited a high degree of accounting literacy and viewed 
accounting information as the major focus of their attention.  The accounting 
routines were enacted, and thereby reproduced in month-by-month use by 
managers.   
 
In the Omega Plc case (Scapens & Roberts, 1993) resistance was expressed by the 
engineering division within the organisation to adopting accounting means of 
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thinking.  A project that was intended to improve information flow in the 
engineering division was abandoned.  The change that was introduced challenged 
existing routines and institutions of the engineering division.  Therefore, it 
became difficult to implement.   
 
Busco et al. (2006) used a case study approach to examine the acquisition in 1994 
of an Italian company, Nuovo Pignone (NP), by the US multinational, General 
Electric (GE).  NP was a bureaucratic Italian company, part of a state-owned 
group called ENI.  NP was sold to GE as part of the Italian government‟s 
privatisation policy.  A couple of years earlier, 20 of ENIs top management, 
including its chairman, had been arrested for corruption and the chairman later 
committed suicide in prison.  So, when GE acquired NP, it was clear that major 
changes would be made.  GE was renowned for its financially-oriented, number-
driven approach to management and emphasised cash generation.  However, NP 
had little history of financial management.  Within about three years NP had been 
integrated into GE‟s world-wide organisation and was managed in the “GE way.”  
This was considered to be revolutionary change.  It had been accepted that the 
existing ways of doing and thinking in the company (NP) were going to change.  
It had been recognised that the prevailing institutions within NP would not be 
acceptable to GE.  There was a collective mindset that change would emerge.  
Although people within NP were anxious, they recognised that change was 
inevitable and they looked for ways of coping with it.  There was massive 
reorganisation of the finance function, with new finance managers and training 
being given to employees.  Quality initiatives were also introduced for the change 
to be effective.  Busco et al. (2006) study is relevant to this thesis as the authors 
(Busco et al., 2006) illustrated management accounting change at organisational 
level using a theoretical framework drawn from Burns and Scapens‟ (2000) 
institutional theory model.  This thesis expands on the institutional theory model 
suggested by Burns and Scapens (2000). 
 
In their case study, Burns and Baldvinsdottir (2005) highlight institutional 
contradictions that create potential openings for change and discuss how actors‟ 
roles changed.  Institutional theory is utilised to tease out the unfolding nature of 
role change in the company called Butt.  Throughout the 1980s Butt had a quasi-
monopoly position in world pharmaceuticals. Financial management concerns 
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were less of a priority compared to other business concerns such as research and 
marketing.  However, by the 1990s these embedded beliefs pertaining to 
excellence in research and marketing came to be questioned.  Previously taken-
for-granted assumptions had been brought to the fore of consciousness, compared 
to an alternative logic, and subsequent changes put into motion.  Technical 
inefficiency was exposed in the previously taken-for-granted assumptions.   
Previously, money did not matter but the growing competition had put pressure on 
the Butt actors to improve their performance.   
 
Nor-Aziah and Scapens (2007) utilise an exploratory case study to present an in-
depth analysis of a Malaysian utility which was required to transform itself into a 
self-financing, efficient and profitable organisation through a process of 
corporatisation.  Despite attempts to enhance profitability by new rules of 
budgeting and recruitment of new accounting graduates, the case reveals that as 
accounting changes were enacted, over time they became separated and only 
loosely coupled to other organisational activities.  The intended purpose of the 
budgets introduced into the case company did not materialise because the 
implementation of the new budgeting system created resistance, due to lack of 
trust and power relations between accountants and operations managers.  Power 
over resources remained in the hands of headquarters accountants; this enhanced 
the tensions and lack of trust between the accountants and operating managers.   
 
Zilber (2002) studied a rape crisis centre in Israel, where the entry of 
therapeutically-oriented members resulted in the infusion of new meanings into 
original feminist practices.  Zilber (2002) claims that the emergence of the 
therapeutic institution triggered some deinstitutionalisation of feminism, but not 
its complete replacement.  The two institutions, therapeutic and feminist, co-
existed in the case study and competed with one another.  Feminism had to do 
with gender discrimination against women.  However, as time went by, members 
had become more aware of the immediate Israeli environment‟s negative stand 
towards feminism.  Therapeutically-oriented volunteers became involved in 
educational activity and highlighted the centre‟s professional work.  Zilber‟s 
(2006) study is relevant to the thesis as the author (Zilber, 2006) provides 
empirical evidence using institutional theory at micro level and demonstrates 
institutional contradictions: coexistence of two institutions; therapeutic and 
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feminist.  The thesis draws on such contradictions and how institutional 
entrepreneurs shape change. 
 
In brief, the reviewed literature carried commentaries of MACS changes of both 
organisational field and organisational level that are relevant to this study.  From 
the organisational field level perspective, there are environmental pressures like 
the donor agencies, state and customers that may call for changes in the TFL 
organisation.  Most studies reviewed relied on institutional theory which informs 
this study as well.  The management accounting literature at the organisational 
level is reviewed as this thesis contributes to this literature. 
 
The previous research has been undertaken at either an organisational field level 
using new institutional sociology theory or at an organisational level using old 
institutional economics theory (Dillard, Rigsby & Goodman, 2004).  This research 
uses institutional theory and attempts to integrate changes at both levels.  New 
institutional sociology theory emphasises isomorphism (stability) while old 
institutional economics using Burns and Scapens‟ (2000) model is vague on 
explanation of change.  The source of contextual change; whether it is from 
endogenous or exogenous forces is missing from the model.  At the same time, 
Burns and Scapens‟ (2000) model does not capture resistance to change.  This 
study intends to extend institutional theory literature in management accounting 
by considering institutional contradictions and illuminates how the contradictions 
influence embedded actors (institutional entrepreneurs) to shape changes.  In 
doing so, the thesis depicts a study of agents, which appears to be a neglected area 
in accounting as identified by Granlund (2001).  Scott and Bruce (1994) also 
elaborate on the importance of human agency, noting that innovations cannot be 
understood without attention to the personal and environmental influences (see 
also Emsley, Barbara & Harrison, 2006).  Having considered the literature on 
MACS change, the next section examines the literature on the management 
philosophy of Total Quality Management which was introduced at TFL. 
 
2.3.0  Theme 3:  Total Quality Management(TQM). 
 
Total Quality Management (TQM) practices, for which a plethora of literature 
exists, were introduced at TFL.  For the purpose of this review, only literature that 
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is relevant to the study is reviewed.  TQM practices have been implemented by 
firms interested in promoting their survival prospects by encompassing quality 
and continuous improvement into their strategic priorities (Shank & 
Govindarajan, 1994; Johnson, 1994; Tuckman, 1994; Chenhall, 1997; Boaden, 
1997; Hoque & Alam, 1999; Lord & Lawrence, 2001; Hoque, 2003). 
 
TQM practices are a set of management concepts and tools that seek to involve 
managers, employees and workers in order to yield continuous performance 
improvement (Hogg, 1993; Shank & Govindarajan, 1994; Johnson, 1994; Powell, 
1995; Boaden, 1997; Chenhall, 1997; Hoque, 2003).  Shank and Govindarajan 
(1994, pp.16-17) note that “whichever approach a firm chooses, quality is such an 
important strategic variable that management accounting can no longer ignore it.”  
Chenhall (1997) notes that TQM enhances the profitability of companies when 
managers are evaluated by using direct measures of manufacturing.   
 
A satisfied customer is the best indicator of the quality image of any business 
(Lal, 1990; Johnson, 1994; Tuckman, 1994; Boaden, 1997).  The whole thrust of a 
TQM philosophy is that quality and its management have to be built in right from 
the beginning and that the accomplishment of quality standards and improvement 
is the responsibility of everyone (Morgan & Murgatroyd, 1994; Westphal, Gulati 
& Shortell, 1997; Lord & Lawrence, 2001; Hoque, 2003).  Although the literature 
suggests that TQM facilitates customer satisfaction, the thesis examines if this 
belief holds in the case of a monopolized telecommunication company in Fiji. 
 
Sharma and Hoque (2002) note the importance of top management involvement 
as a change agent in the introduction and establishment of TQM practices at the 
Housing Authority of Fiji.  Oakland (1993) and Powell (1995) point out that a 
way to accomplish TQM practices is to issue a total quality message that clearly 
states top management‟s commitment to TQM practices and outlines the role 
everyone must play.  Sharma and Hoque (2002) argue that organizations adopt 
management techniques such as TQM practices not for technical reasons (Ansari 
& Euske, 1987) but to become isomorphic with institutional norms (DiMaggio & 




Zbaracki (1998) notes that TQM practices gain institutional value over time as 
they become the accepted way of doing things.  Although TQM practices may 
provide an organisation with few technical benefits, the claim to use TQM 
practices may confer legitimacy on the organisation.  Zbaracki‟s (1998) study 
focused on the use and retention of TQM practices in a variety of organizations to 
see how institutional forces influence the TQM practices within these 
organizations.  Zbaracki‟s (1998) findings demonstrate that as TQM practice 
spreads from one firm to another, the practice garners legitimacy value and loses 
technical value.  That is to say that TQM practice becomes a window dressing 
practice than enhancing technical value within organization.  Managers may use 
success stories to retain TQM practice as a myth of rational action.  Whilst 
Zbaracki (1998) uses institutional theory and an evolutionary model for studying 
the introduction of TQM practices, this study extends the literature by examining 
what institutional contradictions were at play at the subject organization and how 
institutional entrepreneurs exploited these contradictions in order to introduce 
TQM practices. 
 
Hoque and Alam‟s (1999) study is a case study of TQM adoption and changes in 
management accounting systems within a New Zealand construction company.  
They suggest that an organisation may initiate TQM practices to promote 
“institutional” and “quality” culture rather than for technical reasons.  The authors 
use institutional theory in their study, which helps them in capturing significant 
extra “institutional” forces such as market pressures, fierce competition, customer 
expectations, professional associations, public perceptions and regulatory factors 
(e.g., legislation guidelines, quality standards) influencing TQM practices 
adoption in the firm.  The company‟s management accounting system was 
updated to incorporate TQM-based practices, for example, orientation towards 
both financial and non-financial measures and greater involvement of accountants 
within TQM practice programs.   
 
Hackman and Wageman (1995) note that the quality improvement process must 
begin with management‟s commitment to total quality.  Cross-functional teams 
can be used in multiple ways in TQM programs; their central purpose is to 
identify the “vital few” problems of the organisation (Hackman & Wageman, 
1995).  Other teams, also cross-functional (for example, quality-improvement 
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teams), are created to diagnose the problems that have been identified in the 
organisation and to test possible solutions.  Hackman and Wageman (1995) also 
identify that sometimes TQM practice changes may be more window dressing 
than real, as TQM is a program that exhorts people to alter their behaviour and 
requires managers to do little other than issue the exhortation.  The 
implementation may be easy, but the old organizational structures and systems 
remain the same and continue to generate similar behaviour as before.   
 
Mueller and Carter (2005) studied TQM practices over a period of three years in a 
newly privatized organisation of a UK utility sector: Coast Electric.  Their study 
employs the concept of scripts which can be analysed as responses to rationalized 
expectations of TQM practices.  Three scripts were suggested: the first is that of 
“exhortation”, that is, carrying a new practice with rhetoric-intensive language, 
which incorporates the role of ceremony, image and rhetoric.  The second script is 
of “mimetic learning”, a script that incorporates the role of widely diffused, 
rationalized management techniques.  The third script is “routinising” which 
reflects the process of rationalization at the organizational level. It is here that the 
new TQM practices become institutionalized.  TQM was exhorted as a new way 
of working within the organisation.  The exhortation script stripped away the 
dominant culture that had historically been the preserve of engineering.  TQM 
practices were driven by consultants.  There were savings made from TQM 
practices which could be mooted as evidence of some routinisation.  The TQM 
innovation became incorporated into the everyday habits of managers and 
employees.   
 
Warner (1994) suggests that TQM practice is predicated on “scientific 
management”, which is much more widely diffused in Japanese industries 
(p.526).  Warner (1994) notes that with the adoption of TQM practices, the 
Japanese have also invoked the concept of Kaizen, meaning continuous 
improvement.  Kaizen represents a process-oriented, as opposed to western result-
based, way of thinking.  The strategy calls for a corporate culture where no day 





In a Japanese study, Mehri (2006), asks what has made Toyota so competitive.  
The Toyota Production System, based on TQM practice, was a Japanese 
technique which also proliferated in US organizations.  Mehri (2006) points out 
that a “culture of rules” (p.25) determines what goes on in the Japanese 
workplace.  The rules fit in three categories.  The first category is the written rules 
that are distributed in company booklets or are printed and hung on company 
walls and bulletin boards.  The second category is the unwritten rules that an 
employee learns through observation or experience at the company, particularly in 
his or her section or team.  In the third category are rules that are learned 
culturally, simply by being Japanese or living in Japan.  These rules constitute the 
proper language and gestures to be used in speaking to a superior.  The open-
space at Nizumi (the case company) and most Japanese companies facilitates 
monitoring of employees.  Mehri (2006) argues that Japanese workers accede to 
the demands of management simply because they have no choice.  Criticising or 
confronting someone, particularly to embarrass someone in public, is a bad 
behaviour in Japan.  Also if two employees disagree with each other, in Japanese 
culture, it is considered bad behaviour to be confrontational.  One is supposed to 
fake a good-natured relationship and not show his/her true feelings.  Warner‟s 
(1994) and Mehri‟s (2006) study on TQM is drawn as they illuminate the role of 
Japanese culture on enhancing TQM practices.  Such cultural role on TQM 
practices in a Fijian context is examined in the thesis. 
 
Much of TQM practice literature covered benefits associated with the 
implementation of TQM practices.  It has generally been argued that TQM 
practice improves the productivity and competitiveness of organizations, increases 
their market shares, improves relationships among employees and reduces costs 
(Hoque & Alam, 1999; Sharma & Hoque, 2002; Eriksson & Hansson, 2003; 
Mueller & Carter, 2005).  These techniques have a technical element: to improve 
organizational efficiency.  However, the rationale for implementing TQM 
practices goes beyond efficiency and includes social norms and behavioural forces 
which may be captured through an institutional theoretical framework. 
 
It may be necessary to note that there is a critical literature on TQM practices.  For 
example, Ezzamel (1994b) elaborates that when implementing TQM practices, 
there is a tendency for management to overemphasise the use of detailed rules and 
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procedures, which separates the individual from his/her work.  Ezzamel (1994b) 
also views TQM as engendering greater exploitation of group dynamics.  Ezzamel 
and Wilmott (1998) note that, in capitalist organizations, people do not come 
together freely and spontaneously to set up team works.  Rather, confronted with 
lack of wealth, they are coerced by material necessity to sell their labour as a way 
of providing subsistence for themselves and their dependents.  A few authors also 
claim that management uses TQM practices to exploit employees in order to 
extract surplus value for capital (Morris & Wilkinson, 1995; Lord & Lawrence, 
2001). 
 
The mainstream literature on TQM practices has been supportive of TQM through 
the economistic approach of facilitating effectiveness and efficiency in the 
organisation, based on the notion of improved profitability.  Such practices of 
TQM also engender performance targets.  Such performance measures and reward 
structures sanctify success and shame failure (Ezzamel, 1994b). 
 
In brief, TQM practices have been implemented by firms interested in their 
survival prospects by encompassing quality and continuous improvement into 
their strategic priorities.  While authors like Zbaracki (1998) use institutional 
theory and an evolutionary model for studying introduction of TQM practice, this 
study extends the literature by examining what institutional contradictions were at 
play at the subject organization and how institutional entrepreneurs exploited the 
contradictions to introduce TQM practice.  After considering the literature on 
TQM practices, the next section reviews the literature on resistance to MACS 
changes. 
 
2.4.0    Theme 4:  Resistance to change 
 
Argyris and Kaplan (1994), who consider resistance as a barrier that opposes and 
obstructs change, recommend change strategies to reduce resistance.  Education is 
one of the strategies that may be helpful; through education participants learn to 
understand the new ideas.  In-house training may be conducted by the 




It has been claimed that the differing views of managers and employees on change 
is a common root of difficulties in change programmes (Strebel, 1996).  
Kasurinen (2002) endorses Strebel (1996) and notes that for top-level managers, 
change is often an opportunity, whereas for many employees and middle 
managers, change is neither sought nor welcomed.  Managers need to understand 
what change is from the employees‟ perspective (Kasurinen, 2002).  It may be 
unrealistic to expect employees to fully embrace change unless managers define 
new conditions for change and persuade employees to accept them (Kasurinen, 
2002). 
 
Burns (2000) explores accounting change in the product development department 
of a UK chemical manufacturer: Becks.  He employs institutional and power 
mobilisation frameworks to explicate the processes of change.  A processual 
approach is adopted which entails “exploring the temporal dimensions of change, 
unfolding over time through reference to the past, the present and future” (Burns, 
2000, p.568).  The case study is an effort to explore the interplay between new, 
imposed accounting practices, routines, institutions, power and politics (Burns, 
2000).  The latter two act as facilitators or barriers to change.  Accounting 
routines, especially the use of accounting information in contribution terms, had 
become encoded into the organisation.  This was part of the taken-for-granted 
assumptions and beliefs concerning activity in Becks.  Such routinization and 
institutionalisation of accounting was reinforced by a cash flow crisis in 1988.  
The Managing Director wanted the “chemistry know-how” to be supplemented 
more by accounting-oriented ways of thinking (Burns, 2000, p. 577).  Burns‟ case 
on “Becks” company demonstrates barriers to change and conflicts that emerge as 
new accounting routines are unable to impinge on existing ways of thinking.  
There were difficulties involved whilst imposing accounting change on a setting 
where existing institutions were not congruent with new routines and intended 
ways of thinking.  The new accounting in Becks was abandoned at the beginning 
of 1996, based on the limited benefit that it offered to the department or elsewhere 
in the organisation.  The chief chemist stopped collecting time sheets from the lab 
chemists as he was no longer required to produce a development report.  So new 




Scapens and Roberts‟ (1993) case study describes the introduction of a new 
accounting control system into the unit companies of a division of a large 
multidivisional company.  Resistance was encountered in the implementation 
process at Omega (case company).  An inability by workers to find a workable 
relationship between the languages of production and accounting led to resistance 
to accounting change.  There were tensions between operating managers and 
accountants.  This was because of the increasing competition faced by Omega in 
the late 1970s.  A production cost control project was set up to improve 
information flow between the units and to divisional managers.  As a Production 
Cost Control project did not emerge out of shared understandings of the need for 
improved production control in operating units, the divisional accountants had to 
sell the idea to legitimate their understandings.  However, the different 
understandings of the production cost control project were a source of friction 
between the general managers and the project team.  Eventually the production 
cost control project had to be abandoned due to increased resistance by the 
production employees. 
 
Siti-Nabiha and Scapens (2005) use as their case study a gas processing company 
which introduced value based management.  Value-based management was 
imposed on the company by its parent company.  Initially, the value-based 
management was used in a ceremonial way and the KPIs became decoupled from 
day-to-day activities of the business.  The value-based management did not have 
an impact on the way of thinking of organisational participants and was resisted.  
When new KPI‟s under value-based management were introduced, staff 
complained that they were being treated as machines as everything was to “have a 
standard” (Siti-Nabiha & Scapens, 2005, p. 55).  The implementation of value-
based management did not effectively change the way in which managers 
conducted their day-to-day activities.  A change in mindset from a production 
orientation to financial orientation did not occur.  This ceremonial implementation 
of the new system without change in underlying ways of thinking was 
characterised as passive resistance (Siti-Nabiha & Scapens, 2005). 
 
Ezzamel (1994a) demonstrated how accounting knowledge can enable the 
mobilisation of resistance by organisational actors opposed to change.  His case 
study is of a university that attempted to supplant an incremental budget by a 
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comprehensive budget, due to financial crisis.  The university‟s prevailing values 
were being perceived by organisational actors as under challenge from imported 
ones.  In the initial budget, there was a call for some staff redundancies which 
were criticised.  An alternative viable strategy was put forward by staff, which 
allowed the university management to abandon the initial budget with its potential 
redundancies.  Accounting was used by this group with alternative viable strategy 
to show the initial budget with redundancies was unreasonable.  Ezzamel (1994a) 
highlights that by evolving alternative technical arguments from within 
accounting, and by combining them with other arguments such as job tenure and 
academic freedom, organisational actors opposed to change were able to resist the 
disciplinary intents of the initial budgeting proposals. 
 
Wickramasinghe and Hopper (2005) studied MACS in a textile mill in a 
traditional Sinhalese village in Sri Lanka.  Attempts to impose conventional 
management accounting failed, due to workers‟ resistance.  The capitalist mode of 
production and modern industrial culture took unexpected roles when confronted 
by traditional rural culture based on kingship obligations.  The mill was founded 
by the government as a public enterprise.  Government interference in the mill 
was considerable and, due to disappointing performance, there was pressure for 
privatisation.  Results improved after privatisation, partly owing to commercial 
budgetary practices being adopted.  However, cultural asymmetry problems were 
inflamed by a coalition of workers and local managers against foreign owners, 
who fled when financial irregularities were found.  The government resumed 
ownership, and budgeting practices of previous eras returned (Wickramsinghe & 
Hopper, 2005).  Wickramasinghe and Hopper‟s (2005) study illustrates how 
cultural and political forces are relevant to resistance to accounting changes in a 
developing country context. 
 
In brief, resistance is a barrier that opposes and obstructs change (Argyris & 
Kaplan, 1994).  The differing view of managers and employees on change is a 
common root of difficulties in change programmes.  This section reflected on the 
resistance to accounting changes in the literature which is relevant to this study.  
The thesis intends to explore if there are any such barriers to change in existence 
at the subject organisation.  After considering resistance to accounting change, it 
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is vital to indicate the location of the thesis within the management accounting 
and control system change literature. The next section discusses this. 
 
2.5.0  The Location of the Thesis within the Management 
Accounting and Control System Literature 
 
The above review points to an increased interest among researchers in the areas of 
MACS changes.  Much remains to be addressed and it is worth indicating some of 
this here.  The major concern of current literature is around the theoretical 
perspective.  Many researchers seem to employ an economistic view of 
organisational change; that change promotes efficiency, effectiveness and 
improves accountability (Innes & Mitchell, 1990; Solomons, 1991; Cobb et al., 
1995).  There are, however, some critical and interpretive researchers on 
organisational change (e.g., Modell, 2001; Hussain & Hoque, 2002; Seo & Creed, 
2002; Burns & Scapens, 2000).  Research using perspectives such as institutional 
theory is required so as to problematise some of the change issues raised in the 
literature.  Through case studies on MACS changes, the institutional theory 
framework can be extended further. 
 
Burns and Scapens (2000), Burns (2000), Soin et al. (2002), and Scapens (2006) 
have posited that scholars have paid little attention to the micro processes of 
institutionalisation.  The current study intends to investigate a micro process of 
institutionalisation within TFL.  In doing so, the study is novel to the accounting 
literature in that it examines the institutional contradictions that were at play at 
TFL and how institutional entrepreneurs exploited the contradictions to introduce 
MACS changes. 
 
The cultural and political contexts of LDC‟s may be different from those of 
Western industrialised society and this fact can impact the change process.  
Coupled with this, context-oriented empirical case studies with a focus on 
transition companies and the complexities surrounding “change and continuity” 
have a low priority in the literature (see V‟amosi, 2000).  The literature dealing 
with MACS changes has mostly portrayed changes as occurring without much 
resistance (Abernethy & Chua, 1996; Soin et al., 2002; Busco et al., 2006).  As 
Fiji‟s cultural and political contexts are different from western industrialised 
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countries, it may be interesting to see if the specific cultural and political forces 
have impact on change process within TFL.  The next section summarises the 
chapter. 
 
2.6.0  Summary 
 
This chapter has reviewed the literature on management accounting and control 
system changes in both developing and developed countries.  Reviews of 
literature on studies in less developed countries reveal that accounting research 
needs to address issues of culture and politics in organisational settings 
(Alawattage et al., 2007; Alam, 1997).  It is the intention of the thesis to 
contribute towards this literature. 
 
It has also been noted that little emphasis has been placed on studying 
organisations in transition (V‟amosi, 2000).  This study intends to provide an 
interpretive methodological approach which provides an “alternative” dimension 
to the MACS changes in developing countries.  Having reviewed the related 
literature and indicated the location of this thesis in that literature, the next chapter 























Chapter 3:   Methodology, Theory and Methods 
 
3.1  Introduction 
 
This chapter explains the methodology, theory and methods used in the thesis.  
Llewellyn (1992) notes that the concern for researchers lies in recognizing which 
perspective is appropriate for any research effort.  Laughlin (1995) points out that 
methodological choices are inherent in the research process and need to be 
explicitly stated to enable a clear understanding of the researcher‟s prejudices and 
assumptions.  The next section examines the choice of methodology for the thesis. 
 
3.2  Choice of Methodology 
 
The thesis rejects the view that there is an objective world separate from the 
researcher whose job is to record or capture that reality.  Parker (2008) points out 
that interpretive researchers are advised to avoid emulating the characteristics of 
the positivist researcher community.  Rather, a subjectivist methodology is 
adopted for the thesis. In this approach, the author is a part of the reality he or she 
records. The researcher interacts with those researched and attempts to capture 
their understanding of a subjective reality. It is on such understandings that 
interpretations of individual actions are based. The aim of interpretive research is 
to capture the lived experiences of actors being studied (Chua, 1986, 1988; 
Parker, 2008).  In essence, the interpretive researcher seeks to make sense of the 
conduct of human actors. 
 
Chua (1986, p. 615) summarises the aims of interpretive research: 
 
interpretive knowledge reveals to people what they and others are doing 
when they act and speak as they do…the aim of the interpretive scientist is 
to enrich people‟s understanding of the meanings of their actions, thus 
increasing the possibility of mutual communication and influence. 
 
This approach may involve analysis of human interaction (e.g., Ahrens, Becker, 
Burns, Chapman, Granlund, Habersam, Hansen, Khalifa, Malmi, Mennicken, 
Mikes, Ponozzo, Piber, Quattrone & Socheytt, 2008).  The focus of interpretive 
research is on exploring how organizational order is created and on how the 
members of the organisation construct common understandings.  These common 
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understandings become the structure which is produced and re-produced by 
individuals in their daily interactions. 
 
So the objective reality for an individual in an organisation is socially constructed, 
that is, created by actors in constant interaction with one another.  Individuals 
become socialized into behaving in particular ways. Individuals conduct their day-
to-day activities within the socially constructed norms and rules.  These norms or 
rules exist because they are produced and reproduced in everyday life. They may 
become institutionalized, taken-for-granted and used to typify experiences of 
actors. 
 
Interpretive research offers an alternative to “traditional” positivist approaches 
and offers unique potential to contribute to theory (e.g., Armstrong, 2008; Ahrens 
et al., 2008).  Unlike positivist researchers who research the subject at a distance, 
interpretive researchers have direct engagements with the groups they are 
studying (Parker, 2008).  The data are collected at the scene of the action, with the 
aim of capturing actors‟ understanding from inside, and capturing multiple 
constructed realities.  Table 1 summarises the assumptions of interpretive research 
as outlined by Chua (1986). These assumptions will be adhered to in the thesis. 
 
The theoretical emphasis in interpretive research is to explicate human action in 
order to understand how social norms and rules are produced and reproduced by 
individuals in their day-to-day activities.  Ahrens et al. (2008) note that theory can 
be a powerful tool by which interpretive researchers convey the richness and 
analytical detail of their work.  Institutional theory is adopted (and adapted) for 












Table 1 Dominant Assumptions of the Interpretive Perspective 
 
A. Beliefs About knowledge 
Scientific explanations of human intention are sought.  Their adequacy is 
assessed via the criteria of logical consistency, subjective interpretation, and 
agreement with actors‟ common- sense interpretation. 
This approach encourages ethnographic work, case studies, and participant 
observations.  Actors are studied in their everyday world. 
 
B. Beliefs About Physical and Social Reality 
Social reality is emergent, subjectively created, and objectified through human 
interaction.  All actions have meaning and intention that are retrospectively 
endowed and that are grounded in social and historical practices. 
Social order is not a natural phenomenon but an accomplishment. Conflict is 
mediated through common schemes of social meanings. 
 
C. Relationship between Theory and Practice 
Theory seeks to explain action and to understand how social order is produced 
and reproduced. 
 
     Adapted from Chua (1986, p.615). 
3.3  Theoretical Approach 
3.3.1  Introduction 
 
A theoretical approach which allows interpretive study is the institutional 
perspective advanced by Burns and Scapens (2000).  Burns and Scapens‟ (2000) 
model, an institutional perspective, is chosen as it is rooted in social construction 
of reality and was developed to show the role of strategic agency within 
institutional theory.  Conventional institutional theory reified organisational 
practices by emphasising isomorphism within organisations.  Before looking at 
Burns and Scapens‟ (2000) model, it is useful to discuss early institutional 
theorists.  Initially, institutional theorists attempted to study institutionalization as 
a process of isomorphism (e.g., Meyer & Rowan, 1977; DiMaggio & Powell, 
1983, 1991; Lounsbury, 2008). 
 
Isomorphism relates to the adaptation of an institutional practice that is in force in 
other organisations.  DiMaggio and Powell (1983, 1991) argue that organizations 
have to appear legitimate to their broader constituencies and stakeholders in order 
to secure the resources they need for continued survival.  To gain this legitimacy, 
organizations have to be seen to conform to what is expected of them (DiMaggio 
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& Powell, 1983, 1991).  Three classifications of institutional isomorphism have 
been proposed: coercive, mimetic and normative (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983, 
1991).  Coercive isomorphism results from both formal and informal pressure 
imposed on an organisation by another party upon which it is dependent, and by 
expectations of the society within which it operates.  Mimetic isomorphism occurs 
when the organisation faces uncertainty that engenders organizations to model 
themselves after other organizations that they perceive to be legitimate.  
Mimicking others may act as a cost-effective way of getting legitimacy (e.g., 
DiMaggio & Powell, 1983, 1991; Mizruchi & Fein, 1999).  Normative 
isomorphism is where the norms of society and professional bodies influence the 
practices of organizations.  Normative pressures arise from specialized groups 
such as a profession.   
 
While various kinds of professionals within an organization may differ from one 
another, they nevertheless manifest similarity to their professional counterparts in 
other organizations (see DiMaggio & Powell, 1991).  DiMaggio and Powell 
(1991) argue that two aspects of professionalisation are central sources of 
isomorphism.  One is the gaining of formal education, whilst the second is the 
growth and elaboration of professional networks that span organizations.  
Professionalism may be measured by elements such as university credentials.  
Organizations may hire individuals from firms within the same industry or recruit 
staff from a narrow range of training institutions.  Individuals from the same 
training institutions or with similar university education tend to view problems in 
a similar fashion (see Meyer & Rowan, 1977; DiMaggio & Powell, 1991).  
Another example would be that of the accounting profession which inculcates 
preferred methods, practices and principles. Accountants manage organizations by 
using the same methods they have learned from training within the profession.  
For this reason, it is expected that accountants in different organizations would 
employ similar techniques.  This phenomenon is attributed to the socialization of 
members within the profession. 
 
Some institutional theorists elaborate on the reproduction of organizational 
structures, activities and routines in response to state pressure, the expectations of 
a profession or the external environment of the organization (DiMaggio & Powell, 
1983, 1991).  Covaleski and Dirsmith (1988a, 1988b) suggest that an 
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organisation‟s survival requires it to conform to societal norms of acceptable 
behaviour.  The advantages of compliance to institutional norms are revealed in 
the literature as increased prestige for the organization, stability, legitimacy, social 
support, acceptance in the profession and invulnerability to questioning 
(DiMaggio & Powell, 1983). 
 
Some institutional theorists believe that organizations are open systems in that the 
external environment and its participants help to shape organizational structures 
and activities (Meyer & Rowan, 1977; DiMaggio & Powell, 1983, 1991).  
Organisations tend to develop relations and linkages within the larger systems of 
which they are a part.  
 
Early empirical research almost exclusively emphasised isomorphism by showing 
how practices were similar to other organizations.  DiMaggio and Powell (1983, 
p.148) defined an organizational field as comprising of those organizations that, in 
the aggregate, constitute a recognized area of institutional life: key suppliers, 
resource and product consumers, regulatory agencies and other organizations that 
produce similar services or products.  This thesis argues that the focus on 
isomorphism limited the range of explanatory potential of institutional theory.  
Earlier institutional theorists emphasised a distinction between technical forces 
and legitimacy.  This was apparent in empirical research that emphasized a two-
stage diffusion process whereby early adopters of innovations are motivated by 
technical considerations while the later adopters engage in imitation fuelled by 
pressure to conform (Tolbert & Zucker, 1983, 1996).  An over-reliance on 
isomorphism by earlier institutional writers appeared to ignore human agents and 
their interests (e.g., DiMaggio & Powell, 1983, 1991; Tolbert & Zucker, 1983).  
The interpretive theory that is adapted for the thesis is in line with that advanced 
by Burns and Scapens (2000), and is discussed in turn. 
3.3.2  Burns and Scapens’ (2000) Model of Institutional Theory 
 
Burns and Scapens (2000) argue that an institutional framework can assist in the 
conceptualisation of management accounting change.  Institution is defined as “a 
way of thought or action of some prevalence and permanence, which is embedded 
in the habits of a group or the customs of people” (Hamilton, 1932, p. 84).  
Institutions evolve through a process of routinisation of human activity.  There is 
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a duality between action (human activity) and the institutions which structure that 
activity.  This duality is the agency-structure relationship that has been debated in 
the past (e.g., Giddens, 1979, 1984; Archer, 1995).  Burns and Scapens (2000) 
argued that organisational routines and institutional actors influence the process of 
management accounting change. 
 
In many organisations, the management control system constitutes stable rules 
and routines (see Scapens, 1994).  Rules are the “formally recognised way in 
which things should be done”, while routines are defined as “the way things are 
actually done” (Burns & Scapens, 2000, p. 6).  Rules capture the formal 
characteristics of accounting systems: for example, rules are set through standard 
operating procedures, budget manuals and appraisal guidelines.  Routines may 
encompass a group of individuals and represent patterns of thought that are 
habitually adopted by that group (Burns & Scapens, 2000). 
 
Conventional institutional theory tends to emphasise the stability embodied in 
rule-based behaviour and routines in organisational systems.  Nevertheless, the 
Burns & Scapens (2000) theory also considers that the rules and routines can 
change (for commentary, see Burns & Scapens, 2000).  That is to say, studying 
management accounting change entails studying changes in organisational 
routines and how new patterns of behaviour are produced and reproduced (see 
Soin et al., 2002).   
 
The main element of Burns and Scapens‟ (2000) institutional theory model is 
depicted in figure 1, which draws significantly on the conceptualisation of 
institutionalisation developed by Barley and Tolbert (1997).  The distinction in 
Burns and Scapens‟ (2000) model from that of Barley and Tolbert‟s (1997) model 
is in the notion of scripts by the latter which is rephrased as rules and routines by 
Burns and Scapens (2000).  As seen from figure 1, Burns and Scapens (2000) 
draw the distinction between the „realm of institutions‟ and „realm of action‟, with 
rules and routines linking the realms through the processes of encoding, enacting 
and reproduction.  The institutional realm and the realm of action signify 
Giddens‟ two realms of social systems: structure and action (for commentary, see 
Barley & Tolbert, 1997).  Barley and Tolbert (1997, p. 97) note the institutional 
realm as representing “an existing framework of rules and typification derived 
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from a cumulative history of action and interaction.”  The model is based on 
Giddens‟ (1979) model of structuration.  The institutional practices are encoded in 
rules and routines that, in turn, are enacted in specific situations (Johnson, Smith 
& Codling, 2000).  The resulting behaviours revise or replicate the rules and 
routines that informed the action.  The recreated rules and routines thus become 
objectified and externalized, and constitute new institutional practices encoded in 
the behavioural rules and routines, the next cycle of enactment.  The model 
accounts for the interdependence and interpenetration of action and 
institutionalism and how organizational change occurs through revision of 
behavioural rules and routines (for commentary, see Johnson et al., 2000; Burns & 
Scapens, 2000). 
 

























The Burns and Scapens‟ (2000) model shows that institutionalization is a 
continuous process whose operation can be noted through time (see Barley & 
Tolbert, 1997).  The central part of figure 1 illustrates the way in which rules and 
routines act as modalities, linking the institutional realm and the realm of action.   
 
The four arrows (labelled a-d in Burns & Scapens‟ (2000) model) represent the 
synchronic (a and b) and diachronic processes (c and d).  Synchronic refers to 
institution actions at a specific point in time, whilst diachronic refers to actions 
producing and reproducing institutions through their cumulative influence over 
time.  In other words, vertical arrows (a and b) represent institutional constraints 
on action, whilst diagonal arrows show maintenance or modification of the 
institution through action. 
 
The first arrow (arrow a) shows the „encoding‟ of institutional principles in the 
rules and routines used in a particular setting.  Berger and Luckmann (1967) 
suggest that encoding usually occurs during socialization.  It involves an 
individual internalizing rules and interpretation of behaviour appropriate for 
particular settings.  Formal organizational rules often define practices which 
embody institutions, covering activities such as hiring personnel, evaluating 
performance, or offering goods or service to customers (Barley & Tolbert, 1997, 
pp. 101- 102). 
 
Burns and Scapens (2000) describe the second arrow (arrow b) of 
institutionalization occurring when actors enact rules and routines that encode 
institutional principles.  In explaining this enactment, Burns and Scapens (2000) 
suggest that if actors realize that they are following a rule or routine, they will 
offer a rationale for doing this (e.g., “accounting requires this information”).  In 
several cases, actors simply behave according to their perception of the way 
things are (Burns & Scapens, 2000).   
 
The third arrow of institutionalization (arrow c) represents the degree to which 
behaviours „revise or replicate‟ the rules and routines that informed the action.  
Finally, the fourth arrow (arrow d) of institutionalization depicts the 
objectification and externalization of the patterned behaviours and interactions 




Burns and Scapens (2000) point out that from time to time, new rules and routines 
may emerge, and this is illustrated by the separate boxes.  Burns and Scapens 
(2000) note that in various organisation activities, routines may emerge which 
deviate from the original rules, or were never set out explicitly as rules.  In such 
instances, new routines become formalised as rules.  For example, Total Quality 
Management practices can be summarised in a standard Total Quality 
Management manual of procedures.  This can be used to train new staff and to 
avoid knowledge being lost when existing staff leave the organisation.  Here the 
process moves from routines to rules (as shown in the middle box in figure 1).  
Burns and Scapens (2000) point out that there can be a two-way relationship 
between rules and routines. 
 
The two separate boxes in figure 1 show that, by comparing the second box with 
the first box, one can assess that change in rules and routines has occurred.  
Through such comparison, one can identify the social context that produced the 
observed outcomes and perhaps link the findings to other indicators of 
institutional change beyond those found in the research site.   
 
Institutional theory attempts to explain phenomena in "processual terms, teasing 
out why and how things become what they are over time” (Burns, 2000, p. 571).  
Scapens (1994) emphasizes that human agency is essential for study within an 
organisational setting.  In their actions, the individual actors may produce and 
reproduce new practices through new rules and routines.   
 
However, the Burns and Scapens‟ (2000) model is not clear on how the 
institutional change emerges; when and how the agents may change the rules and 
routines is not so apparent.  The essential questions that the model does not extend 
to are: Where does the contextual change come from (e.g. from an idiosyncratic 
and exogenous or endogenous force)? and when and how do actors come to a 
point where they recognise the need to change existing institutions? (e.g., Seo & 
Creed, 2002).   
 
To better explicate MACS changes, Burns and Scapens‟ (2000) model of 
institutional theory may need further refinement.  While Burns and Scapens 
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(2000) suggest that contextual change may emanate from exogenous shocks, there 
is only a very brief discussion of this within their model.  It is apparent that 
exogenous shocks are outside the given model in figure 1.  Criticisms of the 
model have already been made in the literature (e.g., Dillard, Rigsby & Goodman, 
2004).  Dillard et al., (2004) point out that while Burns and Scapens‟ (2000) 
model may be appropriate at the organisational level view, it is limited in 
recognising higher levels of societal, political and economic issues that influence 
and define organisational context. The next section examines how Burns and 
Scapens‟ (2000) model can be extended to explicate MACS changes. 
 
3.4.0  Refinement of Burns and Scapens’ (2000) Model 
3.4.1  Introduction 
 
Scholars such as Seo and Creed (2002) have argued that once institutionalised, the 
rules and routines may become accepted unquestioningly by organisational 
participants.  Seo and Creed (2002) criticise the Barley and Tolbert (1997) model 
used by Burns and Scapens (2000) in the accounting literature.  Burns and 
Scapens (2000) reproduce Barley and Tolbert‟s (1997) model and replace the 
notion of scripts with rules and routines.  Seo and Creed (2002) argue that the 
institutionalised routines become a force of stability and resistance to change.  
This creates a problem for institutional theorists such as Burns and Scapens 
(2000) who seek to explain changes in accounting practice.  If institutions are 
defined by their stability, how is it possible to explain change?  The problem has 
been discussed by Seo and Creed (2002) as the problem of “embedded agency.”  
If actors‟ behaviour is influenced by institutionalised rules and routines, how is it 
possible for the agents to change those rules and routines?  Burns and Scapens‟ 
(2000) model, as discussed previously, is silent on the sources of contextual 
change in actors‟ behaviour.  Their theorisation also does not extend to how actors 
individually and collectively come to a point where they (the actors) recognise the 
need for collective action to change existing rules and routines.  The Burns and 
Scapens‟ (2000) model also fails to reflect the scope for resistance to change, 





Explanations of change often involve the introduction of some external “jolt” or 
“crisis” that forces change, but the exogenous forces seem to be outside the 
theory.  Both Barley and Tolbert (1997) and Burns and Scapens (2000) hardly 
discuss exogenous shocks before actors can make collective choice to change 
institutional rules and routines.  Institutional theory, as advocated by Burns and 
Scapens (2000) has limitations as it cannot provide a complete understanding of 
change.  Embedded actors may be constrained by existing institutional 
arrangements which are a source of stability rather than change within an 
organisation.  A major challenge of institutional theory is to show how actors 
shaped by (i.e. embedded within) existing institutional arrangements become 
motivated and enabled to promote change in those arrangements. 
 
According to Seo and Creed (2002), institutional arrangements create various 
inconsistencies and tensions (contradictions) within and between social systems, 
and these foster change processes.  Ongoing social construction may produce 
some contradictions, and generate tensions and conflicts within social systems 
that may shape actors consciousness and action to change the present order (Seo 
& Creed, 2002).  Institutional contradictions are driving forces for institutional 
change (DiMaggio & Powell, 1991).  A contradiction can be defined as a 
combination of features that produces an unstable tension in a given system 
(Clemens & Cook, 1999). 
 
This thesis attempts to overcome the problem of embedded agency by integrating 
notions of agents and structure from institutional theory perspectives (see Barley 
& Tolbert, 1997; Hirsch & Lounsbury, 1997; Beckert, 1999; Burns & Scapens, 
2000; Lounsbury, 2008).  The conflict/struggle within organisational actors‟ 
interaction influences institutional embeddedness and thus their (institutional 
embedded actors) capability for institutional entrepreneurship (Greenwood & 
Suddaby, 2006).  The thesis utilises three of the four sources of contradictions 
suggested by Seo and Creed (2002) as a basis for understanding the processes of 
change.   
 
Seo and Creed (2002) note that a few authors have produced a theoretical 
framework that addresses the sources of institutional contradiction (inconsistency) 
and the way in which contradictions may lead embedded agents to take collective 
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action for institutional change.  Seo and Creed (2002) identify the sources of 
institutional contradictions that bring about institutional change as (1) legitimacy, 
that undermines functional efficiency, (2) adaptation, that undermines adaptability 
in terms of being resistant to change process, (3) intra-institutional conformity, 
that creates interinstitutional incompatibilities, and, (4) isomorphism, that may 
conflict with divergent interest.  These contradictions will be discussed in depth in 
the ensuing section.  Not all organisation actors may produce all four types of 
contradictions.  Rather, as certain social relationships and actions become 
institutionalised over a period of time, they are likely to produce one or more of 
the four types of contradictions.  The first three contradictions will be utilised in 
the thesis.  The next section examines in turn each of the institutional 
contradiction identified by Seo and Creed (2002). 
 
3.4.2  Legitimacy that undermines functional efficiency 
 
Institutional theorists assume that an organisation‟s legitimacy depends to some 
extent on forces other than technical efficiency; organisation actors gain 
legitimacy and necessary resources by becoming isomorphic with other 
organisations in their environment (Meyer & Rowan, 1977; DiMaggio & Powell, 
1983, 1991).  Conformity of organisational actors with institutional rules and 
routines may conflict with efficiency demands.  Meyer and Rowan (1977) 
mention window dressing of organisational actors‟ activities in order to appear 
legitimate to external stakeholders, but without necessarily achieving technical 
efficiency.  Conformity to external pressures could possibly increase rewards such 
as reputation and resources but at the expense of efficiency.  Institutional theorists 
have accommodated this contradiction between efficiency and legitimacy through 
the concept of decoupling formal structure activities from technical activities 
(Meyer & Rowan, 1977), that is, through people acting not in accordance with 
formal rules and routines.   
 
Seo and Creed (2002) point out that even if organisational actors make decisions 
that improve both legitimacy and technical efficiency, those decisions become 
suboptimal if new optimal solutions are not continually pursued and adopted by 
actors.  Organisation actors may adopt an innovative practice as window dressing 
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which may give them legitimacy from stakeholders but the practices may not 
promote technical efficiency.  This highlights the issue of how institutional rules 
and routines inhibit the continuous pursuit of technical efficient solutions, which 
leads to the next source of institutional contradiction: adaptation that undermines 
adaptability. 
 
3.4.3  Adaptation that undermines adaptability 
 
Institutional isomorphism that increases legitimacy is an adaptive move by 
organisational actors for survival.  A paradox arises when such adaptive moves 
make adapters less likely to adapt over the long run.  Once institutionalised, a 
structure or activity is produced and reproduced by organisational actors over time 
(Seo & Creed, 2002).  It is in the reproduction that the structure is maintained or 
changed by the actors.  Powell (1991) notes that efforts to change shared 
expectations are often resisted as they threaten individuals‟ sense of security and 
disrupt routines.  Resistance in the form of taken-for-grantedness is an essential 
aspect of institutionalisation (Jepperson, 1991). 
 
Seo and Creed (2002) point out that while institutionalisation is a source of 
stability for organisational actors, once it is in place, organisational actors are 
likely to be locked in and isolated from or unresponsive to changes in the external 
environment.  The unresponsiveness creates a situation whereby contradictions 
between organisation actors and their external environment develop and 
accumulate over time. 
 
3.4.4  Intra-institutional conformity that creates interinstitutional 
incompatibilities 
 
The focus here shifts from the intra-organisational level to the extra organisational 
forces that influence the actions of organisational actors.  For example, Meyer and 
Rowan (1977) suggest that organisation actors are embedded in pluralistic 
institutional environments that are imbued with inconsistent prescriptions for 
action, all supported by rationalised myth.  Organisational actors may incorporate 
all sorts of incompatible structural elements, practices and procedures from their 
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external environment in their (organisation actors) continuous search for 
legitimacy and stability. 
 
Institutional incompatibilities may also create institutional crisis.  For example, 
exogenous forces such as sudden change in government regulations and 
deregulation or technological innovations (Seo & Creed, 2002) can appear to be 
the consequence of interinstitutional incompatibilities unfolding in the wider 
institutional environment.  Once induced, the institutional crisis may break down 
institutional embeddedness, making institutional systems unstable (DiMaggio & 
Powell, 1991) and allowing a radical shift in actors‟ collective consciousness. 
 
3.4.5  Isomorphism that conflicts with the divergent interests of actors 
 
Seo and Creed (2002) consider that an institutional arrangement (institutional 
rules and routines) is the product of political struggle among participants who 
have diverse interests and asymmetric power (Seo & Creed, 2002).  Existing 
institutionalised rules and routines are more likely to reflect the ideas and goals of 
powerful political contestants in the social arena.  Organisational practices often 
endure as a result of the effort of those who benefit from them (Benson, 1977).  
The formation and reproduction of institutional rationality are unlikely to satisfy 
the diverging interests of all participants and particularly the interests of the less 
powerful in an organisation.  Seo and Creed (2002) argue that those actors whose 
ideas and interests are not served by existing institutional arrangements may 
become potential change agents and take action to change present institutional 
arrangements (rules and routines). 
 
The four sources of contradictions can be an impetus to institutional change 
through change agents and institutional entrepreneurs.  The thesis utilises a theory 
of agency and structure (institutional realm) proposed by Burns and Scapens 
(2000) which is modified to incorporate the above concepts of institutional 
contradiction and shows how institutional change can eventuate through human 
agents (institutional entrepreneurs).  The paradox of “embedded agency” may be 
resolved by the institutional entrepreneurs who are the internal change agents in 
organisations.  What is argued in the thesis is that institutional contradictions may 
provide an opportunity for the institutional entrepreneurs to disrupt the existing 
52 
 
rules and routines within an institutional arrangement.  The next section discusses 
the concept of institutional entrepreneurs. 
 
3.5.0  Institutional Entrepreneurs and Change Agents 
 
The thesis argues that the institutional entrepreneurs and external change agents 
may play an instrumental role to effect changes in response to institutional 
contradictions/inconsistency.  Institutional entrepreneurs are internal change 
agents within an institutional setting (e.g., Beckert, 1999; Seo & Creed, 2002; 
Dorado, 2005).  DiMaggio (1988) and Zilber (2002) define the notion of 
institutional entrepreneurs as individuals or organizations that act in discordance 
with the established institutional arrangements and may eventually change these 
institutional arrangements.  Institutionalised structures, informal rules, and taken-
for-granted routines come under pressure from agents who recognize their 
constraining quality.  Beckert (1999) points out that the notion of the institutional 
entrepreneur introduces strategic agency into institutional organisation theory.  It 
was DiMaggio (1988) who introduced the notion of institutional entrepreneurs as 
agents who have an interest in specific institutional structures and who command 
resources that can be applied to influence institutionalized rules, either by 
supporting existing institutions or by using them for the creation of new 
institutions.   
 
Insights into institutional entrepreneurship may help to advance an extended view 
of institutionalization (e.g., Dorado, 2005; Leca, Battilana & Boxenbaum, 2006), 
which views actors as both embedded in institutional arrangements (rules and 
routines) and as developing creative activities.  DiMaggio (1988), in his 
introduction of the institutional entrepreneur, turns to a resource mobilization 
argument that states that institutions are changed by actors who command the 
resources necessary to successfully influence institutional designs towards their 
interests.  Garud, Hardy and Maguire (2007) point out that the institutional 
entrepreneurs create a whole new system of meaning that may include change in 
organizational practices.  The notion of an institutional entrepreneur is a concept 
that reintroduces agency, interests and power into institutional analysis of 
organizations.  Institutional entrepreneurs pursue goals related to the realization or 
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enhancement of their own interests and values (Beckert, 1999; Lounsbury & 
Crumbley, 2007). 
 
Beckert (1999) uses Schumpeter‟s (1991) definition of entrepreneurship to 
develop the definition of the institutional entrepreneur.  Schumpeter (1991) 
describes the entrepreneur as the innovator who leaves behind routines.  The 
entrepreneur devotes his/her attention to new options, takes over unusual tasks 
and realizes new combinations in the production process, against the adaptive 
pressure of his/her social surroundings (Beckert, 1999, p. 786).  While managers 
respond to changes by adaptation, entrepreneurs respond creatively (Schumpeter, 
1991).  So the entrepreneur takes a reflective stance towards established practices.  
The other aspect of entrepreneurs is the concept of creative destruction (Beckert, 
1999).  This refers to simultaneously destructive and constructive consequences of 
innovation.  Although innovations destroy traditional practices, they do so by 
simultaneously providing models of alternative ways of fulfilling a task.  The 
entrepreneur is the distinguished type of social actor who has the capability to 
take a reflective position towards institutionalized practices and can envision 
alternative ways of getting things done.  Entrepreneurs destroy established, taken-
for-granted rules if they believe such action to be profitable (Beckert, 1999).  
Leca, Battilana and Boxenbaum (2006) note that, to qualify as institutional 
entrepreneurs, actors must break with existing institutions (rules and routines).  
Seo and Creed (2002) postulate that the creation of alternative institutional 
arrangements (rules and routines) is triggered by the actors‟ ongoing experience 
of contradictory reality. 
 
The notion of institutional entrepreneurship is relevant to the institutional realm 
(structure) versus realm of action (agency) debate, implying that actors can 
disengage from their existing rules and routines and act to change the rules and 
routines.  At the organizational level, institutional entrepreneurs can pursue goals 
such as change in organizational practice.  The paradox of “embedded agency” 
can be overcome by institutional entrepreneurs as they are able to envision 
alternative institutional arrangements and develop them.  The institutional 
contradictions trigger organizational actors to act as institutional entrepreneurs 
(Seo & Creed, 2002).  The ongoing experience of contradictory institutional 
arrangements enables a shift in collective consciousness which transforms actors 
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from passive participants in the reproduction of existing institutional 
arrangements (rules and routines) into institutional entrepreneurs.  Institutional 
entrepreneurship has been a major step in the introduction and development of 
agency into institutional theory (Dorado, 2005).  The next section examines the 
integrated model of the theoretical approach for the thesis. 
 
3.6.0  An Integrated Model for the Theoretical Approach 
 
Figure 2 depicts the theoretical process of the model adapted for the thesis to 
explore innovations at TFL.  Institutional contradictions exist in an organisation‟s 
relationships with external constituents or within day-to-day interaction of actors 
within an organisational setting.  The pluralistic external constituents may place 
different demands on the organisational actors to achieve.  Competing rules and 
routines may be present, creating tensions and conflicts for organisational actors 
in their ongoing social interactions within organisational settings or with the 
external forces.  The contradiction/inconsistency allows institutional entrepreneurs 
to set up alternative rules and routines as the existing ones may be in conflict 
through the interaction of organisational participants.  Figure 2 depicts the process 
of institutionalisation as institutional entrepreneurs destroy existing institutions 
and create the need for a re-embedding process by managers which, in turn, re-
establishes institutional stability. 
 
The model shows that the development of social contradictions triggers change 
vis-à-vis institutional entrepreneurs.  Contradictions enable a shift in social actors‟ 
collective consciousness from an unreflective and passive mode to a reflective and 
active one.  Some uncertainty is created, however, with the help of reflective and 
active institutional entrepreneurs such as managers, who may mobilise other 
actors to bring about changes in institutional arrangements (rules and routines), so 
the uncertainty is reduced. 
 
It must be emphasised that, despite the institutional contradiction/ inconsistency, 
external agents‟ actions may still be critical to provide the “jolt” for change.  For 
example, external consultants may be brought in to induce change emanating from 
the contradictions of social interactions by organisational actors.  According to 
Abrahamson (1996) and Kitay and Wright (2004), consultants do take advantage 
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of uncertain managers through selling the latest management fad or fashion.  
Consultants are seen as “merchants of meaning”, well skilled at manipulating the 
impressions of their clients (Czarniawska-Joerges, 1990).  Kitay and Wright 
(2004) argue that, like modern day merchants, consultants convince clients to pay 
exorbitant fees for intangible service which they present as unique and high in 
“value added” (p.3).  What is also argued in the thesis is that, apart from 
institutional contradiction and organisational actors that trigger change, the 
change may also stem from an external “jolt” (e.g., Laughlin, 1991). 
 
Figure 2  A Dynamic Model of Institutional contradiction, Institutional 






                                                                                             
                                                                                                                                  
                                                                                                                                                 
 
         




(Source: Beckert (1999, p. 788), with slight modifications). 
 
The modification that has been made to Beckert‟s (1999) model is the additional 
external forces/ institutional contradictions before entrepreneurs/ managers act.  
The model has also added managers (institutional entrepreneurs) alongside 
entrepreneurs and have stated institution as encompassing rules and routines in the 
accounting literature.  The Beckert‟s (1999) model with slight modification drawn 
from Seo and Creed (2002) and Dorado (2005) have been used to add to 
management accounting literature which is novel and provides potential insight 
beyond the often used Burns and Scapens‟ (2000) model in accounting literature. 
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The entrepreneurs (change agent) in the above model are classified into 
entrepreneurs and the management team (institutional entrepreneur).  As seen 
from figure 2, this model of institutional theory offers explanation of change 
based on institutional forces or exogenous shocks (Beckert, 1999).  As discussed 
previously, Schumpeter (1991) describes the entrepreneur as the innovator who 
leaves behind existing routines and creates new routines.  External change agents 
such as the consultants may also come from the organisational field.  In the 
absence of such external forces, the change may emerge internally from the 
management team or a steering committee established by management within the 
organisation.  Beckert (1999) notes that while entrepreneurs (external change 
agents) are characterised by a reflective stance towards taken-for-granted rules 
and routines, the managers (institutional entrepreneurs) as a second social type, as 
introduced by Schumpeter (1991), orient their decisions on adaptation of the new 
routines created by entrepreneurs.  It is the manager who corresponds closely, 
with the emphasis on mimesis and homogeneity in institutional theory.  The 
managers are supposedly helpful in stabilising the change through the process of 
enacting, encoding and reproducing new practices on an ongoing basis (Burns & 
Scapens, 2000). 
 
The thesis does not argue that the contradictions lead deterministically to change 
but assumes that institutional entrepreneurs mediate between institutional 
contradictions and institutional change.  The introduction of new rules and 
routines may give rise to some uncertainty which the management team may be 
able to reduce through institutionalising the new rules and routines within an 
organisation. 
 
Pfeffer and Salancik (1978, p. 67) define uncertainty as “the degree to which 
future states of the world cannot be anticipated and accurately predicted.”  
According to Beckert (1999), uncertainty may be a crucial element in the 
explanation of institutional change.  The model shows that deinstitutionalisation 
of existing institutional rules and routines by institutional entrepreneurs produces 
uncertainty amongst organisational participants.  The process of institutional re-
embedding through the process of enactment and reproduction of new rules and 





Beckert (1999) notes that even in situations of high uncertainty, processes of 
adaptation will prevail.  Actors seek continuity by shaping their actions in 
accordance with newly emerging institutions (rules and routines) (e.g., Oliver, 
1991).  Only re-institutionalisation though process of enactment and reproduction 
of new rules and routines may mean the re-embedding of rules and routines, and 
reduces uncertainty within organisational actors.  Managers may be helpful in the 
re-embedding of rules and routines.  Fligstein (1997) points out that institutional 
entrepreneurs (managers) are actors who have social skills to motivate 
cooperation from other actors by providing them with common meanings and 
identities.  This may involve the creation of rules and routines that disparate 
groups can follow.  This can be achieved through education and training 
programs.  Fligstein (1997) emphasises other strategies such as agenda setting and 
framing action (p.399) for achieving stability in rules and routines.  Agenda 
setting is an important tool whereby the institutional entrepreneur has the ability 
to set the agenda for other actors.  Framing action is an approach whereby the 
institutional entrepreneur convinces other actors who do not necessarily share 
interests that whatever eventuates from new rules and routines is in their interests.  
Fligstein (1997) espouses that once a number of actors come on board, others will 
follow.  The central issue is to bring enough actors on board and keep them there 
so that others may join them, either willingly or by default. 
 
In much of the institutional theory literature, actors are depicted as passive 
recipients of institutionalised rules and routines, unconsciously enacting rules and 
routines.  Institutional theorists have also viewed actors as active, rational 
opportunists (e.g., Oliver, 1991; Seo & Creed, 2002; Dorado, 2005).  Such actors 
are willing to take any action for institutional change that will enhance their 
interests, unconstrained by existing rules and routines (e.g., Oliver, 1991; Burns & 
Scapens, 2000).  Burns and Scapens (2000) claim that power (hierarchical power 
or power of a strong individual) can be used to introduce new MACS rules and 
routines.  Power located elsewhere in the organisation may be mobilised to resist 
such MACS rules and routines. 
 
The above model attempts to explain phenomena in processual terms, teasing out 
why and how actions become what they are over time.  It is essential to study 
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human agency within an organisational setting, which the study intends to 
accomplish.  In their actions, and through institutional contradictions, individual 
actors or entrepreneurs may produce and reproduce new rules and routines on an 
ongoing basis.  New institutions can be produced and reproduced by institutional 
contradictions and institutional entrepreneurs on an ongoing basis, as shown by 
the model.  Institutions are conceptualised as the taken-for-granted assumptions 
which define categories of actors, their appropriate activities and relationships 
(Burns & Scapens, 2000; Scapens, 2006).  The Beckert‟s (1999) model has been 
modified to include aspects of Seo and Creed‟s (2002) theorisation of institutional 
contradictions and Dorado‟s (2005) conception of institutional entrepreneurs.  The 
model depicts an integration of often used new institutional sociology theory and 
old institutional economics theory literature in accounting.  The thesis adopts an 
inclusive view of the two theories rather than explicitly distinguishing them.  
After discussing, the theoretical model for the study, the next section presents the 
research method employed for gathering the empirical evidence for the study. 
 
3.7.0   Research Methods 
3.7.1  Introduction 
 
The thesis collects empirical evidence from a case study of TFL through the use 
of semi-structured interviews and study of archival evidence such as annual 
reports, board papers, and other internal proprietary documents, including the 
corporate plan of the subject organization.  The methods used are explained in the 
following section. 
 
3.7.2   Collection of Empirical Evidence for the Study 
 
The approach was to undertake qualitative research which focused on a case study 
strategy (see Yin, 1981, 1994; Scapens, 1990).  Case study approach was chosen 
as it has an explanatory role and is critical for the process of theory construction 
and development.  Interviews were used to collect empirical evidence.  Those 
interviewed were considered to be the ones most involved with the change process 
such as the Chief Executive, Strategic Manager, Quality Manager, Chief Financial 
Officer, Accountants, General Manager- Access, Branch Managers and 
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Operational staff.  Historical data on TFL when it was a government entity was 
gathered from published sources such as annual reports and from interviews with 
past employees and the existing employees who saw TFL transform from a 
government entity to a private company.  Historical information on TFL was also 
gathered by visiting National Archives of Fiji in Suva.  Visits were also made to 
the Commerce Commission office in Suva, the regulator for TFL, in order to view 
archival information on public submission of TFL services and pricing. 
 
Data collection for the case study took place over a 5 year period from 2002 to  
2006.  The 5 year period allowed to capture ongoing changes at TFL and to 
facilitate interviews with a larger number of employees.  The interviews provided 
the main information; a total of 47 interviews were undertaken in the 5 year 
period.  Appendix 3 illustrates a list of interviewees.  While reporting results on 
chapters 7, 8 and 9, anonymised reference numbers are utilised as provided in 
appendix 3 to reflect interviewees‟ subjective views. 
 
The annual reports of the company provided background information to facilitate 
interviews.  The first interview was done with the intention of gathering general 
information; in particular, the history of TFL was discussed identifying 
implications of accounting changes that came about over the last few years.  The 
interviews were initiated with a semi-structured questionnaire, through a common 
set of general questions (see Appendix 2 for interview questions).  The 
interviewees were encouraged to express their views in their own words.  Even if 
they raised issues outside the interview questions, they were encouraged to 
elaborate on them. 
 
All interviews except one were taped and transcribed.  A random selection of the 
interview transcripts were given back to the participants to obtain a clear 
understanding of the issues involved.  Interviews lasted between an hour and two, 
and the researcher made brief notes during and after each interview.  In addition to 
interview transcripts, the collected annual reports, corporate report, board papers 
and other internal documents such as the Quality Manual and performance 




The topics selected for interviews related mainly to the organizational structural 
and strategic changes at TFL, and their implications on the MACS.  These 
changes included the corporatisation of FPTL, separation of Post Fiji from FPTL 
which later became TFL, the implementation of accounting changes after 
corporatisation and the introduction of the Total Quality Management and 
balanced scorecard (financial and non-financial performance measures) at TFL.  
The interviews took place in formal surroundings: in board rooms of TFL and its 
parent company of Amalgamated Telecom Holdings Limited (ATH), and in the 
offices of the staff concerned.  Interview guides were prepared in advance, but 
gradually these were used less in favour of new perspectives introduced by the 
respondents.  Most questions were asked in an open-ended manner to help 
interviewees to respond in their own ways.  The aim was to generate a rich source 
of field data. 
 
Efforts were made to obtain a comprehensive understanding of respondents‟ self- 
reflection, language rationale and perceptions of MACS changes.  Most of the 
empirical evidence came from interviews about the “change” phenomena and 
related thought and speech references about actions.  The rationale for adopting 
this approach was to gain insight into the impact on, and the importance of, 
management accounting in the light of external events.  It was nevertheless, not an 
easy endeavour to accomplish interviewees‟ subjective understanding of reality.  
The interviewees spoke about past events that had occurred some years ago.  
Possibly they talked of them differently during the interview than they may have 
done at that time of MACS implementation.  The interviewees had time to 
rationalise and make sense of MACS changes after MACS had become 
embedded. 
 
High priority was given to the respondents‟ own interpretations and perceptions of 
management accounting change.  These efforts reflect the interpretive orientation 
and the preference for complexity recognition in the organization. 
 
Empirical evidence was collected from 2002 to 2006 from TFL in the capital, 
Suva and its branches around other urban centres in Fiji.  Post Fiji workers were 
also interviewed as they were part of TFL prior to 1996.  Interviews were also 
conducted with Ministry of Public Enterprise employees as they were responsible 
61 
 
for the public sector reforms in Fiji.  Management members of the parent 
company, ATH, were also interviewed.    Interviewees included a range of people 
from within the organization and outside, such as Post Fiji and ATH.  Interviews 
were not limited to financial personnel only but involved staff from all levels of 
the organizational hierarchy, from grass root level to the board level.  Some 
interviewees, such as the Quality Manager and the Strategic Manager were visited 
more than once to obtain clarity of information.   
 
The feedback on results was sought from participants and they agreed on the 
results.  A few alterations were made on the interview transcripts by participants 
to give a better clarity to what they were trying to portray in interviews.  The 
organisation management had said during the time of granting access to the 
research site that they can be publicly identified. 
 
3.7.3   Evidence Analysis 
 
Ansari and Euske (1987) and Creswell (1994) note that the evidence gathered 
from interviews and document studies can be analysed for patterns and themes.  
Tables were drawn that listed issues frequently raised in interviews.  Several 
themes (such as change agents, new practices such as Total Quality Management, 
external influences on change and resistance to change) were drawn from the 
responses and the data representing these were clustered together.  The 
documentary evidence collected was also subsequently matched with the themes 
as advocated by such authors as Tsamenyi et al. (2006).  Institutional theory was 
drawn on to make sense of the empirical and documentary evidence gathered from 
the study in the context of MACS changes at TFL.  The empirical evidence 
collected called for refinement and modification of institutional theory.   
 
3.8.0   Summary 
 
This chapter explained the methodology and methods used in the thesis.  It has 
been argued that an interpretive approach using institutional theory is an 
appropriate research methodology for this qualitative interpretive field research as 
it offers the prospect of contributing important dimensions of knowledge to 
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accounting research.  Seo and Creed‟s (2002) insights on institutional 
contradictions and Beckert‟s (1999) and Dorado‟s (2005) conceptions of 
institutional entrepreneurs were drawn on to expand institutional theory literature 
in management accounting.  Beckert‟s model of institutional theory partly 
resembles Burns and Scapens‟ (2000) model of institutionalisation, with the 
exception that it is the institutional entrepreneurs who create changes in an 
organisational setting.  Burns and Scapens‟ (2000) model which is based on 
Barley and Tolbert‟s (1997) model has been perceived by Seo and Creed (2002) 
to be a model of stability rather than change.  For this reason, Seo and Creed‟s 
(2002) notion of institutional contradiction and Beckert‟s (1999) and Dorado‟s 
(2005) notion of institutional entrepreneurs were adapted to resolve the paradox of 
embedded agency or stability within the institutional theory literature, alongside 
Burns and Scapens‟ (2000) model.  The institutional 
contradictions/inconsistencies provide an impetus for institutional entrepreneurs 
to carry out institutional change.   
 
The chapter further argued in favour of multiple research techniques.  Case studies 
are considered appropriate for the interpretive methodology, for they enable 
deeper and richer understanding of MACS within the broader social, political and 
organizational contexts.  There is a need to study accounting and control practices 
at the various levels within organisations, and the relationship between these 
levels and various groups of managers.  This would facilitate gaining the 
maximum benefits from the case study method of research in MACS.  The next 
chapter discusses the background to the political, social, cultural and economic 













Chapter 4: Background to the Socio-political System of 
Fiji. 
 
4.1.0   Introduction 
 
This chapter gives an overview of the wider political and social system within 
which Telecom Fiji Limited (TFL) is embedded.  The wider social order and 
TFL‟s daily activities are intertwined.  Deegan (2002) posits that society, politics 
and economics are inseparable and economic issues cannot meaningfully be 
investigated in the absence of considerations of the social, political and 
institutional framework in which the economic activity takes place (see also, 
Miller, 1994; Baxter & Chua, 2003).  The wider political and social system 
influences the MACS processes within TFL.  The next section outlines the 
physical environment and demography of Fiji. 
 
4.2.0    The Physical Environment and Demography 
 
The Fiji Islands lie in the South West Pacific between 15 and 22 degrees South, 
177 degrees West, and 175 degrees East (see Appendix 4).  Its sovereignty 
extends over 250,000 square miles, of which only 7,050 square miles constitute 
dry land.  The archipelago includes approximately 300 reef-fringed islands, the 
biggest two being Viti Levu (4,011 square miles) and Vanua Levu (2,173 square 
miles).  The current population of Fiji is approximately 827,900 (Fiji Islands 
Bureau of Statistics, 2008).  Of this, Fijians comprise 57 percent of the total 
population, whilst Indians make up 38 percent and other races (Europeans, 
Chinese, Part-Europeans, Rotumans and others) comprise the remaining 5 percent.  
Indians, however, were outnumbering all other races prior to 1987 (see Appendix 
5).  The annual population growth rate for Fiji is 2.0 per cent (World Bank, 1996), 
while the GDP per capita is around US$1,200 per annum (McMaster, 2001). The 
workforce of approximately 300,000 is well educated, and English is the official 
language of government (McMaster, 2001).  The next section looks at aspects of 





4.3.0    An Overview of Fiji’s Independence and afterwards 
 
This section considers Fiji‟s independence from British colonial rule and the 
political development since then.  Fiji was a British colony from 1874 until 1970 
when it was granted independence.  Since then, Fiji has faced a turbulent political 
environment.  This is not to say that Fiji did not face turbulent times earlier.  Prior 
to independence, the tensions and conflict culminated in the oil distribution 
industry strike of 1959 and the sugar cane growers‟ strike of 1960 (Narayan, 
1984).  The demands of the workers during industrial action varied considerably 
from wage claims, better working conditions, job security and fair treatment of 
workers to claims for higher prices for their produce (Narayan, 1984).  During the 
oil distribution strike, there was considerable anti-government and anti-foreign 
company feeling throughout the capital city of Suva.  There was damage to 
private property which was selective.  The public anger was vented mainly 
through damaging the buildings of large employers, most of whom were foreign 
companies.  Some colonial officers and police were also assaulted.  Narayan 
(1984) postulates that the assault on the police and damage to government 
property were indicative of strong anti-colonial government feelings.   
 
After independence, Fiji witnessed four coups. The democratically elected 
governments were overthrown and democracy was subsequently restored after the 
first three coups.  With the reinstatement of democracy, some strings were 
attached such as the stipulation that only indigenous Fijians from a chiefly family 
background can be appointed President and Vice President.  The appointment of 
President and Vice President is made by a group of tribal leaders who belong to a 
group called “the Great Council of Chiefs” which draws support from the Fiji 
government through the Ministry of Fijian Affairs.   
 
However, a fourth coup eventuated in December 2006 led by Commodore Frank 
Bainimarama and currently Fiji is led by an interim administration.  The deposed 
government of Laisenia Qarase referred his removal case to High Court.  The 
judges made ruling in favour of Bainimarama‟s military regime, that the removal 
was legal.  However, Qarase referred his grievances to Fiji‟s Appeal Court in 
2009 which made the ruling in favour of Qarase, that his deposed government was 
lawful.  The Appeals Court ruled that a caretaker Prime Minister be appointed 
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who would lead Fiji to democratic elections.  However, Fiji‟s President decided to 
abrogate the constitution and dismissed the judges instead.  He then reinstated 
Bainimarama, once again, as interim Prime Minister.  Currently Fiji is governed 
by an interim administration backed by the military with various new released 
Decrees in the absence of a constitution.  Bainimarama is also involved in 
investigating corruption in the previous administration: to this end he has set up 
an investigatory anti-corruption unit.   
4.3.1 Independence 
 
In October 1970, Fiji became an independent sovereign democratic state within 
the British Commonwealth after 96 years of British colonial rule (Lloyd, 1982).  
This amounted to the restoration of political power, which the native rulers of Fiji 
had surrendered to Britain in October, 1874.  Many of the provisions of the 1970 
and the post-coup 1990 constitutions and administrative processes bear a 
resemblance to those which prevailed in pre-cession Fiji and during the colonial 
era.  Of particular significance are the provisions which confer preferential status 
on Fijians in matters relating to land ownership and for the conduct of 
administration affairs within the Fijian community.  This facilitated the formation 
of a communal electoral system that encouraged racialism and segregation along 
ethnic lines.  Several commentators (Lloyd, 1982; Lal, 1992; Kamkamica, 1997; 
Alam, Lawrence & Nandan, 2004) argue that the unstated presumption behind 
colonial rulers policy was that the Fiji Islands belonged to the Fijian community 
and that, by right of their prior settlement of the islands, the Fijians had at all 
times a prior claim to the use of as much land as was necessary for their 
maintenance and support. 
 
To prohibit land sales, the control of land was taken away from the indigenous 
owners and given to a government statutory authority (Native Land Trust Board).  
The Native Land Trust Board (NLTB) was responsible for issuing leases in return 
for rent; the Board administered all native land for the benefit of the ethnic Fijian 
owners and it exists as a prominent institution in Fiji today.  The NLTB retains up 
to 25 per cent of the rent to cover its administrative costs and 25 percent goes to 
the chiefs of the upper level of the social hierarchy, while the members of the 
„mataqali‟ (village) share the remaining 50 percent (Alam, Lawrence & Nandan, 
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2004).  Traditional administration also safeguards the land, traditional customs 
and way of life for ethnic Fijians (Alam, Lawrence & Nandan, 2004).  The Great 
Council of Chiefs is the apex of the Fijian administration system while the Fijian 
Affairs Board is its main executive arm that forms part of the central government.  
In the case of traditional administration, the country is divided into 14 provinces, 
each of which is headed by a Roko Tui (Head of a Province). 
 
At the apex of the Fijian social structure (illustrated in Figure 3) is the vanua, 
formed of the agnatic descendants of a common ancestor living in the same 
general area.  Each vanua would have one or more yavusa, the members again 
agnatically related (Alam et al., 2004).  The yavusa is composed of several 
mataqali whose members are, in turn, the agnatic descendants of a son of the 
yavusa founder.  Within each mataqali are one or more extended families.  Figure 
3 illustrates the Fijian social structure. 
 





  Yavusa    Yavusa   Yavusa (clan) 
 
 
   Mataqali    Mataqali      Mataqali (sub-clan) 
 
 
I Toka toka    I Toka toka   I Toka toka (families) 
 
   (Source: Alam et al., 2004, p. 142)   
 
A Westminster style of bicameral legislature was established by the 1970 
constitution.  The House of Representatives consisted of 52 members.  Of these, 
22 are Fijians, 22 are Indians, and the remaining eight are the General Electors
7
.  
A Fijian-dominated government under the Alliance Party ruled the country for 17 
                                                          
7
 General Electors represent the minority groups that reside in Fiji.  These include the Chinese, 
Europeans, part- Europeans, Pacific Islanders and other minority groups. 
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years after independence.  This was under the Prime Ministership of Ratu Sir 
Kamisese Mara.  The opposition was the National Federation Party, 
predominantly an ethnic Indian party.  In 1985 the multi-racial Labour Party was 
formed.  This party attempted to promote the interest of labour and the poor.  At 
the same time, the Labour Party was critical of both the Alliance and the National 
Federation Party as serving the interests of the rich and ignoring the claims of 
workers, the unemployed and poor which the Labour Party claimed to serve.  The 
Labour Party later formed a coalition with the National Federation Party and 
fought the 1987 elections.  This coalition won the elections and later came to 
power.  Doctor Timoci Bavadra (an indigenous Fijian) was elected the new Prime 
Minister of the country.  Many indigenous Fijians saw this as the erosion of their 
political control (Lodhia, 2003) as the government was composed of majority 
Indo-Fijians, although the cabinet was constituted of equal numbers of indigenous 
Fijians and Indo Fijians.
8
  This government was short-lived as a military coup was 
staged on 14 May 1987 which overthrew the democratically elected government.  
This restored Fijian supremacy in political affairs.  The perpetrators of the coup 
justified their actions in terms of returning the power to the indigenous Fijians and 
as a means of promoting indigenous aspirations.  The next section discusses the 
military coups of 1987 and its implications for the economy. 
 
4.3.2   The Military Coup of 1987 
 
The 1987 military coup was led by Major Sitiveni Rabuka, a high ranking military 
officer.  As a result, the 1970 constitution was abrogated and the country came up 
with the totally new 1990 constitution which introduced an electoral system that 
compartmentalised voters on ethnic lines.  This curbed racial integration through 
voting on the basis of ethnicity: ethnic Fijians could only vote for ethnic Fijians 
while Indo-Fijians could only vote for Indo-Fijian candidates.  The 70 communal 
seat parliament had 37 seats for the Fijians, 27 for Indians, 5 for General Electors 
and 1 for Rotumans.
9
  This ensured that indigenous Fijians have political 
                                                          
8
 In Fiji, Indo-Fijians refer to people of Indian descent. 
9
 Rotumans are people who originate from the island of Rotuma in Fiji.  Although the island has 
been politically part of Fiji, Rotuman culture resembles that of the Polynesian island, to the east , 
most closely with Tonga and Samoa.  Because of their Polynesian appearance and distinctive 
language, Rotumans constitute a recognisable minority group within Fiji. 
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supremacy over all other races in Fiji, although the indigenous Fijian and Indo-
Fijian population were almost of the same size at that time (see Appendix 5).   
 
The economy, however, was on the verge of collapse following the coup (Lal, 
1992).  There was a massive outflow of capital, suspension of the tourist industry 
and a decline in sugar production stemming from droughts, hurricanes, and 
delayed harvesting, with a sharp fall in the country‟s foreign reserve.  As a result, 
the Reserve Bank devalued the currency by 35 per cent in 1987, imposed 
exchange controls, cut salaries in the public service and reduced grants to the 
public sector (Lal, 1992).  These measures helped to ease the economic situation, 
but more was needed to revitalise the depressed economy.  To achieve this end, 
the interim government emerged with a number of policies such as the Tax-Free 
Factory/ Tax Free Zone schemes, deregulation policies and corporatisation of 
public sectors.  The above measures led to a strong recovery with a growth rate of 
11.8% in 1989 as against 1% in 1988 (Nandan, 1997).  In the period 1990-1994 
the growth was around 2.5%.  In 1996, the growth rate expanded to 3% from 
2.1% in 1995 (Reserve Bank of Fiji, Annual Report, 1996).   
 
The 1990 Constitution of the Republic of Fiji reaffirmed racial differentiation and 
conferred differing rights on the two main ethnic groups in Fiji (for commentary, 
see Alam, et al., 2004).  The indigenous Fijians retained political dominance and 
control of natural and material aspects of the environment, including ownership of 
land, forests and fishing rights.  It did not take long for the Fiji government to 
realise that the 1990 Constitution was unworkable. This stemmed from an 
increasing international pressure on Fiji to adhere to the principles of democracy.  
Fiji was suspended from the Commonwealth and in order to re-enter the 
Commonwealth, she had to come up with a constitution based on democracy. The 
ethnic Indian political parties also provided an impetus for the revision of the 
constitution.  
 
Set up in 1995, a three-member review team recommended 697 changes as part of 
1990 Constitution reform (Alam et al., 2004).  The approved revisions engendered 
the emergence of the 1997 Constitution which was welcomed by the international 
community and Fiji was readmitted into the Commonwealth.  In the revised 1997 
Constitution, most of the 1990 clauses on Fijian land ownership and political 
69 
 
supremacy had been safeguarded, but the constitution provided for cross voting 
across ethnic lines.   
 
The Labour Party won most seats in the 1999 elections and, together with other 
minority parties, in the spirit of multiracialism was able to form a People‟s 
Coalition Government that was headed by an Indo-Fijian.  After being in office 
for a year, it was overthrown on 19 May 2000 through a civilian coup led by 
failed businessman George Speight.  Speight had backing of a section of the Fiji 
military forces, Counter Revolutionary Warfare Unit, to carry out the coup. The 
next section discusses the civilian coup of 2000. 
 
4.3.3 The Civilian Coup of 2000 
 
Under the 1999 elections, Mahendra Chaudhry became the first Indo-Fijian Prime 
Minister of Fiji.  His reign was short-lived owing to a terrorist coup led by failed 
businessman, George Speight.  Speight attributed the coup to indigenous Fijians‟ 
dissatisfaction with the government.  The political impasse surrounding the 2000 
coup lasted longer than the previous 1987 coup.  Hostages in the 2000 coup were 
held captive for a period of 56 days while people were required to carry on 
businesses as usual. 
 
The legitimate government of Fiji had been taken hostage.  George Speight, the 
perpetrator of the coup, claimed that his action was warranted in order to put 
control back in the hands of indigenous Fijians.  Singh (2001) reports that many 
people had not reconciled to the Rabuka government‟s defeat, and they included 
nationalist Fijians, defeated politicians and opportunistic Fijians who were denied 
the fruits of power in the changed government.  The underlying rationale for the 
2000 coup seemed to lie in the competition for power among the indigenous 
Fijians. 
 
To make matters worse, at the height of coup a group of terrorist Fijians took over 
the Monosavu Hydroelectricity Dam.  This resulted in the rationing of electricity 
supply.  People were supplied with electricity for intervals of two hours as the 
electricity company relied on generators which could not supply the whole 
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population at one time.  Some parts of the country received electricity for the first 
two hours while others received power for the next two hours, and so on.  The 
terrorist Fijians curtailed the inflow of water to the power station and demanded 
compensation for the use of their land.  They claimed that it was a long standing 
demand of over 20 years which still had not been resolved.  Many other 
grievances were also expressed by the indigenous Fijians through actions such as 
the blocking of public roads and the taking over of Korovou town to express their 
grievances in the absence of a government.  At the height of the coup there were 
also selective burning of Indo Fijian businesses and looting in the capital, Suva. 
 
Fiji has experienced four such armed overthrows of democratically elected 
governments in 20 years (with the latest in 2006).  The coups, as described 
previously, took place owing to a section of the indigenous Fijian population 
feeling displaced and suffering a loss of power by the change in government. 
 
Shortly after the 2000 coup, Laisenia Qarase was appointed as the caretaker prime 
minister.  In June, 2001 he formed a “Soqosoqo Duavata ni Lewanivanua Party” 
(Fijian United Party).  Parliamentary elections were held in August 2001 which 
provided Fiji with a democratically elected government and gave a mandate to the 
government headed by Prime Minister Laisenia Qarase.  However, some 
uncertainty still dominated the political arena of Fiji.  Under the 1997 
Constitution, Qarase was expected to offer the Fiji Labour Party cabinet positions 
as the latter had won 28 seats against Qarase‟s 32 seats.  Qarase declined to fulfil 
this expectation and the matter was referred to the Appeals Court which made the 
ruling in favour of the deposed Labour members that they were entitled to be in 
government.  To the Labour Party, Qarase had offered 14 cabinet positions with 
minor portfolios in an expanded 36 member cabinet which lacked the Fiji Labour 
Party leader Chaudhry (Fiji Live, 24 November, 2004).  However, Chaudhry 
claimed that his party was entitled to 17 such seats and had referred the matter 
back to the Supreme Court.  The Supreme Court ruled that the two leaders had to 
decide on the makeup of a multiparty cabinet.  Chaudhry had instead taken up the 
opposition leader‟s position and posited that the supporters of his party claimed 
strong opposition to joining a government that had no respect for the constitution, 
and that had mismanaged the nation‟s finances (Fiji Live, 24 November, 2004).  
Chaudhry seemed to refer to the agricultural scam under Qarase‟s administration 
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whereby millions of dollars had been lost and only a handful of people seemed to 
have been prosecuted so far. 
 
Chand (2006) points out that since 1986 there have been 13 governments in Fiji, 
which makes the political environment quite turbulent.  Table 2 summarises the 
governments in Fiji since April 1987. 
 
Table 2 Governments in Fiji 
 
Period Type of Government 
April 1987 Elected democratic government 
April 1987- May 1987 Elected democratic government deposed in a military 
coup. 
May 1987- September 
1987 
Military appointed government deposed in a military 
coup 
September 1987 – 
December 1987 
Military government 
December 1987- April 
1992 
Military appointed government 
May 1992- February 
1994 
Elected government under the undemocratic 1990 
Constitution; loses budget vote and resigns. 
February 1994- May 
1999 
Elected government under the undemocratic 1990 
Constitution. 
May 1999- May 2000 Elected government under a democratic constitution; 
deposed in a military- backed terrorist coup. 
May 2000- July 2000 Government held hostage by military backed terrorists.  
No effective government but military claims power. 
July 2000- March 2001 Military appointed government resigns after a court 
decision declared it illegal. 
March 2001- 
September 2001 
Military appointed government re-appointed and 
backed by the military. 
September 2001- 
December 2006 
Elected government under  a democratic constitution, 
deposed in December 2006 military coup 
January 2007 onwards Military appointed government. 
 
The coups carried social costs which Fiji had to bear.  Social problems in Fiji have 
actually elevated since the coups (Halapua, 2003).  As in most other countries, the 
victims of social problems are invariably the poor, the powerless and the weak.  
Women and children seem to have been affected significantly by the breakdown 
in social order since 1987 (Halapua, 2003).  The Fiji Women‟s Crisis Centre 
report (2001) reported that after the 2000 terrorist coup, women‟s lives were 
changed as a result of a “multitude of factors: job losses, pay cuts, fear and 
insecurity, sexual assaults, domestic abuse, family tensions, land issues and 
emotional trauma” (2001, p.1).  Many garment factories in Fiji had to close as a 
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consequence of the 2000 coup and this impacted on many families, especially 
those in the low income groups.  Women were the first victims of this occurrence 
(Halapua, 2003).  The ensuing section explores some of the social problems that 
Fiji faced as a consequence of the coups. 
 
4.3.4   The Social Problem after the 2000 coups 
 
A survey was undertaken by Save the Children Fiji (SCF), a non-government 
organisation, on the impact of the 2000 crisis on children, families, communities 
and organisations.  The political crisis of May 2000 resulted in greater 
unemployment and political instability and enhanced the pace of economic and 
social change (SCF, 2001).  SCF reports an increase in poverty.  The Fiji Sun (15 
December, 2004) highlights that poverty is the main cause of dropouts in primary 
and secondary schools in Fiji.  Although the Ministry of Education has introduced 
the policy of compulsory education in line with the right of every person to basic 
education and equal access to educational institution, the purpose is defeated 
when some children are inhibited by poverty from attending school. 
 
Almost 25 per cent of the people in Fiji live below the poverty line (Kumar & 
Prasad, 2004; Prasad & Reddy, 2002).  The Fiji Census (1996) report posits that 
31,761 Indo-Fijian households suffered below average or inferior conditions.  
This constitutes 46 per cent of all Indo-Fijian households in the country in 1996 
(see also Kumar & Prasad, 2004).  The political crisis has placed low-income 
families at a considerable risk of malnutrition.  “At every school visited, 
malnutrition has reportedly escalated since the crises” (SCF, 2001, p.4).  The 
significant increase in the number of unemployed people throughout Fiji has 
created serious consequences for children and families (SCF, 2001).  Recent years 
have seen an increase in the number of people requesting assistance from 
government and NGOs, the greatest number of people begging on the street and 
an increasing number of malnourished children (SCF, 2001). 
 
Ongoing land tenure and use issues have led to an increasing number of families 
(mainly Indo-Fijians) being displaced, often after multi-generation livelihood on 
the same land.  In certain instances, families have vacated their homes at short 
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notice without the required financial resources for resettlement.  No resettlement 
assistance had been offered to the evicted farmers by the Qarase government in 
terms of finance to resettle them elsewhere, although the previous Chaudhry 
government was offering F$28,000 for the resettled farmers.  Ethnic Fijians, on 
the other hand, are given F$10,000 to take over sugar cane farming on this land.  
Many of these evicted families of mostly ethnic Indians now live with relatives or 
reside in squatter settlements in or near urban centres (SCF Report, 2001). 
 
Many skilled people of both Fijian and Indo-Fijian ethnicity left Fiji for countries 
with greater political stability and better working conditions.  Both the Fijian 
Teachers Association and the Fiji Nurses Association tell of the increasing 
number of qualified teachers and nurses who have emigrated (SCF, 2001; 
Gounder, 2001).  The Fiji Islands Bureau of Statistics (2003) reports that 5,590 
people emigrated in 2000 and 5,877 in 2002.  Most of these emigrants are 
presumably skilled workers.  Lal (2003) reports that between 1987 and 1996, 
5,100 Indo-Fijian professionals emigrated, of whom, 21 per cent were architects, 
engineers and related technicians, 15 per cent accountants, 31 per cent teachers, 
12 per cent medical, dental, veterinary and related workers, and 21 per cent other 
professionals.  The impact of their loss on Fiji is visible and acutely felt, 
especially in the areas of health and education.  Once reasonably self-sufficient in 
medical personnel, Fiji now imports doctors and nurses from overseas and there is 
an increasing shortage of science and mathematics teachers as well (Lal, 2003).  
Fiji Live (10 November, 2004) reports that the World Bank has also highlighted 
Fiji‟s brain drain as posing a major challenge for the country‟s development.  In 
its report on East Asia and the Pacific, the Bank highlighted that one of the 
biggest issues facing Fiji was its high level of emigration by skilled workers.  
Around 0.7 percent of the nation‟s population of skilled workers left the country 
in the first 10 months in 2004 (Fiji Live, 2004). 
 
Having discussed the social problems, the next section concentrates on yet another 
military coup that took place on December 5, 2006 that ousted the democratically 
elected government of Laisenia Qarase‟s “Soqososqo Duavata ni Lewavanua” 






4.3.5   The Military Coup of 2006 
 
On 5 December 2006 Fiji‟s military commander, Commodore Frank 
Bainimarama, seized control of the country in the fourth coup in 20 years.  There 
had been a long war of words between Frank Bainimarama and Laisenia Qarase 
over the controversial bills that Qarase was intending to introduce, including the 
granting of pardons to those involved in the 2000 coups and the ownership of 
coastal and marine resources (Qoliqoli bill) by the tribes in Fiji.  Bainimarama 
was against these bills and asked Qarase to withdraw them, which Qarase refused. 
 
After seizing power, Commodore Bainimarama accused the deposed Prime 
Minister, Qarase, of corruption and of leading Fiji down a path of economic 
decline and shambles.  Bainimarama also claimed that Qarase‟s proposed 
legislation to offer amnesty to those responsible for the 2000 coup which he 
(Bainimarama) helped put down and also Qarase‟s attempt to bring in other 
controversial bills such as the ownership of coastal and marine resources by tribal 
groups (through, “qoliqoli” bill) would severely affect the tourist industry as 
payment needed to be made to the tribes for the use of coastal areas in Fiji by the 
hotel industry.  Another reason advanced by Bainimarama for the coup was that 
the deposed prime minister had created tension in the military by trying to have 
Bainimarama removed. 
 
Bainimarama did not then abolish the 1997 Constitution and declared that all 
government agencies, including the courts and ministries (which were under the 
control of their chief executives), would continue to function.  He argued that the 
military believes in the constitution and that the takeover was constitutionally 
justified under the doctrine of necessity in the constitution.  He claimed to have 
stepped into the shoes of president and in this capacity, under section 109(1) of 
the constitution, he (as the president) is empowered to dismiss the Prime Minister, 
Laisenia Qarase. 
 
On January 2007, Bainimarama handed back presidency to Ratu Josefa Iloilo.  On 
15 January 2007, 15 cabinet ministers backed by the military were sworn in by 
President Ratu Josefa Iloilo while Bainimarama was appointed interim Prime 
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Minister.  Bainimarama claims that electoral boundaries need to be determined on 
the basis of recent population census before the election is held.  He also wants all 
the previous government‟s corruption cases to be investigated, to which end he 
has set up an anti-corruption unit.  He has established a Peoples‟ Charter which 
aims to build a better Fiji, into a non-racial, culturally vibrant and well-governed 
society.  To this end, the 40-member “National Council for Building a Better Fiji” 
has been set up by Fiji‟s President (Fiji Government Online: www.fiji.gov.fj).  
However, the deposed Qarase government filed a case against their removal in 
Fiji‟s High Court.  The High Court judges ruled in favour of military.  However, 
Qarase appealed the case, and the Appeals Court ruled in favour of Qarase and 
gave the verdict that a care taker Prime Minister other than Qarase be appointed 
who would take the country towards democratic rule.  However, soon after the 
Appeals Court decision, the Fijian President abrogated the 1997 constitution and 
sacked all the judges.  The President claimed that the elections will be held in 
2014 after electoral reforms are completed.  Currently, Fiji is led by an interim 
government backed by the military. 
 
Having discussed the 2006 coup, the next section discusses the Fijian cultural 
context within which TFL is embedded.  Culture shapes accounting and control 
systems in organisations.  The Fijian culture may be a useful aid to explain actors‟ 
behaviour in an organisational setting.   
 
4.4.0  Fijian Cultural Context 
 
According to Hofstede (1980), culture is a vital influence affecting a country‟s 
accounting environment.  Culture has been defined as “the collective 
programming of the mind which distinguishes the members of one human group 
from another” (Hofstede, 1980, p.25).  In an effort to develop an acceptable and 
empirically based terminology to describe culture, Hofstede (1980) identifies four 
distinct dimensions which he considers to be reflective of the cultural orientation 
of a country.
10
  The four dimensions are: individualism versus collectivism, large 
versus small power distance, strong versus weak uncertainty avoidance, and 
                                                          
10
 Hofstede‟s cultural dimensions are just one-albeit influential scheme for describing cultural 
characteristics and have been criticised by some.  However, Hofstede‟s cultural dimensions are 
predominantly used in the accounting literature. 
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masculinity versus femininity.  The ensuing paragraphs discuss these dimensions 
as they apply in Fijian culture. 
 
Individualism versus Collectivism 
 
Individualism represents a loosely knit social framework in society wherein 
individuals are expected to take care of themselves and their immediate families 
only.  Collectivism, its opposite, denotes a preference for a tightly knit social 
framework in which individuals can expect their relatives or other in-groups to 
look after them in exchange for unquestioning loyalty.  The Fijians are still 
devoted to their communal social structures and obedient to their chiefs (Achary, 
1998a, 1998b).  The traditional Fijian socio-economic system remains pervasively 
cooperative, communal and village-oriented (Lloyd, 1982).  The chiefs undertake 
the responsibility for making decisions on behalf of the people as a right coupled 
with duty and, in return, receive strict loyalty and obedience to their authority 
from the people (Lawson, 1990).   
 
The Fijian chiefs had given their islands to Great Britain in 1874 by a Deed of 
Cession.  In exchange, the British government promised to protect Fijian interests.  
The colonial rulers opted to preserve the integrity of the villages as subsistence 
communities.  The villages were grouped in provinces, each administered by an 
official, normally a local hereditary chief, responsible to the secretary for Native 
Affairs.  The need for labourers grew with the increased level of trade.  To meet 
the planters‟ labour needs the government indentured workers from India (Norton, 
1981). 
 
Upon arrival, the Indians were assigned to estates that were at that time 
monopolised by an Australian owner, the Colonial Sugar Refinery Company 
(CSR).  Even after the expiry of the indenture contracts, most Indians chose to 
stay in Fiji, and for several decades were joined by a small stream of free settlers 
from India (Chand, 2003).  Some of the Indians who resided in Fiji became 
shopkeepers or artisans, while others entered the civil service or professions; a 
few became wealthy businessmen and landlords.  They purchased land that 
Europeans had already acquired from Fijians.  The vast majority also took up 
small farming.  Kelly (1988) posits that after the indenture system, the Indo-
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Fijians exhibited characteristics of individualistic, materialistic and capitalist 
norms.  Ali (1980) elaborates that: 
 
for Indians the indenture system provided a lesson and an ethos: to survive 
one had to make sacrifices and live a life of industry in an intensely 
competitive capitalist system….It provided them with the incentive, 
determination, orientation, acquisitiveness and individualism for success 
in a capitalist system (p.12). 
 
The Indo-Fijian society embodies a loose knit social framework when compared 
with that of Fijians.  However, its members are still devoted to their ancestral and 
customary practices to support (either financially or socially) their immediate 
family members (see Ali, 1980).  It needs to be noted, however, that most 
businesses in Fiji are owned by one section of Indian community, the Gujeratis 
who originate from the Gujerat State of India. 
 
Large versus Small Power Distance 
The critical issue in the power distance dimension is how society deals with the 
fact that people are unequal.  Societies in which power seems to be distributed 
unevenly can retain this structure as this satisfies the psychological need for 
dependence of the people without power.  Large power distance societies silently 
accept a hierarchical order in which everybody has a place, which requires no 
further justification, whereas people in small power distance societies strive for 
power equalisation and demand justification for power inequalities.   
 
Fiji has a large power distance society that accepts a hierarchical order.  The 
important facet of the ethnic- Fijian lifestyle is that their culture naturally 
appreciates silence as an imperative form of communication and social respect 
(Achary, 1998b).  Silence is respected once authority is exercised (Nayacakalou, 
1978).  The chiefly-based structure of control and power permeates every aspect 
of indigenous society (Davie, 2000).  Achary (1998b) notes that silence in Fiji is 
culturally patterned and embroiled in societal communicative behaviour.  In the 
case of Indo-Fijians, the power distance seems to be low when compared to that 






Strong versus Weak Uncertainty Avoidance 
Strong uncertainty avoidance societies maintain rigid codes of beliefs and 
behaviour, and members are intolerant towards deviant persons and ideas.  In 
studying Fiji‟s inter-ethnic cleavage, scholars such as Ali (1977, 1980), Premdas 
(1978) and Norton (1990) have interpreted ethnic Fijian conservatism as a fear of 
being “overrun” by the Indo-Fijian population.  They assert that conservatism 
operates against forces of change, and that conservatism in less developed nation 
highlights the “opposition to change” or antimodernization element but is defined 
as either nativism or traditionalism.  Watters (1969) studied the socio-political 
characteristics and economic prospects of four Fijian villages and noted that: 
 
…although Fijian society has changed greatly in a century and a half of 
contact, it is still one of the most conservative societies in the South 
Pacific (p. 2). 
 
Nayacakalou (1975) argues that: 
 
One of the most powerful reasons why they [the ethnic Fijians] have been 
wary of “change” is the threat of Indian domination.  As long as this threat 
remains, it will be difficult for them to wholly accept the idea of change 
even though they may be completely convinced of the necessity for it.  For 
they hold the view that their only answer to the threat is unity among 
themselves and that the only way to preserve this unity is to rally behind 
their chiefs and the Fijian Administration, united by a common heritage of 
which they are proud (p. 138). 
 
Lawson (1990) observes that the simplistic presentation of these arguments avoids 
the more difficult issues of explaining precisely why the “Fijian people” have felt 
the need to defend this neo-traditional identity with such tenacity.  He elaborated 
that it may be more accurate to claim that many Fijian chiefs and conservative 
leaders have felt the need more as, in the context of national politics, they have 
needed to emphasise group solidarity in order to retain power (Lawson, 1990).  
Similarly, in collaboration with a minority of Indians, most Europeans, part-
Europeans and Chinese, the Fijian chiefs formed the Alliance party, and claimed 
the retention of ethnic representation would, by preserving the peace, guarantee 
increased foreign investment and expanding employee opportunities (Norton, 
1981). 
 
In the case of Indo-Fijians, the structure of family relations is mediated through 
the activities and purposes of the household; where the context of the family 
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relations is best understood in terms of the independence required to maintain a 
household, defining concretely in the process the relations between husband and 
wife, parents and children and between siblings (see Chand, 2003).  Hence, in the 
Indo-Fijian society it is the cooperation required to maintain a household that 
gives form and meaning to the family (Jayawardena, 1975). 
 
The foregoing analysis demonstrates that Fiji has strong uncertainty avoidance 
where rigid codes of belief and behaviour are maintained and members are 
intolerant towards deviant persons and ideas.  The Indo-Fijian community has also 
shown its unity and solidarity stemming from the political instability, the events 
of the 1987 and 2000 coups and the continuing crisis thereafter. 
 
Masculinity versus Femininity 
 
Hofstede (1980) calls those societies with a maximised social sex role division 
“Masculine”, and those with a relatively small role division “Feminine.”  
Masculinity stands for a preference in society for achievement, heroism, 
assertiveness and material success.  Femininity, on the other hand, stands for 
relationships, modesty, caring for the weak, and quality of life.  In Fiji, there is a 
preference in society for relationships, modesty, caring for the weak, and the 
quality of life.  Fijians have extended families with strong allegiance to the village 
chiefs.  In the case of Indo-Fijians, this attitude of care is fast being lost in the 
urban Indo-Fijian society.  However, the attitude of care in the Indo-Fijian 
community is prevalent amongst rural dwellers (see Lal, 1992).   
 
The analysis in this section demonstrates that there is evidence of some cultural 
differences between the two major ethnic groups in Fiji: the Fijians and the Indo-
Fijians.  The Fijian culture largely exhibits characteristics of collectivism, large 
power distance, strong uncertainty avoidance and a feminine society.  The Indian 
culture exhibits silence and uncertainty avoidance.  As Indians are now a minority 
population of about 36%, the Fijian culture is predominant at organisational level.  
However, there are some similarities in the two cultures as illustrated in the 




4.5.0  Summary 
 
This chapter provided an overall view of the wider political, social and cultural 
system within which TFL is embedded.  Fiji is faced with political turbulence.  
There have been four coups in the last 20 years in which democratically elected 
governments have been overthrown by the military.  Widespread social problems 
resulted from the 2000 coup.  A survey by the SCF (2001) noted that amongst the 
social problems were the contention over land-use issues, the increased mobility 
and break-up of families, domestic violence and uncertainty about the future 
which continue to profoundly affect the children.  Also many skilled people of 
both Fijian and Indo-Fijian ethnicity have left Fiji for countries with greater 
political stability and better working conditions.   
 
The chapter also examined the Fijian and Indo-Fijian cultural context and noted 
that Fijian society is characterised by large power distance, collectivism, strong 
uncertainty avoidance and feminine society.  The Indo-Fijian culture is 
characterised by silence and strong uncertainty avoidance.  In rural areas, the 
Indo-Fijians still have extended families.  However, in urban centres, the nuclear 
family is more predominant amongst the Indo-Fijian population.  The next chapter 

























Chapter 5: Public Sector Reforms in Fiji 
 
5.1.0   Introduction 
 
This chapter examines public sector reforms in Fiji, especially the restructuring of 
the economy insisted upon by international finance agencies.  While institutional 
theory will be employed, a critical reflection on its adequacy as an explanatory 
theory will be offered later in the thesis (Chapter 7 onwards).   
 
Structural adjustment policies such as public sector reform and deregulation have 
been invoked in an attempt to ease the economic problems of Fiji.  Such policies 
are a consequence of the involvement of donor agencies such as the World Bank, 
International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the Asian Development Bank (Reddy, 
1997).  Following the coups in 1987, economic growth declined by 6.4 per cent in 
1987, and stagnated in 1988.  The sugar harvest was interrupted and tourist 
arrivals dropped by 20 per cent (Gounder, 2001).  Gounder (2001) reports that 
during the period 1968 to 1996, Fiji received in constant 1970-71 prices in excess 
of US$608m in aid.  Public sector organisations, in particular, faced institutional 
and economic pressures emanating from conditions set by donor agencies.  When 
public enterprises are faced with economic problems, the government may call 
upon the donor agencies for their assistance (Sharma, 2000). 
 
International creditor institutions and donor agencies have promoted new public 
management (NPM) reforms in all developing countries (Ayeni, 2002).  The 
central features of NPM have been said to include: a shift in emphasis from 
process accountability (input controls and bureaucratic procedures, rules and 
standards) to accountability for results (quantifiable outcomes, measures and 
performance targets); and, devolution of management control coupled with the 
development of improved reporting, monitoring and accountability mechanisms 
(Awio, Lawrence & Northcott, 2007).  The claimed benefits of reform include 
improvements in efficiency, effectiveness and accountability in the public sector.  
Universally, the reforms were expected to engender greater public service 
responsiveness and increased choice of service providers (private as well as 
public) (Olson, Guthrie & Humphrey, 1998).  The next section discusses the role 
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of the donor agencies of World Bank, the Asian Development Bank and 
International Monetary Fund within the Fijian economy. 
 
5.2.0  External Institutional Pressures: Role of the World Bank, 
Asian Development Bank and International Monetary Fund in 
Fiji 
 
The World Bank provides assistance by way of funding for the development 
projects in Fiji and operates an office at the Reserve Bank of Fiji in connection 
with the United Nations Development Programme.  The International Monetary 
Fund (IMF) is a provider of funds or assistance in a like manner if the balance of 
payments is in deficit.  In addition, the Asian Development Bank (ADB) assists 
the Fijian financial markets by providing staff for market development 
programmes.  Their assistance entails certain project funding as well as, or in 
conjunction with, the World Bank. 
 
So, the involvement of international financial organisations is an important aspect 
of the institutional environment for Fijian society.  They have insisted on the 
implementation of private sector concepts in public sector organisations, as has 
been the experience in other countries (e.g., Hoque & Hopper, 1994, 1997).  
There were pressures on organizations to change their practices to be consistent 
with transnational institutions (Granlund & Lukka, 1998).  Prominent sources of 
coercive pressure stem from international aid agencies upon which the State is 
dependent for borrowing requirements.   
 
The ADB and the World Bank tend to finance development projects once their 
recommended suggestions have been implemented for a project.  The ADB, for 
example, had urged the Fiji government to privatise its water supply department.  
Radio New Zealand International (www.nzir.com, 9 June 2004) reported that a 
US$53 million loan from the international bank to improve the country‟s trouble- 
plagued water system could depend on the government accepting the bank‟s 
recommendations.  It is likely that consumers will not be able to meet any 
increase in water bills driven by company profits and share prices.  Green Left 
Online (www.greenleft.org.au, 16 March, 2007) elaborates that safe water is a 
universal entitlement and market based solutions, as recommended by donor 
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agencies, may not be appropriate.  Corporatisation and privatisation can 
disadvantage the population as money and thrift begins to play predominant role 
in these organisations at the expense of providing basic amenities to the general 
population. 
 
According to Kumar and Prasad (2004), privatisation is problematic for Fiji as, in 
the end, consumers suffer due to escalating cost and also 25 per cent of Fiji‟s 
population live below the poverty line.  The Pacific Islands Report (2005) further 
illuminates the increasing number of applications for family assistance in Fiji, 
which manifests the demands and needs of the poor.  The Social Welfare 
Department receives an average of 3,000 applications for State help annually.  
Kumar and Prasad (2004) note that the level of poverty in Fiji is rapidly 
increasing, stemming from poor economic performance over the last two decades.  
Some writers have argued that the poor economic performance stems from the 
government‟s policy failures and multi-dimensional crisis faced by the country 
since the early 1980s (Akram-Lodhi, 1996; Sutherland, 2000). 
 
The World Bank and ADB are expected to make loans only where there are 
reasonable prospects of repayment.  The loans given out by the Bank have to be 
expended for productive purposes only.  In effect, the only requirement that the 
Bank imposes is that, before it grants loans, there shall be a clear agreement on 
how the proceeds of the loan are to be expended and on what the loan is expected 
to achieve.  Such an initiative embodies coercive institutionalisation as accounting 
virtues in terms of repayment of loans are imposed on the borrowers.  In order to 
gain legitimacy and receive funding, organizations have to comply with the rules 
and requirements of the donor agencies (Scott & Meyer, 1983).   
 
There are pros and cons of privatisation and scholars such as Uddin and Hopper 
(2003), in a Bangladeshi case study, have questioned whether privatisation 
improves enterprise performance, facilitates development goals, distributes wealth 
fairly and induces effective controls, accountability and transparency.  The World 
Bank‟s focus is on the narrow criteria of profitability.  According to Uddin and 
Hopper (2003), development aims need to extend beyond commercial criteria to 
issues of poverty alleviation and reducing or narrowing income inequalities.  
Uddin and Hopper (2003) report that the obsession with market relations 
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engenders monitoring of progress through narrow indicators such as growth in 
GNP rather than other worthy development goals. Uddin and Tsamenyi (2004) 
echo this sentiment: that structural adjustment policies serve private interest rather 
than the public interest.  Such rationale are relevant to this study as privatisation 
of TFL may mean increased costs to customers.  Some members of the public 
may be deprived of telecommunication services. 
 
After considering the roles of the World Bank and ADB, the next section 
discusses the State‟s public sector reform policy in Fiji.  The Department of 
Public Enterprises which has been set up in Fiji is responsible for implementing 
the public sector reform programme.  The Department of Public Enterprises 
(1998) promotes the public sector reform policy as one that increases economic 
efficiency and reduces the burden that the public enterprise sector currently places 
on the taxpayer.  The Department of Public Enterprises is a source of coercive 
pressure on public enterprises to invoke reforms in line with the principles of new 
public management.  However, it has to be noted that a consequence of economic 
efficiency is job displacement.  This has worsened the social problems that Fiji 
has faced in the post coup years.  Prime examples are the workers who have been 
laid off after the restructuring of the Fiji Electricity Authority, Airports Fiji 
Limited and Telecom Fiji Limited (Ministry of Public Enterprises and Public 
Sector Reform, 2002). 
 
5.3.0   Public Sector Reform Policies/ Global Trends 
 
Like other post-colonial societies, Fiji relied on its public sector for nation 
building and socio-economic development.  The public enterprises offer essential 
products and services to Fiji: water, electricity, telephone facilities, and ports of 
entry.  It was during the 1980s that the government began to dismantle State 
controls through a public sector reform policy.  Public sector reform is an 
imperative part of the national policy agenda in Fiji.  The government was 
committed, through the reform programme, to selling part of its interests in a 
number of public enterprises, with the proceeds used to repay debt.  The stated 
rationale behind the reform was that many costly and loss-making organisations, 
when reorganised and commercially focused, would appear to be in a position to 
give government and the people of Fiji a better reward for the public funds 
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invested in them (Department of Public Enterprises, 1998).  Sarkar and Pathak 
(2003, p.55) report that the government of Fiji has reformed most of its 
enterprises with the objective of enhancing “profitability, efficiency and 
accountability.”  The Finance and Public Enterprise Minister, in a newspaper 
article in 1998, echoed these sentiments and identified the public enterprise 
reform as an avenue for the government to work smarter.  He argued that it made 
sense to allocate resources to those areas that could use them more adequately and 
render the best returns.  He further evaluated the reform programme as one in 
which: 
 
 We have a win- win situation.  We receive value for the portion of our  
 assets sold, yet we still enjoy higher returns on our remaining ownership,  
 and as a bonus, retain those returns within Fiji for more capital  
 developments. 
     (The Fiji Times, 7 November, 1998:3). 
 
The Fiji government has further claimed that reforms were intended to ease the 
burden on the taxpayer.  Fiji‟s taxpayers have been continually asked to support 
ailing public sector enterprises making losses.  “Losses from public enterprises 
were around F$20 million a year, including foregone tax revenue” (Department of 
Public Enterprises, 1998, p.6).  Public sector reforms were aimed at ensuring that 
government obtained higher returns from its investment and improved 
productivity by providing quality services to the people of Fiji (Ministry of Public 
Enterprises, 2002).  The government‟s expectation was that the restructuring of 
enterprises would improve performance.  Reformed entities would add more 
revenue to the government‟s coffers in the form of 31 per cent corporate taxes and 
dividends.  The Ministry of Public Enterprises‟ annual report (2002, p.20) reports 
that the commercialised government entities paid a dividend and taxes amounting 
to F$3 million in 2002.  The report further indicated that the momentum of 
reforms needed to be maintained in order to achieve improvements in 
performance (see Appendix 6 for change in profitability of commercialised 
government entities). 
 
While a few enterprises have shown signs of economic recovery and profits, most 
still remain loss-laden entities (Sarkar & Pathak, 2003).  Amongst the profitable 
public enterprises are Fiji International Telecommunications Ltd, Telecom Fiji 
Ltd and Air Pacific Ltd.  The overall performance of the public sector has 
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remained weak, with return on assets to the government for public enterprises 
averaging only 2.7 per cent since 1992 (Department of Public Enterprises, 1998).  
There have also been increased job losses in the reformed enterprises (McMaster, 
2001). 
 
The public sector plays a significant role in Fiji‟s economy.  “The public 
enterprise sector accounts for about 30% of employment and roughly 25% of 
investment in Fiji” (Department of Public Enterprises, 1998, p.9).  In 1996, 
contingent liabilities of the government arising from ownership of public 
enterprises were about “F$519 million which is approximately 28% of that year‟s 
GDP at factor cost” (Department of Public Enterprises, 1998, p.16).  These 
contingent liabilities are largely attributed to government guarantees on public 
enterprise borrowing, in particular borrowing from the National Bank of Fiji, Fiji 
Electricity Authority and the Housing Authority. 
 
The Fiji government has problematised public enterprise as engendering 
inefficiencies and indicating that reforms were vital for a more efficient and 
effective public sector (Department of Public Enterprises, 1999).  In this way the 
public enterprises gain legitimacy, resources and stability by implementing new 
controls and techniques.  The Fiji government used the Department of Public 
Enterprises (that has lately became the Ministry of Public Enterprises and Public 
Sector Reform) to invoke reform policies.  The next section discusses the 
functions of the Department of Public Enterprises and Ministry of Public 
Enterprises and Public Sector Reform. 
 
5.3.1 Department of Public Enterprises/ Ministry of Public Enterprises 
and Public Sector Reform 
 
The Department of Public Enterprises was set up in Fiji to monitor activity in 
public sector enterprise and to encourage public enterprises to adopt commercial 
practices.  The Department was established under the Public Enterprise Act of 
1996 that governed the role and responsibilities of the Department and provided 
the structure for its operations (Kiran, 2003).  The Department aims to create a 
new form of corporate governance that involves privatisation and increases 
competition with the aim of improving accountability, performance and the 
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shareholder value of public enterprises (Department of Public Enterprises, 1998).  
In 1999 the Department of Public Enterprises was transferred to the Ministry of 
Public Enterprises and Public Sector Reform (McMaster, 2001).  At the moment 
the Ministry is monitoring 10 government commercial companies (GCCs) and 5 
commercial statutory authorities (CSA) - see Figure 4.  One of the senior 
economists at the Ministry of Public Enterprises and Public Sector Reform further 
elaborated on the monitoring process of public enterprises as: 
 We consider return on assets, return on shareholders‟ funds, return on  
 equity and debt to equity ratio.  If public enterprises are not performing  
 then we discuss these with the boards in order to bring in measures to  
 improve their performance. 
      (Interview 19 February 2004) 
Such financial controls are intended to discipline resource utilisation in public 
sector enterprises and assume the symbolic role of legitimating the organisation.  
It has been argued that public enterprises gain legitimacy if they can emulate or 
symbolically reproduce rationality in terms of return on assets, return on 
shareholders‟ funds and other capitalist measures (Dillard et al., 2004).   
 
The following documents are required by the Ministry of Public Enterprises for 
monitoring purposes: 
 
 Annual corporate plan; 
 Statement of corporate intent; 
 Annual report; 
 Half yearly report; 
 Accounts- unaudited and audited and 












Figure 4 Government Commercial Companies and Commercial Statutory 
Authorities 
 
Government Commercial Companies 
 Airports Fiji Limited 
 Fiji Hardwood Corporation Limited 
 Fiji Broadcasting Corporation Limited 
 National Trading Corporation Limited 
 Post Fiji Limited 
 Ports Terminal Limited 
 Rewa Rice Limited 
 Unit Trust of Fiji (Management ) Limited 
 Viti Corps Company Limited 
 Yaqara Pastoral Company Limited 
 
Commercial Statutory Authorities 
 Fiji Electricity Authority 
 Civil Aviation Authority of Fiji Islands 
 Housing Authority of Fiji 
 Maritime and Ports Authority of Fiji 
 Public Rental Board 
(Source: Ministry of Public Enterprises and Public 
Sector Reform, 2002) 
 
The organisation chart of the Ministry of Public Enterprises is shown in Appendix 
7.  The Ministry was allocated a sum of about F$4 million in 1999 for the 
implementation of reform programme (Ministry of Public Enterprises Annual 
Report, 2000).  Over a three-year period, from 1997 to 2000, some F$10.5 million 
was allocated by the Fiji government to implement the programme.  The Ministry 
of Public Enterprises ostensibly exerted coercive pressure on public enterprises 
which were to run as businesses and were also required to earn a return on assets 






Figure 5 New Entities Established from the Public Sector Reforms 
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The Department of Public Enterprises (1998) reports that the government has 
significantly invested in public sector enterprises.  The return on these 
investments has been low.  Some enterprises have never paid dividends or tax 
(Department of Public Enterprises, 1998).  This is why the public sector reform 
programme was claimed to be so important to Fiji (Department of Public 
Enterprises, 1998).   
 
Some of the major entities that have been established as a consequence of the 
public sector reform programme are illustrated in Figure 5.  In the early stages of 
the reorganisation (1989-1992), four enterprises were corporatised: Fiji Post and 
Telecommunication Ltd, IKA Corporation Ltd (a fish canning company), Fiji Pine 
Ltd and National Marketing Corporation Ltd (Reddy, 1998). 
 
The Public Enterprise Act (1996) provided the basis for a radically different 
governance structure of state-owned enterprises (SOEs).  While the government 
remained the owner, its role was clearly established as part of a governance 
relationship.  As a shareholder, the government appointed a commercial board of 
directors.  Boards were given responsibility for strategic direction and commercial 
performance, with incentives based on commercial performance indicators. 
 
The Public Enterprise Act was passed by the House of Representatives and the 
Senate in 1996 (Department of Public Enterprises, 1998).  This Act provides a 
comprehensive legal framework for implementing the public sector reform 
programme.  The Public Enterprise Act (1996) provides for: 
 the reorganisation and corporatisation of nominated government 
entities 
 the establishment of the principal objectives of Government 
commercial companies to be purely commercial 
 the regulation of the structure, and relationship with the 
Government, of Government Commercial Companies, and 
 the regulation of the reporting and accountability of Government 
Commercial Companies and Commercial Statutory Authorities.  
                                                                (Public Enterprises Act, 1996, p.1049). 
 
The Public Enterprise Act also provides for dividends; the dividend for a financial 
year shall not exceed the amount allowed under the Companies Act and the 
dividend needs to be paid within 6 months after the conclusion of the financial 
year.  The Public Enterprise Act (1996) stipulates that each government 
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commercial company (GCC) or commercial statutory authority needs to have a 
statement of corporate intent for each financial year (p.1085).  The statement of 
corporate intent constitutes the financial and non-financial performance targets for 
the activities of GCCs and Commercial Statutory Authorities. 
 
A number of rationales were offered to justify the Public Enterprise Act.  
Government services to customers needed quality improvements.  Appana (2003) 
espoused that the civil service type career paths failed to provide public enterprise 
employees with sufficient challenge and opportunities to develop their full 
potential.  The expectation was that the restructured public enterprises would 
provide more relevant and meaningful career paths for staff, with promotion based 
on measurable performance.  The Public Enterprise Act 1996 legislated a clear 
commercial imperative, the separation of governance and management, which was 
an important condition for radical change.  The following section discusses the 
processes involved in the implementation of the public sector reform policy in Fiji 
and some of the local problems faced during such reforms. 
 
5.3.2 Implementation and Local Problems 
 
The Fiji government attempted to utilise a three-stage approach towards reform.  
The first stage is reorganisation, which is the process of commercialisation of the 
public enterprise in order to make it an effective and profitable commercial entity 
(Department of Public Enterprises, 1998).  The first stage of reform is not 
intended to change the legal status of the enterprise.  Rather, the aim is to 
implement business-oriented managerial practice in the enterprise (Sarkar & 
Pathak, 2003).  Corporatisation, on the other hand, is a second stage of reform and 
entails a process of transforming the commercial activities of a government 
department or statutory authority into a limited company with commercial 
objectives (Department of Public Enterprises, 1998). 
 
The final stage is privatisation, which attempts to transfer the government‟s 
shareholding in public enterprises, in whole or in part, to the private sector.  The 
government‟s policy perspective is that commercialisation and corporatisation are 
interim measures.  When the companies become commercially viable, they will be 
sold to private investors (Department of Public Enterprises, 1998).  The 
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government would allow Government Commercial Companies (GCCs) at least 
three years to operate as commercial businesses before a decision is taken to 
privatise them.  Privatisation would result in the companies being listed on the 
South Pacific Stock Exchange- Fiji‟s stock market.  The financial market would 
place further coercive pressure on these companies for good governance 
procedures.  Coupled with privatization and in line with the Government‟s 
“Blueprint”, which spells out affirmative action for the indigenous Fijians, at least 
50% of the government shares that are to be offered on sale to the public would be 
offered in the first instance to ethnic Fijian individuals and organisation/ 
institutions.   
 
The objectives of the privatisation programme have been identified by the 
Department of Public Enterprises (1998) as including: 
 Improving the efficiency within the privatised enterprise in the 
provision of goods and services to the private sector and private 
consumers 
 Facilitating more resources to be disseminated to other enterprises 
and sectors of the economy where they will be used more 
productively 
 Reducing the burden on taxpayers and generating government 
revenue 
 Stimulating capital market development, and  
 Widening the ownership of shares in the productive assets of the 
economy. 
                                               (Department of Public Enterprises, 1998). 
 
As part of the reform process, the government embarked on reducing its 
shareholdings in some of the companies in order to infuse new management and 
technical expertise and enhance wider shareholdings (McMaster, 2001).  The 
companies and buyers involved: 
 the majority-owned Air Pacific: Qantas Airways bought 28.55 per 
cent of the shares, reducing the Fiji government‟s shareholding to 
51 percent 
 the majority-owned Amalgamated Telecom Holdings: the Fiji 
National Provident Fund bought 51 percent of the shares, and 
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 the wholly-owned Tropical Food Processors: Freshpac bought all 
100 percent of the shares. 
       (McMaster, 2001). 
On its path towards privatisation, according to a senior economist of the Ministry 
of Public Enterprises, it is imperative that salary structures of Chief Executive 
Officers are improved.  The senior economist of the Ministry of Public 
Enterprises further elaborated on the salary structures of reformed enterprises 
management: 
 after reform, the positions become contractual and will not be on a 
 permanent basis.  Thus, the risks are higher.  Therefore with normally 3  
 year jobs, we have to pay a higher salary.  This has to be matched with the  
 private sector‟s chief executive officers.  With reforms, the demands of 
 management position of public enterprises increases. 
    (Interview with SEP, 23 February, 2004). 
 
The corporate plan entails a performance contract in which shareholding ministers 
specify annual performance targets at the beginning of the year.  The Public 
Enterprise Ministry ostensibly monitors performance against these targets during 
the year.   
 
The growing demands for value for money and the introduction of markets for 
public service pose a challenge for management of public enterprises.  Emphasis 
has been placed on using private sector governance procedures in the public 
sector.  As a consequence, the decision making process surrounding the provision 
of services has become embedded with economic results at the expense of social 
benefits (Ogden, 1995b).  Market-based models of public enterprises are 
becoming institutionalised.  Public sector reform implies the replacement of a 
welfare focus from government with one which focuses on profits and market 
principles.   
 
From the point of view of the power of professional groups, change occurred as 
power was transferred from engineers to other professional groups.  The 
dominance of technical profession in these organisations, pre-reform, can be 
explained by the need for technical skills which were important for the early 
development of the industries.  By the time of the transition, engineers had lost 
some of their influence and other professionals became a vital force in 
94 
 
organisational survival.  At Telecom Fiji Limited, a human resource manager 
recalled: 
In the government days we had a very few accountants, about 2 to 3 and 
around 100 clerks.  The accountants had very little power.  At about the 
same time, we had an abundance of very highly qualified engineers and 
technicians.  Now it is quite the opposite.  We now have a lot of 
accountants and financial analysts and they are a power base of the 
company. 
   (Interview with MHR, 20 January 2006). 
 
Such extensive changes in professional demography and power relations were 
encouraged by new organisational policies whereby investment decisions had to 
be based on commercial and financial measures, not on engineering excellence 
(Erakovic & Wilson, 2005).  Strategies were developed to create a new corporate 
culture by changing decision-making processes, staff attitudes and performance 
measurement.  Some SOEs such as the Housing Authority of Fiji and Telecom 
Fiji Limited also engaged consultants to initiate the programmes of cultural 
change.  In this way, the public enterprises encountered a new language of 
business and economics which challenges the extant public service norms 
(Lawrence, Alam, Northcott & Lowe, 1997). 
 
Under the public sector reform programme, the new entities have performance 
and accountability targets covering investment return, cost of production and 
services (Department of Public Enterprises, 1998).  The New Public Management 
(NPM) model intends to implant business management principles in the public 
sector.  It ostensibly promises better governance, empowerment, customer 
satisfaction and better mechanisms of public accountability (Sarkar & Pathak, 
2003).    This claim is echoed in international literature by Ogden (1995b) and 
Dent (1991) who argue that corporate management has sought a shift from a 
culture based on engineering and operating demands predicated on the notions of 
public service to one which gives greater salience to business priorities and 
customer needs.  
 
However, social and political problems resulted from the reforms.  Political 
activity by the Labour Party had its effect.  Changes and tensions in public sector 
reforms accompanied changes in government in Fiji. Political instability became a 
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feature of the Fijian political landscape. The Chaudhry government that came to 
power in 1999 attempted to interrupt the processes of restructuring. 
 
Prior to 1999, the restructuring programme was gaining momentum under the 
Rabuka regime.  However, the People‟s Coalition government that came into 
power in 1999 under the leadership of Mahendra Chaudhry slowed the reform 
process.  The new government was ostensibly opposed to corporatisation and 
privatisation as these initiatives had resulted in low-income workers being made 
redundant (McMaster, 2001).  In his opening address to parliament in June 1999, 
the then Prime Minister, Mahendra Chaudhry, made the following statement: 
 Government is serious in reviewing the public enterprise restructuring and 
 privatisation program with a view to halting its redundancy impact.  In  
addition, strategic utilities such as water, electricity, telecommunications  
and civil aviation entities must remain under state control as viable units.   
Government will therefore remove all moves to privatise such enterprises,  
but they will be reorganised and streamlined to make them more efficient  
and profitable (Asian Development Bank, 2000, p.20). 
 
The government reinstated workers at Airports Fiji Limited who had been made 
redundant under the Rabuka regime.  This was in accordance with the publicised 
pre- election pledge of the Labour Party (The Fiji Times, 19 June, 1999).  The 
Housing Minister also ordered the Housing Authority to take back three workers 
laid off in the process of implementing a performance-based job contract system 
(Appana, 2003). 
 
The previous Rabuka government had restructured Fiji Electricity Authority 
(FEA) into three separate entities: Powergen Fiji, Powerlines Fiji and Megapower 
Fiji.  This process was reversed by the Labour government in 1999 with a re-
consolidation of the three companies into FEA.  In addition, the Fiji Water 
Corporation, the Public Trustee Corporation and the Fiji Shipping Corporation 
were reconstituted as government departments or units thereof.  Further, the 
Government Supplies Department and the Government Printery and Stationery 
Department that were in the process of being corporatised were curtailed by the 
government, and an internal restructuring of the departments took place instead.  
This demonstrates that with changes in government, tensions can be produced 




The Chaudhry government, however, was ousted by a military coup on May 19, 
2000.  On May 19, 2000, a period of great instability began in Fiji when armed 
rebels led by George Speight overtook the parliament and held Chaudhry and his 
ministers captive.  The military imposed martial law and later negotiated the safe 
release of the hostages. 
 
The 2000 coup produced a massive disruption to the operations of the public 
sector and the economy.  For a few months in 2000, the public enterprises reform 
program came to a complete halt.  After the president resigned, a new president 
assumed office and appointed an interim government headed by Laisenia Qarase.  
Qarase was an experienced banker, heading the Fiji Development Bank for many 
years, and was CEO of the Merchant Bank of Fiji at the time of the coup.  He 
apparently was a strong advocate of public sector reform and appointed an 
experienced Minister of Public Enterprises and Public Sector Reform to reactivate 
the reform process. 
 
In its initial budget, the interim government pledged to carry on with the reform 
program and envisaged the selling of government shares in Amalgamated 
Telecom Holdings on the South Pacific Stock Exchange.  The government 
committed itself to undertake comprehensive reform that included introduction of 
a output–oriented performance-based national budgeting system (McMaster, 
2001). 
 
General elections were held in 2001 and Qarase‟s party, Soqosoqo Duavata 
Lewanivanua (SDL), won the election with a narrow majority over the Labour 
Party.  In November 2001, the Qarase government released its first budget in 
which it explicitly called for policies of both public enterprise reform and civil 
service reform.  Qarase had said that attempts would be made to ensure that the 
reforms created minimal pain for the workers (Fiji Live, 3 April, 2003).  This was 
an undertaking worth noting as earlier efforts by the Rabuka regime (1992-1999) 
to reform and restructure public enterprises had resulted in redundancies among 
workers of the public sector.  However, despite the undertaking by the then Prime 
Minister, redundancies still occurred in Fiji.  Fiji Electricity Authority is a good 





A specific objective of privatisation in Fiji is to offer staff the opportunity to buy 
shares in a company and to share in their company‟s prosperity and losses.  The 
employee share scheme is an explicit attempt to reconstitute the basis for 
employee commitment from “public service” to business priorities (Ogden, 
1995a).  The implementation of the scheme demonstrated a focus on directing the 
organisation towards commercial practice that mirrors those practices in the 
private sector, i.e. manifesting isomorphic behaviour.   
 
Public sector reforms produced some negative impacts on the welfare of Fiji‟s 
population.  According to Uddin and Tsamenyi (2004), opinions are divided on 
whether public sector reforms in developing counties are in the public interest.  As 
stated earlier, reforms in Fiji had seen a large number of employees being laid off.  
This created unemployment in an economy in which 25 per cent of its people live 
below the poverty line (Narayan, 2001; Prasad, 1998).   
 
Reforms give rise to redundancies.  Workers, who in most cases are sole bread 
winners in the family, are made redundant as a consequence of reforms. Given the 
lack of alternative employment opportunities, the drive for efficiency has severe 
consequences for these categories of people who struggle to access the basic 
necessities of life and may be worsening the already overwhelming social 
problems that Fiji encountered after the political upheaval of 2000. 
 
The costs of basic necessities of life such as water and housing have been rising in 
Fiji.  Fiji Islands Bureau of Statistics (2003) depicted a consumer price index for 
housing at 120.9 in 2002, taking the base year of 1993 with an index of 100.  
However, wage levels have not increased to the same level.  The cost of electricity 
also shows a similar increasing trend (Fiji Islands Bureau of Statistics, 2003).  As 
discussed previously, value added tax was also increased from 10% to 12.5 per 
cent in 2003, making the basic necessities of life more expensive (Dewan, Gokal 
& Hussein, 2003).  Value added tax was introduced on 1
st
 July, 1992.  This tax is 
charged on virtually all goods and services, whether supplied by the Government, 




The new forms of corporate governance in Fiji had to contend with a militant 
union movement which was supported by the Labour government elected in 1999. 
One of the managers at the Ministry of Public Enterprises stated: 
 The political environment in 1999 with the new Labour government took  
 us slightly back in our reforming of public enterprises.  Labour  
 government was very much labour-oriented and reversed the reforms as it  
 did not want people to lose jobs.  As a consequence the performance of  
 entities has been affected. 
     (Interview with SEP, 19 February 2004). 
 
In its election manifesto, Labour had indicated an intention to protect the interests 
of the poor and labour and so redundancies were avoided.  An interviewee from 
the Ministry of Public Enterprises told of the resistance from trade unions to the 
reforms.  Fiji has a tradition of strong militant unions.  The trade unions utilised 
their political leverage to go on strike in order to inhibit redundancy measures 
(McMaster, 2001).  Under reforms, the unions perceived that they would lose 
power.  One of the senior economists with the Ministry of Public Enterprises 
commented: 
The problems with carrying out reforms in Fiji is to deal with unions first.  
Union leaders go and tell employees what they (union leaders) want 
employees to hear.  The trade union leaders in Australia and New Zealand 
are not as militant now as they were in 1990s and 1980s.  Here in Fiji we 
have militant leaders.  The current government policy is not to force any 
redundancy, because of which it becomes somewhat difficult to improve 
the efficiency and performance of government entities. 
     (Interview with SEP, 19 February 2004) 
An economist at the Ministry of Public Enterprises stated that the reform at Fiji 
Electricity Authority ostensibly went ahead without any resistance.  This was 
because reforms apparently were done without the involvement of union 
members.  One of the accountants at the Ministry of Public Enterprises 
commented: 
 At Fiji Electricity Authority, the Authority did not deal with the unions.   
 They educated workers before the union could come in and brain wash  
 workers.  Some of the workers joined a new company- Telesource after  
 the restructure.  Terms and conditions of employment are the same as  
 when they were employed by the Fiji Electricity Authority.  Almost 150  
 workers lost jobs but it could work as consultation was done at all levels  
 including those made redundant. 
     (Interview with ACP, 20 February 2004) 
The newly-appointed CEOs were charged with introducing performance-based 
contractual arrangements within their organisations.  However, the unions resisted 
contractual systems, wanting collective agreements.  An accountant of the 
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Ministry of Public Enterprises explained the unions‟ stand on performance 
contracts under public sector reform in this way: 
By adapting performance contracts union feel that the power of the union 
will be eroded.  Unions claim that going on performance contracts will 
mean employers will take over.  What unions want is a collective 
agreement. 
     (Interview with ACP, 19 February 2004). 
The confrontation between the unions and management reflected the political 
situation in Fiji.  Chaudhry‟s Labour party, which had been the opposition party, 
is backed by the trade unions.   Chaudhry and the previous Prime Minister- 
Qarase were not on speaking terms and the resistance from the trade unions 
seemed to derive from the supporters of Labour party.  Many threats of stopping 
work were made by the trade unions over pay rise negotiations. 
 
In brief, the Fiji government utilised a three-stage approach towards reform: 
commercialisation, corporatisation and privatisation.  Emphasis has been placed 
on using private sector governance structures in the public sector.  Through 
reforms, the public sector encountered a new language of business and economics 
which challenged the extant structures of signification, legitimation and 
domination.  However, social and political problems resulted as a consequence of 
reforms.  Continuing changes and tensions in public sector reforms accompanied 
changes in government.  The militant Fijian trade unions were also a source of 
resistance to the reforms and were closely connected with the opposition Labour 
Party.  The trade unions resisted any potential worker redundancies resulting from 
reforms.  The next section provides a summary of the chapter. 
 
5.4.0   Summary 
 
This chapter provided an overview of the public sector reform in Fiji, focusing on 
the restructuring of the economy insisted upon by international agencies.  It is 
evident that the approach to public enterprise reforms in Fiji has been predicated 
on the new public management model (Hood, 1991; 1995; Parker and Guthrie, 
1993).  The reforms have received institutional support from international donor 
agencies such as the World Bank, the IMF and the Asian Development Bank, all 
of which gave impetus to the government to embark on public enterprise reforms 
(Reddy, 1997).  The government‟s coercive efforts resulted in de-
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institutionalisation of bureaucratic norms and institutionalisation of new norms of 
corporate behaviour.  The reform of public enterprises was driven by coercive 
pressures from Fiji‟s government in the form of the Public Enterprises Act and the 
Ministry of Public Enterprises.  Before the transitional period began, all 
enterprises were traditional government departments.  Several developments 
disabled the old organisational practices and supported a radical shift in 
organisational demography from mainly technical professionals to marketing and 
financial experts and the introduction of new governance structures.  The 
marketing and financial experts brought in concepts of private business techniques 
in the reformed entities (normative and mimetic isomorphism).   
 
As for the social and political context, Fiji has been facing a crisis situation since 
the military coups of 1987.  This event led to economic decline, which meant 
increased levels of poverty and suffering for many in the society.  To stabilise the 
economy, the government implemented a number of policies, one of which was 
the corporatisation of public sector institutions.  This was partly driven by global 
trends and was a consequence of the involvement of donor agencies such as the 
World Bank, the IMF and the Asian Development Bank.  The Ministry of Public 
Enterprises was set up in Fiji for the purpose of commercialising public 
enterprises and subsequently preparing them for privatization.  Public sector 
reform has been seen as the government replacing a welfare focus with one that 
focuses on profits and market principles away from the welfare orientation.   
 
Public sector reform has also encountered resistance from the trade unions.  The 
unions have been quite militant.  Unions perceive a loss of power if the reform 
exercise is accelerated.  The Fiji government, on the advice of international aid 
agencies forced SOEs to radically change by altering their legal and ownership 
status, their norms of institutionalised behaviour and the regulated status of their 
markets.  Change in the composition of boards and management teams created a 
divergence from well-established interpretive schemes (Hinings & Greenwood, 
1988).  The following chapter discusses the legislative and regulative framework 
introduced by the Fiji government to corporatise Fiji Posts and 






Chapter 6:  Legislative and Regulatory Framework for 




This chapter examines the background information/environment on the legislative 
and regulatory framework introduced by the Fijian government to corporatise Fiji 
Posts and Telecommunications Limited (FPTL).  The background information 
outlined in this chapter as well as chapters 4 and 5 is essential for understanding 
the empirical evidence outlined in the later chapters. 
 
The chapter considers the Posts and Telecommunications Decree of 1989, the 
corporatisation of the Posts and Telecommunications Department (P&T) in 1990, 
the appointment of new board of Directors in 1991, a review done by consultants 
in 1992, and the formation of the Commerce Commission.  The next section 
examines the Posts and Telecommunications Decree that was utilised to 
corporatise P&T.  The Posts and Telecommunications Decree may be treated as 
an illustration of an exogenous institutional shock (e.g., Laughlin, 1991).  The 
Decree provides publicly observable evidence of the actions by the Fiji 
government which were designed to influence the development of FPTL in its 
transition from the public to the private sector. 
 
6.2.0 Posts and Telecommunications Decree of 1989 and 
Corporatisation 
 
The Posts and Telecommunications Decree (P&T Decree hereafter) subjects 
FPTL management and employees to regulatory processes and defines how FPTL 
members may legally operate.  According to Hassan (2005) and Granlund and 
Lukka (1998), the use of law (decree) is seen by the organisational participants as 
a source of force.  The Fiji government through the P&T Decree 1989, 
transformed the Posts and Telecommunications Department into a corporate 
company, FPTL, with 100 percent of shares owned by the government.  Section 
68 of the P & T Decree (1989) states that: 
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a company shall be regarded for the purpose of this part as wholly owned 
by the Government at any time when all the issued shares in the company 
are held by or on behalf of the Government. 
 
Before the P&T Decree, the Posts and Telecommunications Department (P&T) 
provided postal and telecommunications services and the Telecommunications 
Minister retained the exclusive privilege to provide these services.  The P&T 
Decree requires all system operators to be licensed.  Responsibility for 
telecommunication licensing is with the Minister for Broadcasting, Information, 
Television and Telecommunication, and is exercised through a regulatory unit 
within the ministry.  This unit has a duty under the Decree to protect the interest 
of the consumer when requested to investigate complaints on service and 
apparatus.  The Decree prescribes offences and penalties relating to the operation 
and use of telecommunications services and has an influence on the nature of 
services provided by FPTL.  Interviewees viewed the Decree as imposing 
influential institutional pressure as it provides guidelines for FPTL‟s operations.   
 
The Minister for Broadcasting, Information, Television and Telecommunication 
was given responsibility for reviewing the activities connected with 
telecommunications (P&T Decree, 1989, p.990).  The Decree entails issues 
related to grants and loans to rural telecommunications that the Ministry of 
Finance may offer in order to establish, develop and maintain telecommunications 
systems in rural areas.  Despite the corporatisation of FPTL, the Fiji government 
provides grants for rural postal and telecommunication services as part of its 
public service. 
 
Section 69 of the P & T Decree (1989) states that: 
… the minister may by order appoint…all the property, rights and 
liabilities to which the P&T was entitled or subject immediately before 
that date which shall…become by virtue of this section property, rights 
and liabilities of a company nominated for the purpose of this section by 
the minister. 
 
The P & T Decree outlines that FPTL needs to be registered under the Companies 
Act 1983; however, on the transfer date, when FPTL becomes corporatised, it 
must be a company where all its shares are government owned.  Section 70 of the 
Decree stipulates that: 
 Shares issued in pursuance of this section – 
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(a) shall be of such nominal value as the minister may direct; and 
(b) shall be issued as fully paid and treated for the purposes of the 
Companies Act 1983 as if they had been paid up by the virtue of the 
payment to the Company of their nominal value in cash (p.1009). 
 
Other matters such as conversion of loans vested in the company, government 
investment in securities of the company, exercise of the minister‟s functions 
through nominees, temporary restrictions on the company‟s borrowing powers, 
liability of the minister in respect of liabilities vesting in the company and 
application of the law in relation to any offer of shares or debenture of the 
company are also provided for in the Decree.  Alongside this, the Decree regulates 
postal services and licenses radio communications.  Dividends received are to be 
paid into the State‟s Consolidated Fund (P&T Decree, 1989).  The P&T Decree 
requires FPTL to operate as a business.   
 
With regards to post, the Decree states that after the transfer date 
(corporatisation), the position of Permanent Secretary for Post and 
Telecommunications functions, which encompasses conveying letters from one 
place to another, will be relinquished.  Instead the postal responsibility will be 
with the Postal Division within FPTL.  The Postal Division has sole authority to 
convey letters from one place to another (P&T Decree, 1989, p.1015).  Section 7 
of the Decree grants FPTL a licence to operate telecommunications system whilst 
Section 81 of the Decree gives FPTL sole responsibility for managing the postal 
system of Fiji.  The P&T Decree imposes some restrictions on government 
subsidy.  Only grants or subsidies are available for the rural areas.  Section 29 of 
the P &T Decree states: 
The Minister responsible for finance may at the request of the Minister of 
Telecommunications  make grants or loans-  
(a) to carriers for the purposes of establishing, developing, working and 
maintaining any telecommunications system in a rural area or rural 
areas… (p.992) 
The Managing Director posits that the lack of subsidies has implications for the 
operations of FPTL (FPTL Annual Report, 1991). 
 
In 1989 the Rabuka government planned a series of initiatives to restructure state 
corporations and prepare them for eventual privatisation.  P&T was one of the 
earlier ones to be corporatised under the P&T Decree.  Fiji Posts and 
Telecommunications Limited (FPTL), a private limited liability company, was 
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formed on August 18, 1989 under the provisions of the Companies Act (1983) and 
the P&T Decree (1989).  The transfer of the government business of the P&T to 
the new company, Fiji Posts and Telecommunications Limited (FPTL), occurred 
on January 1, 1990.  FPTL was the first government institution to be corporatised.  
Thus, from 1990, corporatisation and restructuring provided a clear separation 
between commercial and regulatory activities.  The regulatory activities were 
retained by the government‟s Ministry of Broadcasting, Information, Television 
and Telecommunications. 
 
After the implementation of the Decree, the Fiji government issued an exclusive 
25 years licence to FPTL for the provision of telephone, telegraph and telex 
services on a national basis from the beginning of 1990 (FPTL Annual Report, 
1990).  FPTL had a monopoly in these services.  The exclusivity of the licence, 
however, expires contractually at the end of 2014.  This entitlement was later on 
transferred to Telecom Fiji Limited following further restructuring of FPTL in 
1996.  Telecom Fiji Limited‟s (TFL) functions were to provide and install 
domestic fixed line, mobile telecommunications data transmission and telex 
services (TFL Annual Report, 1998).  Other services such as telecommunications 
apparatus and products are non-regulated and the supply of these services is an 
opportunity for the private sector (Opportunities for Growth, 1993).  Having 
discussed the P&T Decree and corporatisation of P&T, the next section discusses 
the appointment of board members after the corporatisation to instil a business 
culture within FPTL employees. 
 
6.2.1  Appointment of new board of directors  
 
A new board of directors with business expertise was appointed on 6
th
 July 1991 
after corporatisation by the Fiji government (The Review, August, 1992).  
According to a manager, the board was appointed with the aim of offering a 
commercial orientation and a customer focus to FPTL, an organisation that was so 
institutionalised with civil service bureaucratic means of thinking.  With business 
expertise, the board of directors was expected to bring these practices to FPTL.  
The Review (1992) notes that this board constituted some famous names in the 
commercial and service industries in Fiji.  The board was considered by many as 
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one of the more qualified and aggressive boards in Fiji‟s corporate world (The 
Review, August, 1992). 
 
For instance, Chairman Robert Lee held a Bachelor of Commerce degree and was 
a past president of the Fiji Manufacturers‟ Association and the Fiji New Zealand 
Business Council.  Gardner Whiteside was a partner in the accounting firm of 
Vishnu Prasad & Company and a runner up in the Fiji Institute of Accountants 
Young Accountant of the Year in 1992.  Kalivati Bakani was deputy chief 
manager of the National Bank of Fiji; Jesoni Vitusaqavalu was a corporate affairs 
director of Air Pacific (prior to this, he was General Manger of the Unit Trust of 
Fiji and had a Masters in Economics).  Mr Ranjit Singh was a deputy General 
Manager of Fiji National Provident Fund
11
.  Mr Singh was an accountant by 
profession and managed one of the largest investment portfolios in Fiji.  Ratu 
Talemo Ratakele was the deputy chairman of Cakaudrove Provincial Council.  
Adi Litia Cakobau was a senator in the government while Rigamoto Taito was 
Permanent Secretary of Finance and a strong advocate of the corporatisation 
program.  Apisolome Tudreu was Permanent Secretary for Telecommunications 
and was previously Commissioner of Northern Division.  Emori Naqova, an 
engineer by profession, was the Managing Director of FPTL. 
 
This board appeared to be well qualified in terms of commercial expertise.  FPTL 
was expected to be the forerunner for the corporatisation and privatisation of 
government-owned statutory bodies.  Other public enterprises were expected to 
emulate FPTL‟s path to corporatisation and privatisation.  A manager stated that, 
in order to invoke commercial routines within FPTL, the board invited tenders for 
consultants to produce a strategic vision for FPTL.  Arthur Andersen Consultants 
was selected to undertake a strategic review and provide a vision for the company.  
The idea was to commission a strategic vision from western-based consultants so 
as to gain legitimacy for FPTL‟s operations from their operating environment 
(e.g., DiMaggio & Powell, 1983).  The directors and management were 
responsible for implementation of the consultants‟ report after their departure.  
The board felt that the consultants could act as a catalyst for change in thinking in 
the organisation and the consultants were a change agent (Beckert, 1999) at FPTL.  
                                                          
11
 Fiji National Provident Fund is the workers‟ superannuation scheme.  Both the employer and the 
employee contribute 8% each towards this scheme. 
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Beckert (1999) refers to change agents as “entrepreneurs”: those who destroy 
existing institution (taken-for-granted rules and routines). 
 
According to a strategic manager, the review and the resultant recommendations 
were completed by the consultants at the end of 1992.  It was the managers who 
tried to implement the consultants‟ report.  According to Beckert (1999), 
managers re-establish institutional stability as a basis for the strategic agency of 
entrepreneurs (who in this case, were the consultants).  According to Granlund 
and Lukka (1998), consultants generally support mimetic processes and the trend 
of isomorphism.  The consultants endorsed similar practices to those that the 
overseas-based Telecommunication Company adapted after becoming privatised, 
exhibiting mimetic isomorphism.  Irvine (2007) notes that consultants‟ services 
can also be considered as normative institutional pressure.  The FPTL actors 
relied on consultants for their professional services.  The ensuing section 
discusses the Arthur Andersen‟s consulting report. 
 
6.2.2  Arthur Andersen’s Consulting Report of 1992 
 
This section examines Andersen‟s report.  The report was used by the board and 
management to provide commercial focus for FPTL‟s activities.  According to a 
Finance Manager, although profits improved after corporatisation, this was mainly 
due to increased tariffs and not improved efficiency.  The consultants spent almost 
six months studying FPTL‟s activities and providing recommendations. 
 
Arthur Andersen‟s report (1992) highlights that corporatisation had not improved 
FPTL‟s performance.  Andersen‟s report notes that revenue was generated 
overwhelmingly by urban customers.  The profitable customer groups appeared to 
be those in government and business that contributed 64% of profits and F$11,820 
revenue per telephone (Andersen‟s report, 1992).  A large number of urban 
customers appeared to be waiting for connection, manifesting a major opportunity 
to increase revenue.  The report emphasised that apparent demand for basic 
services had increased at 6.3% per annum for some time (Andersen report, 1992).  
Urban areas constituted 91.5% of this increased demand.  It appears from the 
report that the early stages of corporatisation had not increased the ability to 




Radio telecommunication services in rural areas were generating losses 
(Andersen‟s report, 1992).12  Revenue and profits were generated overwhelmingly 
from urban customers.  The report claims that costs had increased, stemming from 
an increase in personnel expenses.  FPTL had been faced with salary hikes while 
staff numbers remained constant.  The rise in costs had surpassed the rise in 
productivity.  Andersen‟s report claims that while employee expenses had 
increased by 51 per cent since 1987, telephones per employee had increased by 
26.82 per cent.  This measure was used to demonstrate that large increases in 
average employee costs had not kept pace with average revenue generated by 
employees, measured in terms of telephone per employee. 
 
The Andersen‟s report states that customers waiting for services at that time 
equated to 24 per cent of connected customers.  Since 1988, the lack of 
availability of cable pairs, the connection from the nearest exchange or long line 
into customer premises, had been the predominant reason for non-connection to 
telephone.  Analysis of the wait list demonstrated predominantly urban location 
residents and a shortage of “cable-pairs” to get them connected.  According to the 
report, urban customers were the most profitable and the lack of “cable pairs” 
should not have inhibited them from connection.  Connecting urban customers 
would mean a short-term pay back period.  The report also emphasised that the 
cable pairs were checked only when services were installed; faulty cable pairs 
were the central source of service provision delays.   
 
Andersen‟s report noted many ways to stimulate revenue.  These included off-
peak pricing, optional flat rate or metered local calls, audio text, phone cards 
volume discounts and paging (Andersen‟s report, 1992).  The report emphasised 
that FPTL compared poorly in terms of return on assets and profit margin with 
other Telecom companies in the region, and also with other large companies in 
Fiji.  Return on assets and profit margins were the new targets introduced at 
FPTL.  Initially the employees were used to the public service rules and routines. 
 
                                                          
12
 Provision of telephone services in rural areas, particularly in the outer islands is not possible.  
Hence people in these areas rely on radio telecommunications as a means of communication. 
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A separate review of the postal division revealed that, when accounted for as a 
stand alone business, it was operating at a breakeven level (Andresen‟s report, 
1992).  Total pre-tax profit declined from F$533,000 in 1987 to F$105,000 in 
1992.  The report claimed that half of all post office branches were unprofitable.  
This stemmed from declining business volumes and declining productivity.  
Increased costs stemmed from wage growth which had not been paralleled by 
growth in productivity. 
 
Business was lost to the courier companies with some companies perceiving 
postal services as unreliable.  “I would avoid using the Fiji postal system unless 
time is not a factor,” a local banker told Andersen (quoted in the Review, August, 
1992, p.15).  The report recommended diversification into new business 
opportunities such as bill paying, passport processing, general insurance, other 
banking operations and postal insurance sales.  Sales revenue from this could 
exceed approximately F$500,000 annually (Andersen‟s Report, 1992, p.36). 
 
The consultants report advocated that Emori Naqova, the Managing Director of 
the company, would be unable to lead the organisation into corporatisation unless 
he received further training, possibly a secondment to a telecommunications 
company that had made a transition to a commercialisation from a government 
department.  The secondment would have to be lengthy to infuse significant 
change in commercial thinking at FPTL (Andersen‟s Report, 1992). 
 
A Parliament Paper (1994) pointed out that Andersen recommended the division 
of the company into five Strategic Business Units (SBU), each headed by a 
General Manager.  The five SBU‟s included customer services, a marketing and 
new business unit, a network engineering business unit, a support services 
business unit and a finance business unit.   Andersen also introduced the position 
of Chief General Manager position between General Managers and Managing 
Director.  The Andersen report, implemented by the board of directors and 
management, brought about improvement in FPTL‟s performance.  For example, 
in 1992, FPTL invested F$20 million in development work which brought about 
the modernisation of network technology (FPTL Annual Report, 1992).  The old 
exchanges at Tavua, Lami and Korovou were replaced with modern digital 
exchanges.  The optical fibre system linking Suva and Vunikawai radio stations 
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was installed at a cost of F$1million (FPTL Annual Report, 1992).  The number 
of subscribers increased by 7.1 percent from 1990, while telephone penetration 
improved from 5 to 6 lines per 100 population (FPTL Annual Report, 1992). 
Naqova was also sent on training for some six months overseas. 
 
Wireless technology was introduced in 1993.  The company entered a joint 
venture with Vodafone to implement a cellular telephone service.  Incentive 
schemes were introduced that related directly to the performance of the company 
and to personal measured goals.  By the end of 1993, “96 percent of all working 
lines were connected to fully computerised digital telephone exchanges” (FPTL 
Annual Report, 1993, p. 12).  FPTL‟s annual report (1993) points out that the 
implementation of a new organisational structure took a few months to settle in.  
The organisational restructuring consisted of setting up five strategic business 
units (divisions), each with its separate objectives to achieve.  Appointees to the 
executive management positions for the units were sought both internally and 
externally and these positions were filled in 1993.  A five year development plan 
was set for network planning.  FPTL‟s annual report (1993) noted that greater 
emphasis was being focussed on network planning improvements, effective 
investment and their impact on revenues and profitability.  Previous planning 
guidelines had been based on historical growth in connections which was found to 
be ineffective as it was not closely related to expected cable schemes.  This led to 
insufficient provision to meet telephone connections in certain areas.  Telephone 
penetration reached 7 lines per 100 population in 1993, which was above the 
average for developing countries (FPTL Annual Report, 1993). 
 
Various regional offices were also opened in many urban centres of Fiji.  A 
national help line and 0800 receiver pay telephone service aimed specifically at 
business customers were also introduced during 1994.  At the end of 1994, the 
network had a total of 59,471 working lines, giving it a ratio of 32.23 lines per 
employee- an increase of 2.97 from 1993 (FPTL annual report, 1994).  Some 270 
card phones were also installed to improve accessibility of telephones.  A 
Strategic plan was also put in place which aimed to achieve a penetration goal of 





The postal division diversified its activities to include courier services and Post 
shop.  The Post shops offered a variety of stationery and assorted items to 
customers.  Post shop sales in 1994 returned a gross profit of more than 
F$116,000 from total sales of F$403,000.  Electricity bills could also be paid at 
Post Offices.  The postal division also received commission from the amount 
receipted for electricity. 
 
The decision was also made to split “Posts” and “Telecommunications” into two 
separate entities from July 1996 (FPTL Annual Report, 1995).  Telephone 
penetration had increased to 8 lines per 100 population in 1995.  The number of 
applicants on the waitlist for telephones at end of 1996 was reduced to 7,000 from 
the 9,000 in January 1996 (TFL Annual Report, 1997). Most of the customers on 
the waitlist lived in uncabled areas.  The completion of major cabling projects in 
later years, the installation of new digital radio multi access subscriber systems 
and development of wireless loop technology reduced the numbers waiting for 
telephone services.  Table 3 summarises the financial results of 1992 to 1998 
when Andersen‟s report was implemented. 
 
Table 3  Financial Results for FPTL from 1992 to 1998 
 
 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 
Telephone penetration per 
100 population 
6 7 7.7 8.3 8.9 9.2 9.6 
Net Profit before Tax $4.8m $8.7m $11.9m $18.8m $20.8m $15m $16.7m 
Net Profit after Tax $3.24m $5.3m $7.5m $12m $13.9m $9.8m $10.9m 
Return on Equity 3.0% 4.1% 8.1% 8.6% 14.3% 8.1% 8.8% 
Return on Assets 1.7% 2.9% 3.9% 6.2% 6.8% 4% 4.7% 
         (Source; FPTL Annual Report 1992-1995; TFL Annual Report, 1996-1998). 
 
The table shows an increase in telephone penetration per 100 population from 6 
per 100 population in 1992 to 9.6 per 100 population in 1998.  Net profit after tax, 
net profit before tax, return on equity and return on assets showed significant 
improvements over time.  The profitability ratios were slightly lower in 1992 as 
there was some resistance to Andersen‟s report which resulted in industrial action 
and sabotage of cables in the capital, Suva.  A disruption in the normal business in 
1992 impacted on the company‟s profitability.  The net profits were slightly lower 
in 1997 when compared to 1996.  TFL‟s annual report (1997) attributed the 
decline in net profit to the sluggish economic environment, losses from tropical 
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cyclone “Gavin” and the downward trend of international accounting rates.  
However, profit had subsequently improved in the 1998 period. 
 
Table 4 summarises the financial results of 2001 to 2007. 
 
Table 4  TFL’s Performance over 2001 to 200713 
 









$25,400 $28,000 $37,360 $42,000 $16,000 $32,000 $40,000 
Revenue 
(000) 
$149,500 $145,000 $152,934 $130,000 $131,950 $133,053 $131,346 
Costs 
(000) 
$124,100 $117,000 $115,574 $88,000 $115,950 $101,053 $91,346 
(Source; ATH Annual Report 2001- 2007) 
 
From 1999 onwards the TFL accounts were consolidated into ATH accounts and 
limited information was available on TFL‟s financial ratios.  Much information on 
TFL was provided in summarised form.  However, the annual reports disclosed 
information on net profit, revenues, costs and telephone penetration per 100 
population.  This has been summarised in Table 4.  The net profit showed 
improvements except in 2005 where financial performance was impacted by 
increases in expenses.  Some redundancy payments were made to 300 employees 
who took voluntary redundancy.  The regulator, the Commerce Commission, also 
reduced telecom prices which reduced total revenue for the year and impacted on 
the net profit.  However, profits improved in the later years.  Chapter 8 provides a 
more in-depth analysis of TFL‟s performance from 2001 to 2006. 
 
The employment of Western consulting firms enabled FPTL to gain legitimacy 
through the improved perfromance, except for some resistance that will be 
discussed in the next chapter.  Meyer and Rowan (1977) argue that engaging the 
services of consultants can provide both internal and external legitimacy for the 
company.  Such image building is central for FPTL, since as it is wholly 
                                                          
13
 The 1999 and 2000 results were left out as TFL became a subsidiary of ATH then and the latter 
released its annual report incorporating activities of TFL.  The ATH report released in 2000 
consisted of combined results of 1999 and 2000.  For consistency in comparing results, these two 
years results were left out. 
112 
 
government-owned, its image is not only vital for survival but also ensures 
government does not interfere in its affairs as there is always a possibility of 
government intervention.  FPTL actors have to demonstrate to the government 
and the general public that FPTL is well managed in terms of improvement in 
performance in order to secure legitimacy from them.  Having discussed 
Andersen‟s report, the next section examines the role of the Commerce 
Commission that regulates telecom tariffs in Fiji. 
 
6.3.0   The Commerce Commission 
 
The Rabuka government established a four-member Commerce Commission in 
October 1998 with the introduction of the Commerce Act.  However, this was 
short-lived when the Commission was dissolved by the Labour government in 
1999.  Following the May 2000 coup, a new Commerce Commission was 
appointed in October, 2000 by the interim government (Commerce Commission, 
2005).  The information in 2000 military coup is covered in chapter 4. 
 
The Commission is charged with ensuring that there is non-discriminatory access 
to infrastructure facilities in monopoly or near monopoly situations; this includes 
telecommunication services.  The Commission is an independent statutory 
organisation which promotes fair trading, protects consumers and business from 
restrictive trade practices, and controls prices of regulated industries and other 
markets where competition is limited (Commerce Commission, 2005).  It also 
ensures that companies such as TFL remains financially solvent. 
 
The Commerce Act 1998 empowers the Commerce Commission to recommend to 
the Minister to make an Order which can control prices in industries where 
competition is limited or is likely to be lessened.  The Commission controls prices 
to prevent industries that are in a monopoly position from charging exorbitant 
rates and protects consumer interest.   
 
An example of the role of the Commerce Commission was when Telecom Fiji 
Limited (TFL) wanted to increase tariffs in July, 2004.  TFL management 
proposed tariff increases in line rental of F$2.84 to F$35 per month.  The 
regulator (Commerce Commission‟s) duty includes setting and reviewing the 
113 
 
price cap and TFL‟s compliance with it.  The inter-region call rates were reduced 
from F$0.4276 per minute to F$0.2050 per minute, and the line rental was 
increased by the Commission from F$2.84 to F$12 per month.  The Commission 
ensured that TFL obtained a reasonable return on their assets through revision of 
the tariffs. 
 
The Commission is expected to work with the telecommunications industry to 
ensure that the company continues to provide affordable and accessible 
telecommunications services, while obtaining a reasonable return on its 
investments.  Following this outline of the role that the Commerce Commission 
plays in the telecommunication industry, the next section summarises the chapter. 
 
6.4.0  Summary 
 
This chapter reported on the legislative and regulatory framework introduced by 
the Fijian government to corporatise FPTL.  The chapter identifies social and 
institutional contexts within which FPTL is embedded.  The P&T Decree 1989 
provided the new institutional context in which P&T began to be transformed into 
FPTL.  The Decree was evidence of an external shock (see Laughlin, 1991).  
FPTL was the first government organisation to be corporatised.  A new board of 
directors with business expertise was appointed to infuse commercial practices 
into FPTL.  The new board engaged the services of western consultants, Arthur 
Andersen.  Arthur Andersen consultants recommended a number of changes at 
FPTL that included installing additional telecommunication services including 
card phones, as there was a long queue of customers waiting for the telephone 
services, diversifying services by postal division, and providing commercial 
training to the Managing Director, Naqova.  Andersen also recommended the 
division of the company into five strategic business units, each headed by a 
general manager.  The Andersen report was implemented by the management 
from 1992 onwards.  The outcome was an improvement in services, i.e. telephone 
penetration per 100 population increased from 5 per 100 population in 1991 to 8.9 
per 100 population in 1996. 
 
Net profit before tax, net profit after tax, return on equity and return on assets 
showed significant improvements over the years.  The role of the regulator 
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(Commerce Commission) provided a new language of accountability; it was 
charged with ensuring that there was non-discriminatory access to infrastructure 
facilities in monopoly or near monopoly situations.  The Commission also ensured 
that companies such as TFL remained financially solvent and earned a reasonable 
return on their assets.  As TFL is a monopoly, regulation is required to control the 
prices of telecommunication services. 
 
Some improvement of services was achieved as a consequence of new public 
management reforms.  These included modernisation of network technology, 
establishment of regional offices, and an improvement in telephone penetration 
per 100 population.  It was beneficial to introduce business-like management 
techniques at FPTL.  However, cost of telecommunication services escalated over 
time. 
 
Following the outline of the background information on legislative and regulatory 
framework, the next chapter examines the empirical and theoretical analysis 
relating to the emergence of a new public environment at FPTL in the form of 
corporatisation and resistance to management accounting and control changes.  
The following discussion of the new public environment at FPTL and resistance 


























Chapter 7.0:  New Public Sector Environment and 
Resistance to Change at FPTL 
 
7.1.0  Introduction 
 
Chapter 6 outlined the legislative and regulatory framework introduced by the 
Fijian government to corporatise FPTL.  The chapter also identified social and 
institutional influences within which FPTL is embedded.  This study is a 
longitudinal study encompassing MACS changes over the period of 1989 to 2006.  
As such it is a study on corporatized FPTL (1989- 1996), and TFL from 1996 
onwards.  Post Fiji Limited was separated from FPTL in 1996 and the latter 
changed its name to Telecom Fiji Limited (TFL).  The focus of this chapter is to 
examine some of the intra-organizational or micro level changes that took place at 
FPTL. The aim is to identify changes in institutional routines by using a 
framework based on the notion of institutional contradiction and institutional 
entrepreneurs (Seo & Creed, 2002; Beckert, 1999; Dorado, 2005).   
 
While the impetus for change may have originated in the Fiji government‟s 
policies of public sector reform which were considered in chapter 5, the objective 
here is to outline the often slow pace of intra-organizational change within FPTL.  
The organizational actors faced tensions and initially resisted the change to 
private business routines.  However, with wider education and training on the 
change process, the resistance was reduced.  At FPTL, a management team was 
set up to introduce commercial norms which were subsequently stabilized by the 
team through the ongoing process of enactment, reproduction and routinisation of 
new practices.  The changes at FPTL were protracted in nature as new practices 
depend on the everyday activities of actors, as well as on institutional 
arrangements. 
 
The chapter discusses the chain of events from 1990-1996 which encompassed 
FPTL‟s corporatisation and some cultural and political idiosyncrasies of Fiji that 
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The next section discusses the dominant public service culture at FPTL before 
1989.  The rationale behind this is to tease out the rules and routines that prevailed 
at FPTL during the government department stage. 
 
7.2.0   Dominant public service culture (before 1989) 
 
This section discusses the nature of the organisation culture and institutional 
patterns of behavior prior to the public sector reform and corporatization.  There 
was a perceived responsibility of the Fiji government for the functioning of the 
economy through postal and telecommunication services provision for the social 
welfare of the population which may not be supported by private enterprise 
systems.  Services provided by government represent an important component of 
the welfare state and benefit low income groups in particular (Clayton & 
Pontussan, 1998).   
 
The P&T report (1985) noted that the government assisted P&T management and 
employees with government grants.  The report further highlights that, as a 
government department and monopoly supplier, P&T management operated under 
certain restraints and had regard to “national needs and priorities” (p.4).  The 
department members were to undertake projects of “significance in the social 
welfare and development of the country even if the return is unsatisfactory judged 
by commercial standards” (P&T report, 1985, p.4).  There was no discrimination 
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A Strategic manager at TFL recalled: 
Our job was to provide postal and telecommunication services to people.  
Costs and revenue were not so important then. 
     (Interview with SPM, 20 January 2005). 
The above interview from 2005 gave a manager‟s recollection of events 
surrounding FPTL prior to 1989.  Prior to reform, money, cost and profit were not 
prime concerns for FPTL members and appeared to play a minimal role in their 
making sense of the purpose and meaning of daily activity.  Systems of 
accountability were set up in government days to ensure FPTL management was 
publicly accountable to parliament via the Minister of Telecommunications.  An 
accountant in 2005 claimed that FPTL did not deploy an ethos of quality 
consciousness or customer satisfaction.  Instead, it maintained a relatively static 
range of products and services.  The accountant was trying to rationalize the 
reform at FPTL.  A customer service manager commented: 
Those days they connected almost one customer a day.  Customers used to 
give them celebratory food to get connected.  They favoured the customer.  
Customers sometimes got the connection by giving money to the 
technicians.  Customers do this because connections come after a couple 
of years after they put in an application. 
     (Interview with MCR, 26 February 2004). 
 The customer service manager in the above statement was trying to justify the 
reasons for reforms: that public service was inefficient for customer needs.  He 
was speaking years after the public sector reform.  An engineer commented: 
Engineers were quite powerful in the government days.  What was 
important was to provide lines to customers.  Money was not so important 
then. 
     (Interview with ENG, 19 January 2005). 
Most management positions were occupied by engineers (Fiji Posts & 
Telecommunications report, 1988).  Management in the government days 
appeared to be secure in their conviction that an engineering discourse was a 
legitimate one and that they were acting in the interest of the public as a whole.   
 
The accounting system was cash-based and ignored asset records.  While FPTL 
was a government department, the government provided assistance such as off 
shore loan guarantees from the Asian Development Bank and World Bank and 
free rentals of all property (FPTL annual report, 1990). The free rentals related 
mainly to FPTL land and buildings.  The loans from ADB and World Bank 




A customer service manager recalled: 
In the government days, often ministers may also intervene into who 
should get the phone even though we may have a long wait list.  Political 
favours were prevalent for some customers known to the government 
ministers, especially if they were supporters of the ruling party. 
    (Interview with MCR, 19 January 2005). 
In civil service days, FPTL actors had rule-bound bureaucratic management and 
some political intervention into operational issues.  Control lay with politicians 
who intervened into the operational affairs of FPTL to exercise patronage and get 
advantage for their party in terms of votes in upcoming elections (see also 
Wickramasinghe, Hopper & Rathnasiri, 2004).   
 
An accountant commented: 
In the civil service days, there was lots of bureaucracy.  Any position that 
you needed to fill or requests had to go through Public Service 
Commission for approval.  The Public Service Commission took ages 
before the approval was granted which was a bit frustrating for us.  Our 
organisational chart was also very hierarchical then. 
    (Interview with ACT, 3 February, 2005). 
From the evidence, it may be concluded that as FPTL was a bureaucratic 
organization with more levels of organizational hierarchies, communication at 
times was delayed and decision making took longer than anticipated by FPTL 
agents.  Management was subject to the civil service rules of the Public Service 
Commission.  Public service obligations necessitated accountability to the Public 
Service Commission and to parliament. 
 
However, some people within FPTL were quite supportive of the public service 
model, as evidenced by the following interview quotes: 
We were quite happy with the civil service culture then.  Our jobs were 
more secure. 
    (Interview with RMB, 18 January 2005) 
 
Our intention was to provide a public service.  Money didn‟t matter then. 
    (Interview with ACT2, 26 February 2004) 
 
We were providing a public service.  The cost of our services was 
affordable.  We enjoyed the privileges of being civil servants, had secured 
jobs and had abundance of leave to use. 
     (Interview with ENG, 20 January 2005). 
I‟ve been with the company so long and have seen many changes.  We 
have had to learn to adapt to these changes and to move with times.  When 
I first joined the Operator Services Sector, the operators worked on old 
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manual switchboards and because there were only a few subscribers we 
basically knew all our customers by name.  Now we have learnt to operate 
the latest in computerised technology, a far way from old days.  We now 
deal with thousands of customers.  Although the new and modern systems 
are good to work on and more efficient, I still miss the early days. 
    (Interview with OS, 18 January 2005) 
As evidenced from the above interview extracts, some employees were so used to 
the public service rules and routines that they regretted the loss.  
Telecommunication services then were considered a social commodity and were 
affordable to the average customer.  A strategic manager stated that there was 
abundant leave such as sick leave, compassionate leave, bereavement leave 
available to employees during government days which some workers made 
maximum use of.  The leave that was in existence in the government days entailed 
annual leave of 18 days, sick leave without medical certificate of 6 days and with 
medical certificate of 21 days, and compassionate leave of 3 days.  Also civil 
service jobs were secure, with people continuing to work until their retirement; 
there was no contractual employment. 
 
The Fiji Posts and Telecommunications annual report (1986) notes that the 
departmental members were responsible for the development and maintenance of 
postal and telecommunications services throughout Fiji.  The Fiji Posts and 
Telecommunications annual report (1989) points out that the departmental 
managers and employees ensured that there was a cost-effective communications 
network adequate to cope with national needs and priorities.  There was an 
emphasis on capital investment to reduce the wait for telephone service by 
achieving a higher rate of new connections (Fiji Posts & Telecommunications 
annual report, 1989). 
 
The department‟s management control followed government regulations such as 
financial regulations, guidelines and circulars issued by Ministry of 
Telecommunications.  Controls emphasized hierarchical responsibility and 
financial accountability.  It took applicants years to get a telephone line, but with 
political interference the connection could be quicker.  There were 12,773 people 
waiting for telephone services in 1989 (FPTL annual report, 1990). 
 
On advice from the World Bank, the Fijian government began corporatising FPTL 
in 1989.  The change could be described as emanating from an external jolt 
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(Laughlin, 1991).  The Fiji government‟s reform policies involving 
corporatisation produced some conflicts and struggles amongst FPTL actors 
which are discussed in the next section. 
 
7.2.1  Corporatisation of FPTL (1989-1990) 
 
The interim Fijian government in the late 1980s, under pressure from the World 
Bank, was encouraged to corporatise FPTL.  The coercive pressure for 
corporatisation also stemmed from Arthur Andersen consultants, brought by the 
new FPTL board, and the globalizing influences of new public management 
(NPM).  Hood (1991, 1995) refers to NPM as one that lessens or removes 
differences between public and private sectors and emphasises a greater element 
of accountability in terms of results.   
 
The ethos and rhetoric surrounding the reform was marked by a heavy emphasis 
on corporatisation, deregulation and decentralization inspired by the then interim 
government‟s neo-liberal reform agenda (Opportunities for Growth, 1993).  
Whilst stressing the need for radical change, the reform emphasized the steps 
necessary for enhancing the efficiency and quality of postal and 
telecommunication services (FPTL annual report, 1990). 
 
A key mechanism for reinforcing the incentives of efficiency and quality ends was 
the “quasi market” logic embedded in new accounting principles of return on 
assets and profitability.  Such logic contrasts with the past when engineers were 
predominant and physical production was viewed as more relevant than 
commercial accounting values.  In keeping with the market logic, subscribers to 
telecommunications were renamed “customers.” 
 
The previous institution of public service norms was viewed by management and 
media to have lacked customer focus.  Ultimately the ongoing movement towards 
a commercial business ethos introduced a clash between the two institutions of 
public service and commercial business.  This will be discussed in-depth later in 
the chapter (see page 124).  Despite the reform, FPTL continued to provide rural 
telecommunication services which were subsidized by the Fiji government.  The 
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non-commercial service was part of the public service goal of FPTL in order to 
fulfill the communication needs of rural people. 
 
The World Bank and ADB were lenders to the Fiji government and their (World 
Bank and ADB‟s) general ideology was that the public sector ought to be efficient 
and responsive to the needs of customers.  As engineering and physical 
production routines were predominant at FPTL, the infusion of business norms 
through corporatisation created tension amongst actors.  A human resource 
manager commented: 
As corporatisation was a new thing, some people went along with it.  As 
with any introduction of new ideas, 30% will go along, 30% will sit on the 
fence and the 30% will be on the other side opposing the change.  It will 
be like this whenever you start a new thing.  It was a little bit difficult to 
educate the people. 
     (Interview with MHR, 18 February, 2004). 
An engineering staff member commented: 
With corporatisation, there were mixed feelings.  Some people were 
uncertain of their future as to what would come to them. 
     (Interview with ENG, 18 February, 2004). 
 
The above interview evidence indicates uncertainty and possible resistance to 
change by some people.  There was an ongoing conflict between public service 
and commercial business routines.  Seo and Creed (2002) note that the likelihood 
of a shift in collective action by actors increases when actors face tensions arising 
from contradictions.  Through corporatisation, there was a challenge to extant 
ways of thinking and operating in terms of commercial business routines.   
 
The reform of Post and Telecommunications was considered by some employees 
at FPTL as part of the harshness of government policies emanating from pressure 
from donor agencies of the World Bank.  The corporatization meant FPTL‟s 
members were more concerned with profit seeking which shaped increased prices 
for postal and telecommunication services.  For FPTL members, money as an end 
became more important after the reform.  In the historical circumstance, there was 
little demand for accountants.  The role of engineers was more important.  After 
the reforms, the management rationalized them, regarding the public sector as less 




Corporatisation of FPTL shaped a “radical change” (Lawrence et al., 1997; Burns 
& Scapens, 2000) which enabled a shift in actors‟ collective consciousness 
towards business norms.  A customer service manager commented: 
There was a lack of performance targets in public government days.  As a 
result people did not pay much attention to customers then. 
    (Interview with MCR, February 26, 2004). 
The desire to transform the government department into FPTL as a business-like 
organisation necessitated the transplantation of managerial habits and routines 
such as introduction of TQM practices and performance management system.  
Within FPTL, changes included the appointment of 5 general managers of 
divisions that were renamed as Strategic Business Units in the areas of Customer 
Services, Marketing, Network Engineering, Support Service and Finance.  The 
position and name of Permanent Secretary for Posts and Telecom was changed to 
Managing Director and the Private Automatic Branch was renamed Corporate 
Business and Small Business and Residential.  Changes were noticeable as the 
restructuring proceeded at FPTL and a mission statement was adopted as a 
guiding principle for meeting company visions and objectives.  The mission stated 
that: 
Fiji Posts and Telecommunications Limited is committed to providing its 
customers high quality postal and telecommunications services.  Our 
purpose is to meet the needs of our customers by providing efficient, 
reliable, cost effective and affordable products and services.  We will 
improve our network and facilities fully utilizing the resources available 
including the introduction of new technologies.  We will promote an 
organizational climate that will increase productivity through training, 
team work and innovation among our staff.  We will continue to be 
profitable in our business. 
    (FPTL annual report, 1990, p.1). 
 
On the transition from a government department to corporate organization, 
workers were given a choice: they could choose to remain with government or 
join the new company.  One of the finance managers commented: 
Only at this instance, at the time of separation from government which 
was from a department to corporate organization, we gave the opportunity 
to people whether you want to remain in government or be part of team of 
Posts and Telecom Limited.  That time option was given to the people.  
Those who wanted to stay with the government, they stayed with 
government.  They were given jobs in the government departments. 





Another accountant commented: 
Non-technical staff were given the option of joining the new company or 
remaining in the civil service.  To avoid staff leaving the company, FPTL 
gave higher salaries which worked well and staff chose to remain with 
FPTL. 
    (Interview with ACT2, February 3, 2005). 
 
One per cent of the employees, approximately 13 to 15, mainly administrative 
staff, left FPTL for the civil service.  Some staff faced a contradiction between 
public service and private sector templates and chose the former, thus exhibiting 
their resistance to commercial business routines.  By these workers joining the 
public service departments, their taken-for-granted institution of public service 
was not disturbed.  A customer service manager commented:  
We should not forget that the Regulatory Unit of the former Posts and 
Telecommunications Department has been taken by the Ministry.  That 
was to keep the regulatory arm under the government.  Out of the 13 or so 
staff that joined government, 5 were from the regulatory section who had 
no choice but to remain with the government. 
    (Interview with MCR, 17 January, 2006). 
 
One of the finance managers commented that “during the transition, everyone was 
asked to resign from civil service and rejoin Fiji Posts and Telecom Limited.”  He 
went on to say: 
You have to give choices to the people and this is what the government 
said; those who want to stay with government stay, those who want to go 
to Post and Telecom can go there.  And that is the time they (government) 
said you have to resign because you‟re no longer employed by the 
government.  Resigning and rejoining was done at the same time. 
    (Interview with FM, February 26, 2004). 
 
Another quality manager commented: 
People who joined the civil service were mainly conservative in their 
thoughts.  They thought by remaining with government their job is secured 
and were worried that by joining Post and Telecom company, may be they 
(employees) will lose jobs because of expected restructuring that may lead 
to redundancy of workers. 
     (Interview: February 25, 2004). 
 
The workers were faced with uncertainty after corporatisation.  As evidenced 
from the above interview quote, the workers who moved to civil service, except 
those in regulatory function who had no choice, were used to public sector 
traditions as a mode that governed day-to-day activities.  Integral aspects of 
corporatisation were changes in people‟s attitudes, behaviour and values 
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(institution) to create appropriate business routines within FPTL employees who 
were so embedded with public service ethos in the pre-reform days.  Also given 
the unemployment issue, some employees felt more secure to remain within 
government departments. 
 
Having described some of the events immediately around the corporatisation of 
FPTL, the next section examines the various contradictions at FPTL that shaped 
changes to business routines at FPTL.  The changes were recommended by 
Andersen consultants, an external change agent who was hired by the board of 




7.2.2   Institutional Contradictions at FPTL 
 
This section reflects the various institutional contradictions that existed at FPTL.  
The contradictions are referred to in relation to the literature by Seo and Creed 
(2002) who identify a number of contradictions in the social interaction of 
organisational actors.  One is the gap between the levels of performance arising 
from conformity to existing institutions and the alternative opportunities in the 
market place (the “inefficiency contradiction”).  The second is the inability of 
organisation actors to adapt to exogenous jolts due to “locked-in” patterns of 
behaviour (the non-adaptability contradiction).  The third contradiction is the 
inconsistencies between values deeply held but mutually inconsistent (the 
interinstitutional incompatibility contradiction).  The presence of institutional 
contradictions can drive, enable and constrain further institutional change (e.g., 
Seo & Creed, 2002). 
 
In the postal and telecommunication sector there have been clashes of interest 
between trade unions and management, and between engineering and accounting 
staff.  As a senior Telecom manager recalled when asked about the role of unions 
in the reform process: 
In Fiji, we always had militant unions.  With reforms, the unions consider  
 
                                                          
14
 The thesis distinguishes between external change agents and institutional entrepreneurs (internal 
changes agents).  Institutional entrepreneurs are the embedded actors who change institutions 
while external change agents may come from outside the organisation.  
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that they will lose power and so strongly resist reforms, especially when it 
comes to shedding of workers. 
   (Interview with GMA, 19 February, 2004). 
 
The trade unions have been a source of tension in the reform process.  There was 
an increase in the number of industrial disputes and strikes in Fiji since the Qarase 
government came to power in 2001 reaching an all-time high during 2002 with a 
record number of 174 industrial disputes and 25 strikes (Ministry of Industrial 
Relations, 2004).  Table 5 summarises the detail of industrial disputes and strikes. 
 
Table 5 The Detail of National Industrial Disputes and Strikes (1993- 2003) 
 





85 78 88 158 170 142 143 114 143 174 170 
Strikes 12 8 9 12 8 6 9 13 15 25 16 
  (Source: Ministry of Labour and Industrial Relations, 2004). 
Fiji Islands Bureau of Statistics (2007) reveals the number of strikes in 2005 as 6 
compared to 9 in 2004. 
 
A secretary of the Telecom union, on being asked about the impact of reforms on 
FPTL workers, commented: 
We will not tolerate any redundancy and have not tolerated any so far as a 
result of restructure.  Any potential redundancies need to be discussed with 
us.  And if members wish to voluntarily take redundancy package, then 
this is welcome but we do not welcome any forced redundancy.  That is 
our stand since the reforms and we very much maintain that stance. 
   (Interview with FPTLS, February 24, 2004). 
 
The secretary of the union went on to say: 
FPTL workers are well known for the industrial disputes.  We are here to 
fight for the basic rights of the workers and will ensure that their rights are 
not violated.  We have been doing this since the organisation has been 
corporatised. 
    (Interview with FPTLS, January 24, 2004). 
 
A fundamental premise of Marxist political economy is that only labour can 
produce surplus values and thus profits (Wright, 1999).  The capitalist exploits 
labour to extract surplus value from the production process.  A major way of 
increasing this exploitation is through increase of surplus value resulting from the 
expansion of the working day and intensity of work.  Workers are forced to work 
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in a system that they intend to subvert through various resistance practices.  All 
the contradictions of capitalism are between wage labour and owners of capital.  
Contradictions provide a continuous source of tensions and conflicts which may 
shape consciousness and action to change the present order.   
 
The case of privatised TFL represents capitalist social formation which is 
somewhat antithetical to the interests of labour.  The trade union-management 
clash is an indication of TFL workers‟ inability to adapt to exogenous jolts 
because of “locked in” patterns of behaviour and thought (the non-adaptability 
contradiction) (see Seo & Creed, 2002).  The employees tended to resist adapting 
to commercial business routines and tended to negotiate for higher wage rates 
relative to the private sector.  An interview with the union secretary revealed that 
the TFL management teams have been in constant negotiation with the union and 
have been giving the workers marginal annual increments.  Such increments in 
wages to employees may allow embedded actors to act as institutional 
entrepreneurs.  The embedded agents are normally happy with increments and can 
become institutional entrepreneurs to shape changes.  The increments are 
normally provided by management if changes are embraced by organisational 
actors. 
 
FPTL actors had to change incrementally to commercial business routines as a 
consequence of the government‟s policy on public sector reforms which was 
incompatible with FPTL actors‟ public service way of doing things.  In relation to 
FPTL actors, there was a dramatic change in institutional arrangements.  FPTL 
actors were to run FPTL as a “successful business,” selling their products and 
services at a profit.  A board of directors and a chief executive were appointed to 
effect the changes.  Preferences in such appointments were for people who had 
been successful in the private sector in order to inject a new type of governance to 
FPTL.   
 
The tensions between two contrasting institutions were evident at FPTL.  A new 
interpretive scheme with a different language has been introduced, providing an 
alternative view of effective and efficient postal and telecommunication services.  
There was a clash between the two institutions, and people were mobilised to 
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effect or resist the new language of accounting and economics taking over from 
what used to be mainly engineering concerns. 
 
Managers rationalised performance concerns by creating dissatisfaction with 
public service routines.  Seo and Creed (2002) refer to this contradiction as the 
technical inefficiency contradiction.  There were gaps between the levels of 
performance from conformity to institutional prescription of public service and 
from alternative opportunities as a corporatised FPTL where efficiency in 
business terms became the primary objective.   
 
Seo and Creed (2002) also point out that a common way in which institutional 
contradictions facilitate a shift in actors‟ collective consciousness is by creating an 
abrupt disruption of existing social order through institutional crisis.  Once 
induced, institutional crisis may break down the institutional embeddedness, make 
the institutional system highly unstable (DiMaggio & Powell, 1991), and induce a 
radical shift in actors‟ collective consciousness.  This illustrates an example of 
interinstitutional incompatibilities (e.g., Seo & Creed, 2002).  The FPTL actors 
had to meet multiple stakeholders‟ expectations which involved the government 
and the donor agencies.  These stakeholders demanded that FPTL be run as a 
business.  The donor agencies of the World Bank, for example, wanted their loans 
to be repaid with interest.  Running FPTL as a business was perceived as ideal by 
the Bank.  The next section examines the political and cultural struggle that 
existed at FPTL and which is a form of non-adaptability contradiction. 
 
7.3   Political and Cultural Inconsistencies and Control Changes: 
1992-1995 
 
This section examines the political and cultural struggle at FPTL and outlines how 
the institutional entrepreneurs were involved in the change process.  The second 
subsection outlines the political and cultural issues specific to Fiji that induced 
resistance to the change process.  The resistance to change inhibited changes at 





7.3.1  Institutional Entrepreneurs: 1992-1993 
 
The newly appointed Board of 1992 and top-level managers were the institutional 
entrepreneurs who inherited an organisation that for many years had a strong 
public service ethos.  Fligstein (1997) points out that some social actors (in this 
case the Board of Directors and top-level management) are better at producing 
desired social outcomes than others, and may be called institutional entrepreneurs.  
Winning the hearts and minds of the workforce and changing habitualised modes 
of thinking and behaviour was a challenge.  For a time, there was bound to be 
uncertainty as institutional contradiction/inconsistency was introduced to the 
organisation.  The institutional incompatibilities created a sense of institutional 
crisis (see Seo & Creed, 2002).  It is in times of crisis that agency comes to the 
fore (Giddens, 1991; Beckert, 1999; Dorado, 2005). 
 
Cultural change does not happen overnight and there was no apparent immediate 
improvement in performance at FPTL.  According to a manager, it became 
apparent to the Board that after two years of corporatisation, FPTL‟s efficiency 
had not improved.  Profits were generated by price hikes and not by improved 
efficiency (FPTL annual report, 1992).  FPTL was a monopoly, so could raise 
prices to improve profit without needing to be customer-conscious.  The newly 
introduced commercial rules and routines may have been no more than formalised 
myth and ceremony (Meyer & Rowan, 1977).  Though routines were being 
changed for the sake of appearing legitimate to outside constituencies, operational 
efficiency was unaffected (see Seo & Creed, 2002; Meyer & Rowan, 1977).  The 
external change agent was the hired Arthur Andersen consultant.  Fligstein (1997) 
identifies strategies such as agenda setting and framing action that institutional 
entrepreneurs may use to change the behaviour of embedded actors.  Agenda 
setting is the ability to set the course of action for other actors and may mean 
convincing multiple actors and groups that the agenda is in their interests.  
Framing action may mean that institutional entrepreneurs have to convince others 
that the apparent change is in the actors‟ interest.  Through these strategies of 
agenda setting and framing action, changes within the institution may be brought 
out. 
 
FPTL‟s annual report (1992) notes that the consultant was charged with 
introducing commercial values such as focus on profitability, return on 
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investment, debt/equity ratio and realignment of FPTL‟s organisational structures.  
The Andersen consultants were hired for six months by the Board to produce a 
strategic vision for FPTL.  Andersen consultants studied FPTL‟s operations and 
noted in their report that revenue was generated overwhelmingly by urban 
customers, and that there was a large urban customer wait list that needed to be 
improved (Andersen‟s report, 1992).  This report emphasised that FPTL compared 
poorly in terms of return on assets and profit margins against other Telecom 
companies in the region, and also against other large companies in Fiji.  Andersen 
called for a rise in telecom prices and improvement in the “efficiency” of 
telecommunication services.  The consultants‟ report also advocated that Naqova, 
the managing director of the company would be unable to lead the organisation 
into corporatisation unless he received further training, possibly a secondment to a 
telecommunications company that had already made a transition from a 
government department to a commercial entity.  Andersen also recommended 
dividing company into five Strategic Business Units headed by a general manager 
and introduced the position of Chief General Manager between general managers 
and managing director. 
 
The top-level management team performed the role of institutional entrepreneur in 
implementing the consultant‟s report.  Through this implementation, the external 
change agent of Board and institutional entrepreneurs of management attempted 
to destroy the institution of public service ethos and create a new institution of 
commercial business routines.  The institutional entrepreneurs attempted to 
motivate other actors to act cooperatively in the production and reproduction of 
commercial business routines.  The uncertainty created by the institutional 
entrepreneur (management and board members) had not yet been replaced by new 
institutionalised behaviours.  The next section examines the resistance to change 
by Naqova and other managers in accepting new commercial business routines. 
 
7.3.2   Political and Cultural conflict used by Naqova and other 
managers to resist change: 1992- 1994 
 
This section illustrates some of the resistance expressed by Naqova and other 
managers to the change process.  According to one of the interviewees, while 
implementing the Andersen report‟s recommendations in 1992 (and as discussed 
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in chapter 6), as part of introducing a commercial culture into FPTL, the Board of 
Directors met extensive resistance to change from Naqova (Managing Director) 
and other managers.  Naqova, an engineer by profession, had been the Permanent 
Secretary for P&T since 1982, and was appointed Managing Director when P&T 
was corporatised in 1990.  As discussed previously, the consultant‟s report 
claimed that Naqova would not be able to lead the company into corporatisation 
and recommended that he be given overseas training.  According to an 
interviewee, Naqova was asked to leave after refusing to accept such offers.  
Naqova personified the internal contradiction introduced to FPTL in which profit-
oriented ways of thinking conflicted with the longstanding public sector ethos 
within FPTL.  A customer service manager pointed out: 
In the civil service days our objective was more on providing 
telecommunications as a public service.  It was more of a political 
ambition through social objectives to concentrate on geographical 
coverage or telephone service penetration to all at any cost. 
     (Interview with MCR, 20 January, 2005). 
 
According to one manager, many managers and workers were against the board, 
especially against Robert Lee, the chairman of the board, who was called “El 
Supremo” around FPTL.  Lee was putting a lot of pressure on FPTL employees to 
work towards commercial business goals.  Lee had been appointed Board 
chairman as he had sufficient business expertise and was owner of a successful 
business in the capital, Suva.  FPTL‟s commercial routines, according to a 
customer service manager, had not gained widespread acceptance and were 
challenged. 
 
Naqova‟s success in holding back the change process at FPTL represented a non-
adaptability contradiction (e.g., Seo & Creed, 2002).  The lack of acceptance of 
commercial norms stemmed from the top, that is, the management/board, and only 
after Naqova was forced to resign were FPTL management and staff more willing 
to acquiesce to the change process.  The workforce needed assurance that 
commercialisation would not result in job losses, as evidenced by one of the 
accountant‟s comments: 
We were told to accept the change as no one would be made redundant 
from the job.  Rather the services that were outsourced, staff were 
redeployed elsewhere in the company.  Those who were shifted were told 




    (Interview with ACT2, 17 September, 2002). 
 
Great uncertainties clearly existed between management and workers.  There were 
tensions at the highest level, and these involved social, political and cultural 
factors specific to Fiji, localised influences that tend to be ignored in conventional 
portrayals of the isomorphic tendencies of institutional theory.  The new Minister 
for Telecommunications added to the uncertainty because of his support for 
deposed Naqova.  One of the human resource managers commented: 
The minister gave an ultimatum to Lee (the chairman of the Board of 
Directors) to resign.  Lee did not resign and the Board said it supported 
Lee.  Rabuka, the then Prime minister, intervened and asked Lee to stay 
on.  The Board then turned around and sacked our General Manager, 
Pratap Singh, who was fiercely opposed to change.  About 1,000 FPTL 
workers went on strike in support of Singh. 
     (Interview with MHR, 3 February, 2005). 
 
Cultural influences played a pivotal role at FPTL.  For example, the minister gave 
an ultimatum to Lee as he did not want Naqova to lose his position.  The minister 
was from the same Naitasiri province as Naqova.  Communalism and close 
personal relationships are common in Fiji.  The traditional Fijian socio-economic 
system pervasively remains cooperative, communal and village-oriented (Lloyd, 
1982).  It appeared from the local press (The Review, 1992, p.10) that only when 
Rabuka, the then Prime Minister, advised Lee to stay on did the Board decide to 
sack Pratap Singh, an influential general manager who, like Naqova, was fiercely 
opposed to change.  “The board accused Singh of subversive action to topple the 
board of directors” (The Review, 1992, p.10).  Singh was a great supporter of 
Naqova and, according to the Review (1992), was also a friend of the Minister of 
Telecommunications and provided an FPTL vehicle to the minister to use over the 
weekends.
15
  As the trade unions in Fiji are militant, the union supported FPTL 
members to take industrial action unless Singh was reinstated.  Singh‟s dismissal 
led workers to stay out of work for fear of redundancies.  On failing to secure his 
reinstatement, the workers became so frustrated that they sabotaged cables, 
affecting many people in the capital, Suva.  The FPTL annual report (1992, p.4) 
stated that: 
the strike and sabotage in July 1992 severely disrupted company 
operations and temporarily interrupted forward movement. 
                                                          
15
 The Ministers are restricted from use of ministerial vehicles for personal use.  It appeared that 




Here the introduction of commercial rules and routines was subjected to resistance 
as it met socio-cultural influences and challenged the traditional interests of the 
labour movement as well as a public service ethos opposed to profit seeking from 
essential services.  Public service routines dominated by physical production and 
engineering norms had been legitimate during government department days.  
Powell (1991) points out that efforts to change shared expectations, in this case 
the civil service ethos and engineering norms, are often resisted as they threaten 
individuals‟ sense of security and disrupt routines.  The sabotage was a form of 
resistance due to contradictions between employees and the Board.  Trade unions, 
which are quite militant in Fiji, played a pivotal role for employees. 
 
The philosophical root of resistance could be mooted as the failure of the new 
system which could be seen as exploitative and making profits in a monopolistic 
situation.  The institutionalisation of business-like, profit-oriented ways of 
thinking was not initially successful.  The government-appointed change agents 
such as the consultants were trying to institutionalise the pursuit of profit and 
shareholder value, but this seemed not to have been widely accepted. 
 
According to a manager, as workers stayed out, there was no sign of resolution to 
the dispute.  This culminated in the extraordinary act of the Board stepping down 
„in the national interest‟.  The Minister for Telecommunications then threatened 
Prime Minister Rabuka that if Naqova was not reinstated his and Naqova‟s 
Naitasiri province would withdraw support for Rabuka‟s party.  As Rabuka‟s 
government was fairly new at that time, he feared the withdrawal of support and 
gave in to Naqova‟s reinstatement (The Review 1992).  This meant that the Board 
had to step down, as the Managing Director, Naqova, and the Board shared an 
unhealthy working relationship (The Review, 1992).  According to an 
interviewee, the Minister appeared to have a track record of creating industrial 
disputes.  It was claimed that he had led a strike as a high school student when he 
was head boy and at lease two interviewees portrayed him as someone who was 
quite confrontational in attitude.  The cultural and political context of Fiji is a 
complicating factor in institutional change within FPTL.  The lack of 
institutionalisation may be partly due to the interplay between cultural and 
political forces.  People have close relationships: they appear to quite closely 
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associate themselves with others who belong to the same province or tribe as was 
the case with Naqova and the Minister, and forces such as profitability are 
secondary to these people.  Fijian society is characterized by collectivism, large 




Lee, the chairman of FPTL in 1992, told the Review (1992) about his and the 
Board‟s stepping down: 
For any corporatisation program, there needs to be a political will and 
commitment to carry through.  People holding responsibility require 
understanding of the Companies Act and Articles of Association by which 
the company is expected to operate.  Unfortunately, this was not 




The role and functions of a Board of Directors is defined in the Company‟s Act 
and FPTL‟s Article of Association, section 87, which states that the business of 
the company shall be managed by the Directors.  However, the Minister overruled 
the decision of the Board by reinstating Naqova. 
 
At least two industrial actions eventuated at FPTL which led to the reinstatement 
of Managing Director Naqova.  In 1992, workers were frustrated at not getting 
Naqova reinstated so, as mentioned earlier, they sabotaged cables at the Suva 
Exchange, affecting 14,000 lines (FPTL annual report, 1992).  They undertook 
industrial actions on the second occasion and, with escalating industrial actions, 
the government acceded to workers‟ demands and Naqova was reinstated after the 
initial board resigned.  FPTL‟s annual report (1992) reports that “27,512 man-
hours were lost as a result of a strike by workers” (p.10).  The trade dispute based 
on Pratap Singh‟s dismissal was referred for compulsory arbitration with the Fiji 
Public Service Association representing Mr Singh.  The arbitrators ruled in favour 
of Mr Singh‟s reinstatement (FPTL annual report, 1992).  The government set up 
a board of enquiry into the affairs of FPTL so that the confrontation could be 
                                                          
16
 In Fiji, each village is headed by the chiefs and people have considerable respect for the chiefs; 
silence is an imperative form of communication and social respect (Achary, 1998b).  Any 
questioning of the authority of chiefs is seen as a deviant behaviour as this characterises high 
uncertainty avoidance society.  Femininity is pervasive in Fiji as there is a preference in society for 
relationships, modesty, caring for the weak and quality of life.  Fijians have extended family and 
strong allegiances to the chiefs in the village. 
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overcome.  A report of the enquiry set up by the Fiji government into the affairs 
of FPTL pointed out that: 
…the board has made substantial out-of-court settlements, which may be 
interpreted to mean they erred in their original decisions but we record our 
concern at the loss to FPTL at a critical time of most experienced 
chartered engineers including Naqova… 
  (Parliament Paper, 1994, p.10). 
The enquiry noted that Naqova and Singh had been responsible for the planning 
which had resulted in digital exchanges, fibre optic calling, trunk radio and 
cellular systems after corporatisation (Parliament Paper, 1994). 
 
FPTL‟s annual report (1992, p.2) noted that: 
…the year witnessed unprecedented events within the company which 
seriously affected public confidence in our ability to meet fully our 
obligations as an essential provider to those who are the purpose of our 
existence. 
 
A parliament paper (1994, p.2) also pointed out that: 
…the transition from Government Department to Competitive Corporation 
started in earnest from 1
st
 January 1990… and further training of private 
sector concepts and objectives are still needed to fully convert and 
convince all employees. (p. 2). 
The (1994) parliament paper went on to emphasize that while commercial 
objectives had been introduced, better industrial relations and cooperation 
between the Board of Directors and management were needed for continued 
achievement of FPTL‟s commercial objectives.  The public sector norms at FPTL 
seemed to have been locked in and became isolated from or unresponsive to 
changes in the external environments.  This unresponsiveness created a situation 
whereby conflict between FPTL employees and the Board of Directors developed.  
This can be attributed to cultural and political influences specific to Fiji.  The next 
section outlines the appointment of a new Board and managers. 
 
7.3.3   Appointment of a New Board and Managers: 1993-1995 
 
This section examines the appointment of a new Board and management with 
business expertise in order for the change process to proceed.  It required political 
will to appoint in 1993 a new Board which then attempted to remove the friction 
between management and to begin the process of implementing the Andersen 
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consultants‟ report.  The new chairman, Lionel Yee, reported in the Review 
(1994, p.56) that: 
My first job was to stabilize the company because of internal staff friction.  
This has not been totally eliminated yet.  It takes time.  Even those who 
feel opposed, hopefully in time will see that if they want to be a part of the 
organization, they should work together towards a goal of being a 
profitable organization in terms of capital and assets and so on. 
 
The new chairman ensured that there was better communication and education 
about change to dissipate any fear among employees.  There was a massive 
program of training, and overseas consultants on change management were 
brought in to educate workers on the needs and benefits of change.  Besides this 
training, the key pillar of the new chairman‟s strategy was to expose key players 
to the FPTL training centre, an organization of FPTL used for telecommunications 
and other related courses.  The courses at the centre also focused on customer 
services, leadership development programs and best practice sharing. 
 
The FPTL annual report (1993, p.7) had forewarned of the challenges: 
The restructuring of a Government department into a commercial 
company is never an easy task and there are many examples all around the 
world of the problems encountered in such an exercise.  A new operational 
structure inevitably means the relocation of some working groups, group 
functions have to be redefined and new working practices have to be 
introduced. 
 
Also a new chief general manager was appointed in 1993 to effect the necessary 
changes.  The Chief General Manager had worked with several companies in 
Israel, USA and Europe (The Review, February/ March 1993). His function was 
to introduce, with the support of the Board of Directors and senior managers, 
strategies of profit orientation. The manager had dual professional qualifications, 
being both a qualified accountant and an engineer.  His job was to introduce new 
practices to FPTL.  In the language of institutional theory, he was a normative and 
mimetic influence, bringing practices and values from previous company 
experience as well as professional norms. These norms were buttressed by new 
Board appointments of people from business backgrounds.  The Board was 
composed of business men and business women.  For example, Board member 
Kanti Tapoo was the Executive Chairman of the Tapoo group of Companies, Mr 
James Raman was the General Secretary of the National Union of Factory and 
Commercial Workers, Savenaca Narube was the Governor of the Reserve Bank of 
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Fiji, while Adi Litia Qionibravi was the Deputy Secretary with the Fijian Affairs 
Board (FPTL annual report, 1995).  Erakovic and Wilson (2005) note that such 
change in professional demography encourage new organizational policies where 
investment decisions are predicated on commercial and financial measures, not on 
engineering excellence.   
 
Additional accountants with professional qualifications were hired.  A person 
from Sri Lankan Telecommunications Ltd, previously a chief marketing and 
operations officer, was appointed Chief Finance Manager.  The appointee had 
experience with business plans, budgets, variance statements and monthly 
performance reviews. He too had dual qualifications, being a member of the 
Chartered Institute of Management Accountants of UK and also holding a 
Bachelor‟s Degree in Engineering.  After Board appointments were made of 
people with business background, the new Chief General Manager, the new Board 
and the Chief Financial Officer developed a strategic business plan for the 
company with some assistance from Telecom New Zealand consultants.  The 
strategic business plan identified essential benchmarks for the company in terms 
of expected revenue, expenditures, investment and profitability forecasts.  
According to a manager, the strategic business plan encouraged employees to 
wear the “hat of finance” and consider shareholders‟ interests.  The strategic 
business plan was supported and reinforced by extensive programmes of training 
by FPTL management. 
 
The (1994) parliament paper emphasized that, while commercial objectives had 
been introduced, better industrial relations and cooperation between the Board of 
Directors and management would be needed for continued achievement of 
FPTL‟s commercial objectives.  Due to the industrial actions of 1991/1992 and 
strong resistance to change by some senior management and staff, FPTL 
employees‟ thinking had not totally adapted to commercial routines.  The next 
section outlines how commercial routines were assimilated by FPTL actors after 





7.4.0   Production and Reproduction of New Practices: 1995 
onwards 
 
The period of uncertainty had brought tensions and lack of progress to FPTL.  The 
model of institutional contradiction, institutional entrepreneurs and the process of 
institutionalization described earlier in Chapter 3, section 3.6.0, Figure 2 shows 
how managers may be able, in time, to overcome uncertainty created by the 
destruction of old institutions by creating a sense of stability through the process 
of enacting and reproduction of new practices. 
 
Although the difficulties of 1991/1992 had a temporarily negative effect on 
business operations and profits, the business experienced recovery (FPTL annual 
report 1995). The new Board of Directors and top-level managers began a process 
of education and training which involved the introduction of new practices based 
on Total Quality Management (TQM) principles in 1996.  Staff were involved in 
the change process and the advantages of these new stabilized procedures were 
slowly incorporated into daily routines. Improvements in operational efficiency 
were evident in, for example, reduced wait lists and a move into fibre optics, trunk 
radio and cellular networks, and a digital exchange improvement which had been 
much desired in the pre-corporatisation days (FPTL annual report, 1995).  Some 
uncertainty was created by the abrupt changes but actors gradually assimilated the 
new business routines.  There were ongoing conflicts between public service and 
commercial business routines such as profitability and use of accrual accounting, 
which created uncertainty, but gradually through education and training, actors 
slowly began to routinise commercial business routines.  The accountants were 
proactive in introducing commercial business routines such as economic value 
added, net present values and pay back period to be discussed in the next chapter. 
A manager commented: 
There were regular staff circulars and site meetings informing of the 
changes that were coming in. 
    (Interview with GMA, 3 February, 2005). 
 
According to one of the managers, there was a great deal of awareness and 
education about changes to explain the Andersen report and associated 
corporatisation.  Explanations were given to employees at all levels of the 
organization.  FPTL workers had in-house training whereby they received 
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explanations about what was happening in their changing work place.  This 
helped to dissipate the mistrust many of the workers felt and somewhat reduced 
the confrontational attitude of the early 1990s.  Jacobs (1998) observes that 
systems of accounting and accountability introduced to anchor reform will 
encounter minimal resistance if the whole reform process is well-communicated 
to organizational participants.  After 1995/1996, the public service ethos was 
slowly reduced, as can be observed in the following interview extracts.  Decisions 
were made much more quickly, informed one of the managers.  Another manager 
claimed that: 
We have freedom to do our work.  And at the end of the day what the 
government needs is the tax and dividend income. 
     (Interview with QM, 26 February 2004). 
Result-orientation in terms of customer satisfaction, as well as bottom line 
profitability, began to play a pivotal role at FPTL.  A Strategic Manager 
commented: 
After corporatisation, our culture had to change.  We were to be more 
customer-focused and had to change our attitude.  Before it used to be 8:00 
– 4:30 p.m work.  Now even after 4:30p.m, service is still given.  The aim  
is to finish work.  At the end of the day, it is the customer that matters. 
    (Interview with SPM, 11 January 2006) 
A Finance Manager commented: 
TFL is now focused on both dollar and service provision.  At the end of 
the day how you provide service is what you get.  This is in terms of 
performance targets that we have to reach.  In terms of capital investment, 
we need to seriously look at return on investment. 
    (Interview with FM, 17 January 2006). 
 
Result orientation became routinised at TFL.  A Quality Manager stated that, in 
order to accept changes, TQM was introduced in 1996 and in-house training held 
which assisted the new Board to set up routines of business and accounting norms.  
Around 1997, commercial criteria were also developed in the form of 
performance incentive schemes predicated on profitability.  A human resource 
manager commented: 
Our performance is assessed every quarter by our superiors.  And on 
meeting our performance targets which are mainly commercial and output 
oriented, we are granted bonus payment equal to one fortnight‟s pay every 
quarter. 




The performance incentive scheme motivated employees to gradually assimilate 
commercial business norms.  Each employee is assessed by his/her superior on the 
basis of punctuality, customer services, job expertise, business/financial focus, 
and professional attribute/ interpersonal relationship (TFL performance 
measurement form, 2002).  A possible 100 marks is allocated on the above 
indicators and those employees achieving 70% or more are granted bonuses 
equivalent to their fortnightly pay. 
 
The commercial norms slowly became reproduced by FPTL employees over a 
span of time and became institutionalised practice.  In other words, there were 
changes in routines, as people adapted to the new commercial environment.  
Interview evidence suggests that, as time went on, the commercial routines were 
assimilated, as the employees habitually practiced these actions.  The managers 
played an instrumental role in institutionalising these commercial business 
practices at FPTL.  This is not to say that the public service institution under 
which FPTL was initially established was totally eliminated.  In rural areas, FPTL 
actors still provide telecommunication services which are being subsidized by the 
government.  This non-commercial service is part of the public service goal of 
FPTL in order to fulfill the communication needs of rural areas.  The expenditure 
is partly subsidized by the government.  ATH‟s annual report (2005) reports that 
the annual government grant towards rural services is approximately F$1 million. 
 
Over time, FPTL actors moved from an interpretive scheme of public service 
ethos to one predicated on business norms within an ongoing climate of change.  
There were some delays in this movement, due to uncertainty surrounding the 
suspension of some engineers by the Board of Directors while other employees 
were fearful of being made redundant as well.  Conflicts between two competing 
management control ideologies of public service and commercial business 
routines were profound.  The new work culture was a shock to most workers.  
They had to work harder and become customer friendly.  The new routines were 
not well received by many workers.  A typical complaint was that “there is a lot of 
work, too much.  The company likes to exploit us.  Our salaries have gone up but 
at the same time we are loaded with much work” (Interview with ACT1, 11 
January 2006).  Change was ongoing at FPTL, but the change to business 
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routines, in particular, was not smooth.  The institutional entrepreneurs faced 
some difficulties in embedding changes. 
 
New commercial accounting routines performed both technical and symbolic 
roles.  The commercialization of FPTL created a new environment that rendered 
the old bureaucratic procedures inadequate and stale.  A finance manager 
commented: 
 The Finance division became more important than ever before. 
     (Interview with FM, 20 January 2006). 
 
A human resource manager commented: 
There were new ways of measuring the performance of employees that 
were more transparent than previous confidential ways where employees 
hardly got a chance to view the report.  This showed that changes were 
taking place.  
     (Interview with MHR, 20 January 2006). 
 
The other commercial technologies that were introduced to anchor the reform 
process entailed: 
 internal management reporting systems.  Each division had the 
services of a management accountant reporting on budgeting 
and planning systems.  The management accountant had to 
report budgeting and planning systems in turn to the Finance 
division; 
 government auditors replaced by PricewaterhouseCoopers. 
 
As the enactment of business norms progressed, it created some uncertainty 
amongst FPTL actors.  Through ongoing training and education by the 
institutional entrepreneurs of the top-level management team, employees became 
more certain about the rules and routines embodying commercial and financial 
orientation.  According to one interviewee, the change was ongoing and it took 
four to five years before business norms were assimilated and routinised by 
actors.  In this situation participants chose to live, however reluctantly, under a 
new underlying dominant ethos of the pursuit of financial returns, together with 
associated accounting technologies.  The changes were ongoing in nature and the 
business norms were enacted from 1995 onwards when tensions subsided slightly.  
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The business norms also paved the way for the separation of Post Fiji from TFL 
(FPTL) in 1996, both pursuing financial returns as business-like enterprises.  The 
pressure for the split emanated from Arthur Andersen‟s consulting report, which 
itself reflected the globalizing influence of the concept of new public 
management.  The changes at FPTL were facilitated by the institutional 
entrepreneurs of top-level management with the help of the new Board of 
Directors.  It was the change agent of consultants that helped to destroy the 
existing institution of the public service ethos.  The consultants were the agents of 
managers or what Czarniawska-Joerges (1990) calls the carriers of the new ideas 
and practices into the organization.  The carriers (Czarniawska-Joerges‟ 
“merchant of meaning”) infused TFL with new commercial language and 
objectives. The institutional entrepreneurs acted in discordance with the 
established institution and practices of a public service ethos in order to eventually 
change them to commercial business routines.  The next section brings the 
narrative together and discusses the results in line with the theoretical framework 
developed in the chapter. 
 
7.5.0    Discussion/Summary 
 
Institutional processes often create institutional contradictions or paradoxes which 
may be exploited by particular actors by invoking alternative templates of 
organising in challenging the entrenched order (Beckert, 1999; Seo & Creed, 
2002).  In Fiji in the late 1980s, the established public sector rules and routines 
were challenged by the interim government which started to reform public 
enterprises under the strictures of the World Bank and ADB (Sharma & 
Lawrence, 2008).  There were also what Seo and Creed (2002) describes as non-
adaptability contradictions.  Actors were locked in a public service culture and 
often there was a barrier between the trade union and management regarding the 
shedding of workers during reforms.  The top-level managers had to assure the 
trade unions that no redundancies would be made, while slowly introducing 
organizational control changes at FPTL amidst some overt resistance from 
employees.  The intervention by government and encouragement from overseas 
financial agencies created an institutional crisis which demanded cultural change.  
Once induced, the institutional crisis began to break down the institutional 
embeddedness of the public service ethic among the management and employees 
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and, while there was some initial resistance, the contradiction led to a radical shift 
in actors‟ collective consciousness.  The changes included the appointment of five 
general managers of divisions that were named Strategic Business Units, a 
mission statement being established, Board members and management with 
business expertise being hired, and Total Quality Management practices and the 
performance incentive scheme practices being also implemented. 
 
Initially, there was evidence of institutional contradictions.  Clemens and Cook 
(1999) define contradiction as a combination of features that produce an unstable 
tension in a given system.  Although the changes towards a “business-like” 
approach provided external legitimacy, efficiency gains for the organisation were 
not forthcoming.  Consultants were hired by the FPTL Board to infuse 
commercial routines within the daily practices of FPTL employees in the belief 
that new public management routines, including profit-oriented accounting, would 
lead to improved effectiveness and efficiency of operations.  The consultants‟ 
recommendations were implemented by the institutional entrepreneurs, that is, the 
top-level management.  The institutional entrepreneurs used strategies such as 
agenda setting and framing action to change embedded actors‟ actions (e.g., 
Fligstein, 1997).  The institutional entrepreneurs of top-level managers, through 
training, had to encourage other actors that the changes were in their interests and 
that they would not lose their jobs.  Once the fear of job losses was alleviated, the 
employees gradually adapted to new business routines.  Nevertheless, there was 
still some resistance to change in the early years of corporatisation. 
 
To understand accounting control and environment relationships, a consideration 
of both the technical and institutional environments is essential (Abernethy & 
Chua, 1996).  The central argument of this chapter is that changes at FPTL were 
introduced as part of the broader reform of the public sector under the banner of 
NPM that emphasised value for money in public sector organizations.  A more 
business-like approach was demanded.  FPTL management responded by 
introducing new policies and procedures in line with technical-rational 
theorizations.  The accounting changes enabled FPTL‟s management to 




The Fiji government introduced changes as a result of coercive pressure from the 
World Bank, ADB and the world-wide movement towards new public 
management in order to reform its public sector.  Coercive pressure from the state 
government took the form of funding constraints.  FPTL began to be infused with 
accounting changes that made it appear more like a business.  The accounting 
changes enabled FPTL‟s management to demonstrate acceptance of a new set of 
values, thereby securing funding and legitimacy. 
 
Inside FPTL, the changes were neither quickly nor universally accepted.  The 
monopoly status of FPTL contradicted the market model on which the reforms 
were based.  A manager recalled that during the early stages of corporatisation, 
improvement in profit was a consequence of price hikes in services and not of 
efficiency.  Pallot (1998) has argued that privatization of public assets and the 
pursuit of a profit objective is problematic.  There were also militant trade unions 
which resisted any move towards redundancies at FPTL.  This can be ascribed to 
a non-adaptability contradiction (Seo & Creed, 2002).  During privatization, the 
quest for improved profit may trigger management to shed labour, but in this case 
such action was strongly resisted by the trade unions.  The new institution may 
sometimes take a couple of years to fully evolve (Greenwood & Suddaby, 2006).  
The conflict/struggle of actors transforms the embedded social actors into 
institutional entrepreneurs who further enable the subsequent change process.  
Assurance by management that workers would not be made redundant after 
reform enabled the top-level management to convince some workers to accept 
change, albeit with some reluctance.  Overt resistance was often demonstrated and 
if such a situation arises in the future, resistance may surface again. 
 
At FPTL, the composition of the board changed with private business 
personalities and consultants brought in to align FPTL with private business 
techniques.  Legitimacy predicated on consumer choice was evident with the 
hiring of a new Chief General Manager who belonged to both the professional 
organisation of accountants and that of engineers and who brought professional 
practices into FPTL. 
 
Institutional theory can be extended to explain human agency.  To overcome the 
problem of “institutional embeddedness,” Seo and Creed (2002) suggest an 
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ontological position that understands the world as always in flux and institutional 
arrangements as temporary phenomena.  The seeds of new practical creation lie in 
the everyday activities of actors, and their social construction reflects particular 
interests and power structures. 
 
The top-level management team, together with the Board of Directors, was 
instrumental in institutionalizing commercial business practices with input from 
consultants.  Profitability began to be an emergent institution and ultimately 
became a “settled way of thinking” common to FPTL employees.  However, there 
was uncertainty.  Political and cultural issues specific to Fiji are pivotal in 
explaining the resistance that occurred.  This was an example of non-adaptability 
contradiction (Seo & Creed, 2002).  Communitarian values and tribal obligations 
in the form of personal relationships at the top management level triggered 
resistance.  As a result of cultural and political inconsistency, some managers and 
employees resisted change for a few years before the Fiji government could 
stabilize the company through the appointment of a new Board and a Chief 
General Manager from overseas who tried to comfort the workers through 
reassurance that there would be no job losses.  The new business routines were 
enacted and reproduced by the institutional entrepreneurs of the Board and the 
top-level management with the help of the western-based consulting firm of 
Arthur Andersen.  The institutional entrepreneurs attempted to motivate other 
actors to act cooperatively in the production and reproduction of commercial 
business routines, although they met with some resistance.  The emergence of a 
new institution is a meaningful example of entrepreneurship (Greenwood & 
Suddaby, 2006).  The institutional entrepreneurs help to give rise to the new 
institution (Maguire, Hardy & Lawrence, 2004). 
 
Ongoing social construction produces a range of contradictions, stimulating 
tensions and conflicts which may shape consciousness and action to change the 
present order.  This chapter saw institutional contradictions of legitimacy that 
undermined efficiency, non-adaptability contradictions and interinstitutional 
incompatibilities (Seo & Creed, 2002) as driving or constraining changes at 
FPTL.  Stemming from institutional inconsistencies, institutional entrepreneurs 
such as the Board of Directors and the top-level management team infused 
commercial values which paved the way to contradiction within the organisation 
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and created some resistance (see Beckert, 1999).  In the early years of 
corporatisation, there was a lack of progress towards commercial business 
routines because of conflicts (institutional contradictions) between the public 
sector ethos and the emerging commercial business norms. 
 
Gradually resistance was overcome.  The process of enactment, reproduction and 
routinisation of new institution has been advocated by Barley and Tolbert (1997) 
and Burns and Scapens (2000).  The notion of agency/interest has been brought to 
institutional theory literature by considering Seo and Creed‟s (2002) institutional 
contradiction and Beckert‟s (1999) model of interest and institutions which 
partially resembles Giddens‟ (1979), Barley and Tolbert‟s (1997) and Burns and 
Scapens‟ (2000) models of duality of agency/ structure relationships of 
institutionalization at the micro level.   
 
The previous literature highlighted that organizational participants have generally 
perceived accounting change as occurring on an ongoing basis with little 
resistance (Zilber, 2002; Soin et al., 2002; Busco et al., 2006).  However, the fact 
that change at FPTL took a few years could be attributed to cultural and political 
influences specific to Fiji, an example of non-adaptability contradiction.  The 
localized idiosyncratic sociopolitical influences have been acknowledged as 
important influences on the outcomes of attempts to effect change.  The cultural 
and political influences were pivotal in the resistance to the change process in a 
developing country context.  Such influences may not be so pertinent in Western 
industrialized societies.  Following the discussion of the new public sector 
environment and resistance at FPTL, the next chapter analyses the role of 












Chapter 8.0:   The Role of Accounting in the 
Corporatisation and Privatization of TFL 
 
8.1.0  Introduction 
 
In chapter 7, new public management and resistance to change were discussed.  
The chapter encompassed P&T‟s corporatisation and some political and cultural 
idiosyncrasies of Fiji that affected the pathway of change.  The chapter examined 
how the new management teams, together with the board of directors, were 
instrumental in shaping institutionalized commercial business practice with input 
from consultants.   
 
This chapter discusses the role of MACS in the corporatisation and privatization 
of TFL.  The accounting changes are examined from the extra-organizational and 
organisational levels.  From the extra-organisational perspective, the chapter 
examines the external forces that influenced the accounting system.  Pallot (1998) 
argues that accounting and accountants can affect the pattern of relationships, 
including structures of power and accountability within organizations and in 
society at large.  The new accounting procedures that were introduced included 
accrual accounting, budgeting/ planning and investment appraisals. 
 
The reforms at TFL laid the conceptual groundwork for subsequent changes in 
other government sectors as TFL was the forerunner in the Fiji government‟s 
reform program, being the first state-owned enterprise to be privatized.  TFL‟s 
corporatization is the largest in terms of market capitalization in Fiji.  It is listed 
on the South Pacific Stock Exchange through its parent company of Amalgamated 
Telecom Holdings Limited (ATH), and its market capitalization is F$426,325,917 
(South Pacific Stock Exchange, 2007).  A massive organizational structural and 
accounting change occurred as FPTL was corporatised and privatized.  This 
chapter focuses on the role of accounting and accountants as institutional 
entrepreneurs in facilitating changes at TFL.  In doing so, the chapter also 
examines the external forces that influenced the accounting system.  The next 
section outlines the historical circumstances of the valuation process of TFL 




8.2.0 Accounting and the Valuation Process 
 
This section examines the processes involved in valuing TFL before it was sold to 
private interests in 1998 as this sets the background to MACS changes.  TFL had 
to be valued before it could be sold to private interests.  The Fiji government 
invited Rothschild consultants to carry out the valuation in order to prepare the 
company for full privatization from a corporatisation stage.  TFL was being 
prepared for sale to a private investor around 1998.  There were some tensions 
and contradictions within TFL‟s environment as it was sold to the superannuation 
fund of Fiji National Provident Fund at an inflated price; a conflict situation was 
created by the Fiji government through the sale of its telecom holdings.  This 
section examines the valuation from an extra-organisational-level perspective. 
 
The Rothschild consultants amalgamated all telecom companies under the parent 
company of Amalgamated Telecom Holdings Limited (ATH) to prepare for full 
privatization and listing on the stock exchange.  The ATH subsidiaries included 
ATH Technology Park Limited, Fiji Directories Limited, TFL, Vodafone Fiji and 
Fiji International Telecommunications Limited (FINTEL) (see Appendix 1 for 
ATH‟s organisation chart).  Accounting numbers played a role in the valuation 
process insofar as past revenues and expenditures were used as a basis for 
predicting future cash flows.  According to Grynberg, Munro and White (2002), 
Rothschild valuation of ATH was overvalued and used by the Fiji government to 
sell Telecom Holdings to the country‟s superannuation fund, Fiji National 
Provident Fund (FNPF) at F$253 million (51% ownership).  The government 
appointed board members of FNPF who were instrumental in purchasing the 
telecommunications sector.  Grynberg et al. (2002) claimed that Telecom 
Holdings was overvalued and Rothschild used figures from a time when the 
economy was doing well and had not considered the Asian crisis of the late 1990s. 
 
The valuation was based on the assumptions of TFL‟s continuing monopoly and 
relied on the financial reports which involved substantial accounting assumptions 
and policy choices.  The sales and purchase negotiations were based on 
assumptions of NPV calculations; most cash flow predictions were subject to a 
high level of uncertainty, particularly estimates of future prices and volumes and 
the choice of discount rates in areas where there were no comparable private 
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sector returns.  It was the Rothschild valuation study that provided the 
government‟s selection criteria for a purchaser.  The Rothschild consultants 
estimated that the value of ATH was in the vicinity of US$350million (Grynberg 
et al., 2002), a result based on an analysis undertaken in mid-1996.  Grynberg et 
al. (2002) note that: 
 
The Rothschild valuation was undertaken in 1996, using 1995 and 1994 
figures.  This was when the economy was performing considerably better 
than in 1998 to 1999, when it was suffering the combined effects of the 
Asian financial crisis, the National Bank of Fiji collapse and the drought in 
the cane belt. 
        (p.120) 
 
Grynberg et al. (2002) argue that the inflated telecom holding valuation was used 
to recover from the state‟s National Bank of Fiji crisis where some F$200 million 
dollars in loans were lost without adequate credit checks of customers.  Grynberg 
et al. (2002) claim that most of the loans were given to political supporters of 
Rabuka‟s party (the then Prime Minister).  The Fiji government guaranteed 
depositors‟ money in this bank: that is, if the bank became insolvent then the 
government could be called to repay depositors‟ money, possibly through income 
collected from tax payers.  The general public felt that TFL‟s sales were mainly to 
rescue the National Bank of Fiji from the brink of bankruptcy. 
 
The accounting assumptions employed in the Rothschild analysis relied on the 
experiences of 1994 and 1995 when there had been a 10 per cent growth in 
working lines in the FPTL; this growth was then extrapolated forward to 2010.  
Grynberg et al. (2002) note that in 1999 Rothschild projected the number of 
working lines to be approximately 96,000 while the actual figure was 72,000.  
This gave rise to overvalued telecommunications holdings out of which 51% was 
sold to the superannuation fund of FNPF to recover the almost collapsed National 
Bank of Fiji from crisis.  Grynberg et al. (2002) question the role of Lionel Yee 
who served a dual role: he was the chairman of TFL board as well as the CEO of 
FNPF.  They (Grynberg et al. (2002)) suspect that Yee had a conflict of interest 
for the ATH sale transaction that took place when he (Yee) led both organizations.  





There was a general public perception that FNPF had made a misjudgment in 
purchasing 51 percent stake in ATH (Islands Business, 1999, p.44).  The other 
two bids were from Cable and Wireless (F$60 million) and France Telecom 
(F$70m).  The sale delighted Fiji‟s then Finance Minister who was quoted in the 
Islands Business Magazine as saying: 
This sale is a gift made in Heaven.  We will show a surplus this year of 
about F$150 million which is about five percent of our Gross Domestic 
Product. 
     (1999, p.44). 
 
The Islands Business Magazine reports that, according to the 1999 budget 
documents, the Fiji government had expected under F$100 million from the sale.  
The Finance Minister, however, made it public that the FNPF bid was what the 
financial consultants, Rothschild, had estimated its telecom assets to be worth.  
The next section outlines the external coercive pressures on TFL actors to absorb 
commercial business routines. 
 
8.2.1 External Coercive Pressure on TFL actors 
 
The superannuation fund of Fiji National Provident Fund (FNPF) owns 58.2% of 
Amalgamated Telecom Holdings Limited (ATH).  For this reason, Fiji National 
Provident Fund has the power to nominate the majority of ATH‟s directors.  The 
FNPF has been returning 6 percent annual return on the pension funds.  The fund 
places immense pressure on ATH to perform in terms of improved profitability so 
that the fund can give a better return to its members.  Consequently, the ATH has 
been placing pressure on TFL members for optimum performance in terms of 
commercial results (return on investment and profitability ratios). 
 
As for accounting practices, generally accepted accounting practices were 
followed by ATH accountants on drawing up the group accounts.  The ATH 
subsidiaries include TFL, FINTEL, ATH Technology Park and Fiji Directories 
Limited.  The accounts were prepared by the Finance division in accordance with 
Fiji accounting standards, and the accounting practices are gradually moving 
towards the international accounting standards during the period of the study.  The 
accounts were externally audited by the international accounting firm of 
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PricewaterhouseCoopers.  Since 1998, an annual report has been released by ATH 
management which shows consolidated group results for all subsidiaries.  Prior to 
that, TFL management used to release TFL‟s annual report only. However, now 
ATH group releases the annual report and covers activities of TFL on a couple of 
pages. 
 
The parent company‟s (ATH) management also expects its subsidiaries (TFL, 
Connect, Transtel, Xceed, Vodafone, Fiji Directories, ATH Technology Park 
Limited and FINTEL) to prepare accounts on a quarterly basis on Excel 
spreadsheets.  ATH members use accounting software known as Consolidated 
Reporting Package to construct accounts.  ATH‟s management is a source of 
coercive pressure on TFL actors.  For example, a company secretary of ATH 
mentioned: 
We control TFL‟s board.  We appoint members of TFL board.  All TFL 
board members are our nominees.  We also expect monthly reports in 
areas such as finance, competitors, customers, marketing, industrial 
relations and staff matters. 
     (Interview with CSATH, 20 January, 2006). 
The monthly reports are around six pages in length and submitted on a monthly 
basis to ATH management; that indirectly summarise the progress of TFL actors‟ 
performance under the above subheadings. 
 
Further to that, the South Pacific Stock Exchange requires half yearly reporting 
from ATH management.  A company accountant in 2005 stated: “we‟re working 
on our results on a quarterly basis.  Six months‟ unaudited accounts are prepared 
and given to South Pacific Stock Exchange.”  
 
Actual versus budgetary results are also compared by the subsidiaries of the 
parent company.  A new accounting was developed, based on external financial 
accountability, with the intention of giving the right to the parent company to hold 
TFL staff to account for their work performance.  Although the coercive pressure 
began to be felt from 1998 onwards, internally accountants had already 
commenced the work required to facilitate corporatization and privatization, 
which demonstrated their proactive approach.  The next section outlines the 




8.3.0  Accounting and Organisational Change at FPTL and the 
Fijian Culture. 
 
This section examines changes in accounting and organisation at FPTL as a 
consequence of the Fiji government‟s public sector reform policies.  While 
activity at the policy level concerned the legislative framework (like the Posts & 
Telecommunications Decree discussed in chapter 6), at the organizational level 
activity concentrated on restructuring and establishing commercial accounting 
systems.  Accounting change was seen by some interviewees to have facilitated 
organizational change by changing perceptions of TFL management and 
employees.  The changes were quickly embraced owing to the cultural pattern of 
Fijians. 
 
The Fijian culture reflects silence which has been used by management in order to 
introduce MACS changes.  The culture reflects a strong communal society where 
the support structures inherent in the communal lifestyle typify Hofstede‟s (1980) 
cultural characteristics of “femininity.”  Chand and White (2006) point out that 
the femininity of Fijian culture is reinforced by Christian church, which plays a 
significant role in Fijian society.  Village society exhibits a rigid hierarchy.  The 
culture through its religious values and hierarchical system reflects the cultural 
attributes of uncertainty avoidance and strong power distance.  Both Fijian and 
Indo-Fijian culture appreciates silence.  The Fijian will not normally speak up 
against their superiors or chiefs and readily accept their wishes.  The Finance 
Managers and CEOs are normally perceived as people who carry authority like 
the chiefs and will not normally be questioned for their actions.  The silent culture 
of organizational actors has been used by management to introduce new 
accounting technologies which received little resistance.  Both Indo-Fijian and 
Fijian culture exhibit uncertainty avoidance (Chand & White, 2006).  Due to the 
cultural pattern of employees, the power distance between management and 
workers is prevalent within TFL. 
 
The MACS changes eventuated with changes driven by institutional entrepreneurs 
of CEO and accountants.  The annual reports grew in size after corporatisation.  
Prior to corporatisation, annual reports were about 17-20 pages, covering a report 
from the Postmaster-General who was the head of FPTL, and a few appendices 
including net revenue, capital expenditure and postal services statistics and 
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staffing details within FPTL.  After corporatisation, the annual reports were 
around 40-50 pages and covered the chairman‟s report, the CEO‟s report, 
information on the board of directors, and audited financial statements including 
income statement, balance sheet, cash flow statement, notes to accounts and 
statement of changes in equity. 
 
The old accounting procedures in pre-corporatisation days were cash-based.  
There was an absence of a balance sheet.  A Post and Telecommunications Trust 
account was operated in which all receipts from the postal and telecommunication 
services were credited and from which all expenditures, both of a recurrent and 
capital nature, were paid.  The money was paid into the Trust account and the 
Permanent Secretary was empowered to apply any of the monies standing to 
credit of the Trust account in payment of all expenditure properly incurred in the 
exercise of the powers and carrying the functions of P&T.   The accounts were 
audited by the Auditor General and presented in parliament.   
 
In pre-corporatisation days, the accounting efforts struggled under a 
predominantly manual system which was primitive in areas like customer billing, 
and purchase and job costing.  A regional manager recalled: 
Before, anything to do with subscribers was done manually.  It was very 
difficult then to sort out the problems of customers. 
    (Interview with RMT, 19 January 2005). 
 
According to a finance manager, responsibility for financial matters was not 
explicitly identified with cost centres or individuals.  Information was not 
available when needed.  An accountant recalled: 
Some information then was not available without a great deal of research.  
The data may be stored elsewhere. 
   (Interview with ACT4, 19 January 2005). 
Traditionally, FPTL operated in the name of public service rather than the 
economic, and the overriding concern of engineers was with physical production 
rather than making profit.  However, previously taken-for-granted assumptions 
had been questioned, and changes put into motion (Seo & Creed, 2002).  The 
corporatization challenged the traditional social welfare values, and the reforms 
introduced new ways of interactions.  After corporatisation, a consultant was hired 
by the board of directors, in search of commercial business routines, to switch to 
commercial accounting practices (accrual accounting).  He was seconded from the 
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Australian Telecommunications Commission and advised on the establishment of 
a commercial accounting system for FPTL (FPTL annual report, 1990).  The 
consultant also took on similar assignments for Telecommunications in Malaysia 
(FPTL annual report, 1990).  The consultant spent a year at FPTL overseeing the 
preparation of the FPTL accounts.  Staff from the Finance Strategic Business Unit 
were also involved in setting up the new accounting system. 
 
The FPTL annual report (1990) noted that: 
Despite the work involved in changing to a new system and the inevitable 
problems and difficulties which were encountered, the staff have generally 
responded well to the new requirements.  The new system marks a major 
step forward in enabling FPTL to conduct its business in more meaningful 
and purposeful ways. 
    (p.2). 
After corporatisation, the consultant and the Finance team separated the accounts 
from the government accounting system and then prepared and presented the 
accounts in accordance with commercial accounting practices and the Fiji 
Companies Act 1983.  FPTL‟s annual report (1990) stated that “the new system 
provides for classification of departmental costs in terms of clearly defined areas 
of responsibility and functional activities” (p.2).   
 
An accountant commented: 
After corporatisation, workers began to realize they needed the 
information to manage resources.  Our accounting system was 
computerized.  The ultimate aim for TFL employees was to reduce cost 
and increase revenue so that net profit is maximized and shareholders are 
satisfied. 
    (Interview with ACT1, 20 January 2006). 
Before corporatisation, profits were not the end of TFL agents and played no part 
in making sense of daily activity.  There was no need for management accountants 
in the production and reproduction of the systems.  After corporatisation, TFL was 
to operate as a successful business and maximize shareholder value.  Activities 
were to be accounted for and justified in economic and commercial terms, rather 
than in terms of physical production.  TFL staff used the Integrated Customer 
Management System for customer care and billing; Sunsytems Financials 
(comprising Sun Account and Sun Business) were used for accounting purposes.  
The TFL annual report (1997) noted that efforts to control costs and secure value 




The TFL annual report (1997) noted that three managers had completed their 
Master‟s degree in accounting and business programmes from Australia.  The 
employment of new blood allowed for radical changes to existing commercial 
accounting practices.  There was a demand for accounting information to be used 
in decision making and so the accountants‟ role became important. 
 
As part of the concern over money, the TFL annual report (1997) pointed out that 
the training of TFL‟s Procurement Section resulted in savings of F$100,000 
through the preparation of cable tenders in Fiji.  This had previously been handled 
under a commercial arrangement by the Crown Agents in London (TFL annual 
report, 1997).  The TFL annual report (1997) mentions that in terms of debt 
control in order to boost the revenue base, courtesy calls to customers with 
overdue accounts were introduced and had positive results in debt control.   
 
As part of cost savings, the accountants also recommended that the TFL training 
centre be leased out in 1997.  The leasing process started for what had become an 
underutilized and expensive asset to operate (TFL annual report, 1997).   The 
accountants advised the management of the need for a tender process to select the 
best lessee.  Following an evaluation of some eight expressions of interest 
received, the terms offered by J.O.B.S Fiji/ Central Queensland University were 
accepted.  The annual lease for the land and buildings valued at F$3.0 million was 
set at F$300,000 per annum (TFL annual report, 1997).  TFL management also 
sold 39 vehicles in 2005 and another 19 vehicles later (ATH annual report, 2006).   
Accounting and Finance played predominant roles, with accountants continuing to 
provide vital financial decision-making advice to management.   
 
Accountants computed the payback period on capital projects, after privatisation.  
For example, the service of broadband access to outer islands with resorts 
required the TFL Finance team members to work out payback periods.  As Fiji‟s 
economy is heavily reliant on the tourism industry, tourism operators required 
broadband access to promote and manage their resorts which are located in many 
small islands.  For this; „Aprisa Microwave Radio‟ technology had proved a cost 
effective and reliable solution.  The pay back period calculated by the Finance 
team members was two years and the project was accepted.  The next section 
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outlines the economic value added and net present value techniques that were 
introduced for use of capital investment decisions at TFL. 
 
8.3.1  Economic Value Added and Net Present Value in Capital 
Investment 
 
The shift towards accounting and economic logic in decision making is evidenced 
by the introduction of net present value and economic value added (EVA) which 
became important for TFL management and employees after corporatisation.  
These were introduced by the Finance Division with the help of overseas 
consultants.  A Finance Manager does this calculation which has to accompany 
requests for most capital.  An accountant commented, pointing at the Finance 
Manager: 
This is the man who is specialized in EVA and also does discounted cash 
flows for the company.  All our major projects need to be EVA positive 
and generate positive net cash flows to go ahead.  The Finance Manager 
and his team are quite active in advising our managers on that. 
    (Interview with ACT1, 20 January 2006). 
An EVA and NPV calculation had to accompany any request for capital and be 
forecasted for the company over the five year period in TFL‟s business plan.  The 
TFL Strategic Business Plan (2001- 2006) noted that all capital projects were 
EVA positive, and that revenue and profitability growth were EVA accretive.  
EVA indicates whether or not the returns generated exceed the required returns by 
investors.  TFL accountants calculated and forecasted some of the EVAs in their 
business plan (2001-2006) as shown in table 6. 
 
The positive EVA is meant to show the business is increasing shareholder wealth,  
an issue that became important to TFL management and employees.  Through 
EVA calculations, the managers and employees raised and promoted changed 
logic in running TFL as a business.  Those projects that did not generate positive 
EVA were rejected.  The EVA computation is complex and difficult and may pose 
uncertainty.  The analysis represented a change in internal accounting operations 


































17,758 18,653 19,498 20,336 21,346 20,680 
EVA 10,164 10,835 11,849 15,723 20,230 50,789 
 
    (TFL Strategic Business Plan, 2001-2006). 
 
The above computations, however, represent residual income and not EVA.  
However, in doing such calculations, the management demonstrated a change in 
commercial business logic and made decisions on the basis of such calculations.  
Capital investment appraisal was carried out on capital projects by the Finance 
team.  For example, around 2002, a capital investment appraisal was carried out 
for the installation of either 500 phones in free standing booths without walls or 
1,000 Telecard public phones in wall-mounted booths.  The accountants decided 
to carry out an EVA analysis for the options.  The intention was to replace the old 
public phones, which required the phone numbers to be manually rotated to make 
the calls, with new modern phones where the numbers needed to be pressed, 
making it much easier for the users.  Before corporatisation no such EVA analysis 
had been done by accountants but the phones would just be installed.  However, 
after corporatisation the accountants played a critical role by justifying to the 
management via financial analysis whether the capital projects were viable and 
were adding to shareholder value.  The analysis as shown in tables 7 and 8 yielded 
a positive net present value for both projects but was higher for the 1,000 Telecard 
Public Phones in wall mounted booths.  A separate EVA calculation also 
demonstrated high EVA for the 1,000 Telecard public phones in wall-mounted 
booths.  Hence, the capital investment with 1,000 Telecard public phones in wall-
mounted booth was undertaken.  Had the analysis shown a higher NPV for the 
phones in free standing booths without walls, then this would have been 







We do NPV calculations on capital projects and only accept those that 
yield positive NPV.  If the NPV is negative, we simply reject those.  What 
matters is the maximization of shareholders‟ return.” 
  (Interview with ACT2, 20 January, 2006) 
 
The justification for expenditure had to be in terms of financial performance.  
Proposals for capital expenditure were subjected to discounted cash flow, with 
project benefits expressed as positive cash flows.  The new decision procedures 
were based on economic and accounting logic rather than physical production 
criteria.  A finance manager commented: 
We use a combination of measures such as net present value, internal rate 
of return, payback and EVA to evaluate capital projects.  This was not the 
case prior to corporatization.  Now we need to justify expenditure and tell 
management what is a sound investment proposal. 
    (Interview with FM, 20 January 2006). 

































Table 7  Capital Investment Appraisal: Installation of 500 Telecard Public 
Phones in Free Standing Booths 
 
Investment 2,220,000  Maintenance 32.0%   
STD IRR 16.0%  Admin 87.0%   
NPV 1,500,348  Interest 6.5%   
Achieved IRR 33.77%  Term  5   
       
Revenue Details       
Public phones 322,500      
Revenue/ month 322,500      
Annual Revenue 3,870,000      
       
 Yr0 Yr1 Yr2 Yr3 Yr4 Yr5 
Profit & Loss       
Revenue  3,870,000 3,870,000 3,870,000 3,870,000 3,870,000 
Disposal 
Proceeds 
      
Income Stream  3,870,000 3,870,000 3,870,000 3,870,000 3,870,000 
       
Expenses       
Maintenance Cost   710,400  710,400  710,400  710,400  710,400 
Admin  1,931,400 1,931,400 1,931,400 1,931,400 1,931,400 
Depreciation   444,000  444,000  444,000  444,000  444,000 
Total Expenses  3,085,800 3,085,800 3,085,800 3,085,800 3,085,800 
NPBT   784,200  784,200  784,200  784,200  784,200 
Tax   274,470 274,470  274,470  274,470  274,470 
NOPAT   551,796  546,928  537,267  526,959  515,960 
Cost of Capital   277,500  227,719  176,200  121,230    62,579 
EVA   274,296   319,209  361,067  405,729  453,381 
PV (EVA) 1,271,487      
       
Balance Sheet       
R/Earnings   431,607  872,256 1,330,847 1,808,581 2,548,650 
Loan   1,821,755 1,409,600  969,842  500,633 - 
Creditors   274,470  274,470   274,470  274,470  274,470 
  2,527,832 2,556,326 2,575,159 2,583,684 2,823,120 
F/Assets  1,697,877 1,184,796  1,389,657  213,661 - 
Cash  829,955 1,371,530 1,185,502 2,370,023 2,823,120 
  2,527,832 2,556,326 2,575,159 2,583,684 2,823,120 
       
Cash Flow       
Outlay (2,220,000)      
Loan 2,220,000 (398,245) (412,155) (439,758) (469,209) (500,633) 
Receipts  3,870,000 3,870,000 3,870,000 3,870,000 3,870,000 
Payments  (2,641,800) (2,641,800) (2,641,800) (2,641,800) (2,641,800) 
Tax   (274,470) (274,470) (274,470) (274,470) 
Cash Flow   829,955 541,575 513,972 484,521  453,097 
IRR Calculation (2,220,000) 1,108,011  889,517  912,252  932,042  953,158 











Table 8 Capital Investment Appraisal: Installation of 1,000 Telecard Public 
Phones in Wall Mounted (Semi-Outdoor) Booths 
Investment 2,570,000  Maintenance 39.0%   
STD IRR 16.0%  Admin 136.0%   
NPV 3,979,761  Interest 6.5%   
Achieved IRR 73.70%  Term  5   
       
Revenue Details       
Public phones 582,500      
Revenue/ month 582,500      
Annual Revenue 6,990,000      
       
 Yr0 Yr1 Yr2 Yr3 Yr4 Yr5 
Profit & Loss       
Revenue  6,990,000 6,990,000 6,990,000 6,990,000 6,990,000 
Disposal 
Proceeds 
      
Income Stream  6,990,000 6,990,000 6,990,000 6,990,000 6,990,000 
       
Expenses       
Maintenance Cost  1,002,300 1,002,300 1,002,300 1,002,300 1,002,300 
Admin  3,495,200 3,495,200 3,495,200 3,495,200 3,495,200 
Depreciation   514,000  514,000  514,000  514,000  514,000 
Total Expenses  5,011,500 5,011,500 5,011,500 5,011,500 5,011,500 
NPBT  1,978,500 1,978,500 1,978,500 1,978,500 1,978,500  
Tax   692,475  692,475 692,475  692,475   692,475 
NOPAT  1,334,723 1,329,087  1,317,903 1,305,970 1,293,237 
Cost of Capital   321,250  263,621  203,979  140,343    72,445  
EVA  1,013,473 1,065,466 1,113,924  1,165,627 1,220,792 
PV (EVA) 3,980,625      
       
Balance Sheet       
R/Earnings  1,195,585 2,481,610 3,767,635 5,053,660 6,339,685 
Loan   2,108,969 1,631,835 1,122,746 579,562 - 
Creditors    692,475   692,475   692,475   692,475   692,475 
Other Payable     500,000 832,915 
  3,997,029 4,805,920 5,582,856 6,825,697 7,865,075 
F/Assets  2,104,698 759,085 245,085 231,085 - 
Cash  1,892,331 4,046,835 5,337,771 6,594,612 7,865,075 
  3,997,029 4,805,920 5,582,856 6,825,697 7,865,075 
       
Cash Flow       
Outlay (2,570,000)      
Loan 2,570,000 (461,031) (477,134) (509,089) (543,184) (579,562) 
Receipts  6,990,000 6,990,000 6,990,000 6,990,000 6,990,000 
Payments  (4,636,638) (4,620,535) (4,588,580) (4,554,485) (4,518,107) 
Tax   (643,777) (649,413) (660,597) (672,530) 
Cash Flow  1,892,331 1,248,554 1,242,918 1,231,734 1,219,801 
IRR Calculation (2,570,000) 2,353,362 1,725,688 1,752,007 1,774,918 1,799,363 
(Source:  TFL Internal Document, 
2002) 
The net present value calculation shown above is flawed as depreciation has been 
shown as a cash flow but is actually not a cash flow item.  However, the managers 
relied on these calculations for decision making and to promote changed business 
logic in their thinking.  It seems from the rigorous calculation that TFL actors 
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appeared to be adapting the calculations for more of a window dressing.  
Although they made decisions on the basis of these accounting calculations, they 
were flawed as identified above.  The next section outlines the restructuring that 
took place at TFL for financial accountability. 
 
8.3.2 Restructuring of TFL for Financial Accountability 
 
Organisational restructuring at TFL was geared towards decentralization.  TFL 
regional offices emerged in other urban centres of Fiji.  Much of the change was 
brought about through organizational restructuring and change in personnel.  The 
restructuring was supported by changes in accounting systems and the ever-
increasing involvement of accountants at all levels in the company.  Various 
divisions were renamed business units to give a more commercial focus for TFL.  
For example, the Support Service Business Unit consists of Human Resource 
Management, Material Management, Fleet and Property, and Land Management 
services that are critical for TFL‟s business.  The Network Engineering Business 
Unit is a profit centre responsible for the operations of network infrastructure to 
provide the services that the customers want.  The unit provides products and 
services for the Customer Services Strategic Business Unit (division). 
 
Some five business unit General Managers with commercial expertise were 
appointed.  The skills that business managers brought included marketing, long-
term planning, and “bottom line” management.  The following interview quotes 
illustrate the shift towards commercialisation: 
Business managers were planning people who had long term goals for 
TFL. 
    (Interview with MCR, 19 January 2006). 
We were generally weak in business and marketing areas and had to 
tighten this up. 
    (Interview with ACT3, 20 January 2006). 
 
A quality manager recalled: 
There were new objectives emerging from accountants.  These made 
people think differently.  It‟s all to do with market.  The traditional FPTL 
wasn‟t that sensitive to market place. 




New accounts were crafted.  Gradually through actions and interactions, the new 
accounts were part of organizational activities and promoted new business logic.  
The following interview extracts illustrate this: 
All divisions/strategic business units members were reliant on accounting 
information for decision making. 
     (Interview with ACT3, 20 January 2006) 
Profitability became a common language at TFL and this again was 
promoted by the accountants in the Finance division.   
    (Interview with ACT2, 20 January 2006). 
The accountants promoted the capping of expenditure after corporatisation.  The 
Chief Executive Officer hired new accountants and encouraged the existing 
accountants to create new accounting technologies.  Accounting terms like „return 
on investment‟ and „shareholder values‟ became more important at TFL.  A 
strategic manager described the experience as: 
 It was a journey of discovery and making progress. 
     (Interview with SPM, 2 February 2005). 
 
It was when the new Managing Director, Winston Thompson, was appointed that 
major changes in commercial business routines commenced.  According to a 
human resource manager, unlike the previous managing director who had been 
employed as a government permanent secretary, the new managing director was 
much younger, with a business background, and also had been Fiji‟s ambassador 
to the UN.  At about the same time, Fiji‟s most eminent financial advisor to 
government, Lionel Yee, was appointed as the Board chairman.  Lionel Yee 
headed Fiji‟s superannuation scheme, Fiji National Provident Fund, which 
handled around F$2.3 billion in asset management and is a major financial 
institution in Fiji (FNPF annual report, 2006).  A chief operating officer from 
New Zealand with telecommunication experience and business expertise was 
hired.  Existing jobs and responsibilities were redefined with the help of overseas-
based consultants, and new positions were created with considerable recruitment 
from private sector (and where necessary, from outside Fiji), particularly in the 
financial and marketing areas and the top management like the chief operating 
officer‟s position.  The administrative layers were reduced to four and the 
employees were delegated authority.  A financial manager observed how regional 
office employees could make decisions without resorting to head office so far as 




Under the new managing director, TFL underwent restructuring into separate 
companies, including Transtel (telecard company), Connect Fiji (internet services) 
and Xceed Pacifica (business telecommunication equipment installation 
company).  In 2005 some 300 people voluntarily took redundancy packages, 
particularly those at the head office.  The trade union emphasized that only those 
workers should be made redundant who volunteered to take redundancy packages.  
Hence, no one was forcibly made redundant.  Accountants saw cost savings as an 
imperative aspect of accounting and recommended the redundancy programme.  It 
was envisaged by the accountants that while in the short-term redundancies would 
be a major cost for the organization, in the long term this would yield substantial 
cost savings in terms of reduced salary expenses.  The appointment of a general 
manager, Finance Business Unit, signaled the importance placed on accounting 
effort.  The establishment of a new accounting system was critical in changing the 
organizational culture.  In meetings, the employees also began to talk of 
accounting measures such as profitability and return on investment, thus depicting 
the routinisation of internal accounting practices.  Some of the performance 
indicators reported after the reform were lines per employee, revenue per 
employee ($) and revenue per line ($).  In 2000, the lines per employee was 61, 
revenue per employee was $125,751 and revenue per line was F$1,063 (ATH 
annual report, 2001).  This eventually improved over the years.  For example, in 
2006, the lines per employee was 114, revenue per employee was $147,495 while 
revenue per line was $1,292 (ATH annual report, 2006).  The Commerce 
Commission also reduced the tariff charges in 2005, thus impacting on the 
company revenue. 
 
New performance measures set by CEO and management team involved a wide 
range of performance indicators covering quality, human resources, operational 
and financial matters.  The employees were assessed by their superiors on a 
quarterly basis on indicators such as customer service focus, business/financial 
focus, professional attribute/interpersonal relationship, managing change and job 
expertise, and were assessed out of a total weighting of 100%.  Those getting 70% 
and above were entitled to a quarterly bonus (see Appendix 8 for performance 
measurement forms).  A finance manager claimed: 
These performance indicators were developed to make TFL employees 
more customer focused and quality driven. 




Apart from the performance indicators, the financial ratios of liquidity, 
profitability and financial structure ratios became important for TFL management.  
TFL‟s balance sheet showed strengthening results over the years.  Return on 
assets, for example, averaged 12% from 2001 to 2006 while return on 
shareholders‟ fund improved from 17.5% in 2000 to 39% in 2006 (ATH annual 
report, 2006).   
 
The general manager of the Finance Business Unit built a new accounting system 
with the help of overseas consultants.  Each subsidiary had its own separate 
accounting system with a separate balance sheet and income statement.  The 
independence allowed each company to review its own financial performance.  
The subsidiary company‟s reports were then consolidated into TFL‟s report, 
which was subsequently consolidated into the parent company, ATH‟s annual 
report.  An accountant commented: 
The game changed towards effectiveness.  Previously we were slack on 
cost- could use whatever was given to us.  And now the whole 
performance culture has changed.  We are continually working towards 
the performance targets in terms of profit to be achieved and return on 
investment. 
     (Interview with ACT3, 18 February 2004). 
The key business assumptions needed reorienting towards customers and cost-
efficiency issues- a revolutionary change (Burns & Scapens, 2000).  Certain 
groups and individuals, including Finance Strategic Business Unit teams, became 
central to the process through which new ways could be carved out and eventually 
become generally accepted and adopted (Burns & Baldvinsdottir, 2005).  For 
example, in meetings managers examined subsidiary accounts in terms of the 
“bottom line” of subsidiaries.  As the managers‟ purpose at TFL was to make 
profit, the significance of customers was revenues.  Another accountant 
commented: 
 Finance played a vital role in supporting telecommunication activities. 
    (Interview with ACT1, 11 January, 2006). 
The finance manager saw his role as, “equipping and advising management with 
necessary information so that they could do their jobs” (Interview, 19 January, 
2005), and created the concept of divisional management accountants for each 
strategic business unit.  The management accountants were responsible directly to 
the strategic business unit (divisional) managers.  As accountants and accounting 
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became a day-to-day part of organizational practices, the conditions for altering to 
commercial business routines for management and employees were set in place.  
The finance manager described how the divisional managers were beginning to 
rely on management accountants for accounting information in their day-to-day 
managerial duties.  A system of “accounting buddies” (e.g., Lapsley & Pallot, 
2000, p.225) was introduced whereby each operational unit had a person from 
accounting services assigned to it.  This person provided ongoing advice on 
financial matters and formed part of any project team.  A management accountant 
commented: 
The divisional managers now realize they need information to manage 
resources.  Divisional managers feel their understanding of accounting 
numbers is useful in running a business. 
    (Interview with ACT1, 17 January, 2006). 
A divisional manager commented about the management accountant: 
He gives me encouragement in my business, and helps me to make 
business decision.  He is my adviser.  He makes a valuable contribution to 
the running of my strategic business unit. 
    (Interview with MCR, 19 January 2006). 
The accountants encouraged and assisted operation managers to think about the 
financial implications of any local decisions.  The business managers valued their 
relationships with accountants and vice-versa.  Previously, the accounting 
function had been centralized and removed from day-to-day operations; they were 
housed in a separate block.  The function was now decentralized and situated in 
the operational field.  The finance manager expected the accountants to pass on 
their accounting routines and know-how through training and day-to-day 
interactions. 
 
A manager commented: 
We‟re indeed an engineering company.  But engineers in government days 
had little understanding of what they were doing in terms of bottom line.  
The engineers now know what a “bottom line” actually is and can respond 
to it. 
    (Interview with NMQ, 25 February 2004). 
The planning activities began to symbolize the search for profit maximising 
opportunities.  A strategic manager commented: 
We and the management team got control of the planning process.  We 
have the responsibility for planning and budgeting.  That has become our 
power base. 
     (Interview with SPM, 2 February 2005). 
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The accountants were institutional entrepreneurs at TFL driving support and 
power from management and CEO.  The accountants were proactive in destroying 
the old institution of public service rules and routines and introducing new 
accounting logic of EVA, NPV and payback calculations which aided managers in 
planning and decision making.  The next section discusses the role of the business 
plan at TFL. 
 
8.3.3   Business Plan at TFL 
 
This section examines the role of the business plan which is part of MACS at TFL 
and how accountants and management contributed to planning.  TFL had a 5 year 
business plan, as evidenced by a strategic manager: 
We have a business plan which company accountants were helpful in 
putting in place and everything may need to be achieved in accordance to 
the plan.  We have specific profit targets on the plan which we are striving 
towards.  The targets include connection of lines, service restoration, 
revenue level, expected profits and so on. 
     (Interview with SPM, 20 January 2006). 
 
The management and workers were expected to work towards the business plan.  
The business plan was developed with the assistance of Telecom New Zealand 
consultants.  The steering committee at TFL was made up of key managers and 
accountants who helped to develop the business plan.  The plan focused on the 
aims of meeting customers‟ expectations and cost reduction.  The key goals for 
five years were: 
1. Financial- achieve revenue, profit targets which were in terms of return 
on investment of 12.5% and debt to equity ratio 
2. Development- add at least 8,000 lines per year and increase telephone 
penetration to about 35 per 100 population 
3. Reliable delivery of quality service on time, in full, every time, and 
4. Be easy to do business with. 
(TFL Strategic Business Plan, 2001-2006, p.10). 
The business plan was a bulky document, intended to inform the management of 
the expected targets.  It established new performance targets and benchmarks by 
which business decisions and actions would be judged and perceived and formed 
part of MACS.  The steering committee decided to publicise the plan throughout 
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the organization, down to the operational staff.  Business plan pamphlets were 
distributed to staff while seminars were also held to spread corporate awareness 
and develop new knowledge of the plan.  The business plan was helpful in 
establishing new ways of thinking, as well as helping to dismantle old taken-for-
granted public service assumptions.  A manager commented: 
With the implementation of the business plan, some of us now aim to 
finish work even if it is after 5:00p.m.  This was not the case when we 
were with the government; we might leave it for the next working day.  
But now completion of work has become important for us. 
   (Interview with RMN, 11 January 2006). 
 
A strategic manager claimed that “the business plan drove everything at TFL.”  
According to a manager, business processes were aligned to the business plan.  
So, the business plan was a new rule that embodied the intended new ethos of the 
business, and to which other organizational phenomena (systems, structure, 
practices, etc) should be aligned (see Burns & Baldvinsdotir, 2005). 
 
The Finance Strategic Business Unit employees played a significant role at TFL 
and advised management on financial decisions, in terms of cost reduction and 
undertaking projects that yielded positive net present values and EVA.  In these 
contexts, the Finance division employees recast dialogue from telecommunication 
language and engineering into their business language of markets and 
profitability.  The establishment of new accounting systems had been vital in 
changing organizational routines from a centralized bureaucratic one to a 
decentralized management one and in shaping new roles so that meaningful 
budgets and performance reports could be established.  Through business 
planning, the accountants, public relations personnel, marketing managers and 
customer service managers increased their power relative to engineers. 
 
The whole management team was bound up in the creation of the business 
routine.  The management and the finance teams, including a steering committee, 
were the institutional entrepreneurs of the change.  Seminars were conducted for 
the various operation managers by Finance, consisting of financial awareness 
programme aimed at such topics as budget setting, budget management, capital 




What we have been doing is a skill transfer- providing knowledge to 
operation managers on decision making based on financial information.  
And we showed them financial information and said this is how you use it. 
    (Interview with FM, 20 January 2006) 
The finance team attended team meetings to contribute to business decisions that 
previously would not have concerned them.  The operation managers appeared to 
embrace such interactions and relationships with the Finance team.  A strategic 
manager commented: 
Accountants are now more integrated into the business.  They‟re more 
proactive and help us.  We often ask them to help us focus on what is 
needed for improvement. 
    (Interview with SPM, 20 January 2006). 
Through the integration of accountants, thrift and concern for money became 
institutionalized and taken-for-granted by TFL members.  Accountants, as 
institutional entrepreneurs, continually advised the managers of Strategic Business 
Units of sound business practices, becoming powerful actors within TFL and well 
respected.  The business practices became new routine for TFL actors.  The next 
section examines the privatization of TFL. 
 
8.3.4  Accounting and Privatization at TFL 
 
The corporatisation phase of FPTL facilitated the privatization of TFL by 
allowing TFL employees to assimilate commercial business routines.  TFL 
management had recorded improved profit over the years, from F$28 million in 
2000 to F$42 million in 2004.  There had been a decline of profit in 2005 to F$16 
million owing to redundancy payments made to about 300 workers and the 
regulator, the Commerce Commission, which reduced tariff charges.  The 
workers‟ redundancies were made possible through a locally hired consultant who 
took up the position of managing director at TFL in 2005.  There was an 
increasing pressure from the unions that only the workers who opted for 
redundancies be made redundant.  The management adhered to this proposal and 
laid off only workers who voluntarily accepted a redundancy package.   
 
Price hikes by the monopoly had to be regulated by the Commerce Commission to 
prevent exploitation of customers by TFL.  The Commerce Commission ensured 
that the price hikes were reasonable for the monopoly to achieve adequate return 
on investment on their assets.  For example, in 2004 TFL management wanted an 
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increase in prices for telecom services.  However, as discussed previously, the 
Commerce Commission regulates the prices for state monopolies, and called for 
public submissions on Telecom‟s stipulated price increases.  Submissions from 
the public, which are contained in a public register at the Commerce Commissions 
office in Suva included such statements as: 
 Telecom has not reduced their overall rates including domestic. 
 
We can‟t afford high charges as TFL provides inefficient services and is a 
monopoly. 
 
People in lower categories make fewer phone calls.  Price rental is too 
high in the tariff repackaging plan submitted by TFL. 
 
I strongly support the view that the current monopoly restricts  
competition. 
 
We don‟t earn good incomes and many of our relatives (sons and 
daughters) don‟t have employment and therefore can‟t afford higher 
telecom charges. 
 
In general the public submission highlighted concerns such as high call charges 
for local, long distance and international fixed line services.  The Commerce 
Commission members used the public submissions to reduce charges, while 
ensuring that TFL earned a reasonable return on their capital.  This action was 
discussed with the Telecom stakeholders.  The inter-region call rates were reduced 
from $0.4276 per minute to $0.2050 per minute and the line rental charges were 
increased from F$2.84 to F$12 per month.  TFL management had wanted a 
monthly line rental increase to about F$35, as the line rental was cheaper in Fiji 
than in neighboring countries (see Appendix 9). 
 
Despite the intervention of the Commerce Commission, TFL continued to show 
increases in profits from 2006 onwards.  For example, in 2006 TFL made a profit 
of F$24.6 million (ATH annual report, 2007).  The profit, however, was lower 
than the 2004 financial year‟s.  The company‟s chairman reported increased profit 
in 2006 to the media in this way: 
TFL made gains from an approved increase in line rentals, and a 
diversification in its revenue away from a reliance on a traditional fixed 
line call charge. 
   (Fiji Live, 27 July 2007). 
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TFL management diversified into satellite phones such as EasyTel which was an 
avenue for increased revenue (ATH annual report, 2005).   
 
In terms of improved efficiency and financial performance, accounting played a 
technical role in providing the information that enabled better cost control, cash 
management, accounts receivable projects and fixed assets.  Annual reports show 
that there had been reductions in operating costs and an increase in revenue and 
profitability, except for 2005 where some 300 workers received large redundancy 
payment which increased costs and reduced profit.  Also in 2005, the Commerce 
Commission‟s directive on reduced telecom charges impacted on the revenue.   
Table 9 summarises the results of TFL‟s performance from 2001 to 2006. 
 
Table 9  TFL’s Performance over 2001 to 2006 
 
Year 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 
Net profit 
(000) 
25,400 28,000 37,360 42,000 16,000 32,000 
Revenue  
(000) 
149,500 145,000 152,934 130,000 131,950 133,053 
Costs  
(000) 
124,100 117,000 115,574 88,000 115,950 101,053 
     (ATH annual report: 2000-2006). 
In 2001 TFL posted a F$25.4 million after tax profit.  ATH‟s annual report (2001, 
p.14) reported that “on an annual basis it is a 16.9% improvement over the 
previous period.  Total revenue was a record for any 12 month period of F$149.5 
million and exceeded budget of F$148.7 million.”  In 2002 profit after tax 
increased and cost was reduced.  However, there was some reduction in revenue 
and this was attributed by management to the effects of the May 2000 coup.  The 
ATH annual report (2002) stated that “the residual effects of the events of May 
2000 were still affecting the company, particularly during first quarter” (p.18).  
The next year, 2003, saw an improvement in profit which the ATH annual report 
(2003) noted had exceeded the targeted profit by 2.2 percent.  Expenses were also 
reduced and revenues increased due to an enhanced marketing plan under which 
some discounts were offered to customers on telephone calls made.  There was an 
increase in working lines to 99,100 and the telephone penetration rate increased to 
12.1 per 100 population for the year, which was an increase from 11.7 per 100 




In 2004, TFL managers and employees recorded an increase in net profit.  There 
was a drop in the revenue due to the separation of Xceed Pasifika Limited and 
Transtel Limited.  Transtel Limited employees were given responsibility for 
prepaid telephony business and public phone installation programme.  Xceed 
Pacifica was a wholly owned subsidiary of TFL and took over equipment and 
distribution rights, customer premises equipment and customer premises cabling 
(ATH annual report, 2004).  The number of working lines increased to 101,283 
from 99,100 in 2003.  Telephone penetration rate also increased to 12.3 per 100 
population from 12.1 per 100 in 2003 (ATH annual report, 2004).  
 
In 2005 financial performance was impacted by an increase in expenses.  TFL 
management also recognized restructuring costs (in particular liabilities for 
redundancy payments) as early as possible.  The Commerce Commission‟s price 
determination also partially weakened the company‟s profitability position.  While 
the redundancy package was in accordance with the accounting principles of 
prudence, it also had the advantage of making performance in subsequent years 
look good.  However, ATH‟s annual report (2006) noted that sales revenue was 
stable but expenses were reduced by a significant margin during the year.  
Consequently, net profit for the year almost doubled from the 2005 result. 
 
The privatization of TFL brought pressure for TFL participants to improve the 
accounting system.  A manager commented: 
 With the help of accountants, we have developed a corporate culture-the 
aim is towards enhancing profit for the company and growing share value. 
    (Interview with SPM, 18 February 2004) 
Accountants were proactive in the organizational change, and promoted 
accounting logic within the organization. 
 
There had been a general call for TFL members to improve revenue and 
profitability so that the shareholder value is maximized.  Accounting and 
accountants routinised commercial business norms in terms of profitability and 
finance at TFL.  Under a business mentality, telecommunication products and 
services were regarded as just another economic commodity.  A new language of 
business and economics has become predominant and routinised at TFL.  The 




8.4.0   Discussion/ Summary 
 
This chapter has covered a range of issues surrounding the role of MACS and 
accountants in privatization, the introduction of a technical calculus and new 
power structures within TFL.  The way in which reforms were introduced by the 
Fiji government to achieve efficiencies was to establish telecommunications as a 
profit-seeking corporation.  A number of accountants were hired from the private 
sector and these people expressed a new ideology.  The influx of technical 
accountants accompanied a new set of rules and routines.  The introduction of 
business concepts such as strategic planning, EVA, NPV and ROI were aimed at 
changing the traditional culture of public service at TFL.   
 
The accounting system changed from cash-basis to accrual accounting.  The 
emergent change to accrual accounting and computerized based accounting 
system evolved from the recognition of interinstitutional contradiction (Seo & 
Creed, 2002) by key (change) agents and by questioning the previously taken-for-
granted routines based on physical production.  A great deal was demanded from 
the subsidiary (TFL) by the parent company, ATH, in terms of reporting the 
results of subsidiaries.  TFL subsidiaries accounts were consolidated into TFL 
accounts which subsequently were consolidated into ATH‟s accounts.  ATH 
members use accounting software known as the Consolidated Reporting Package 
to construct and consolidate the accounts of subsidiaries.  On the advice of World 
Bank, stakeholders of the government created a conflicting situation, thus creating 
interinstitutional contradictions.  A logic of commercial business routines was 
followed which accountants promoted.  The finance division continually advised 
managers on financial decision making.  The managers relied on accounting 
information for decision making, and so the management accountants‟ role 
became central to TFL‟s operations. 
 
Apart from the accountants from TFL, ATH management also appointed TFL 
Board members and expected monthly reports from TFL in areas such as finance, 
competitors, customers, marketing, industrial relations and staff matters.  Also the 
South Pacific Stock Exchange listing conditions required better financial 
information from ATH.  The converging response to commercial accounting 
practice emerges from the search for legitimacy (social fitness) and efficiency 
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(economic fitness) (Granlund & Lukka, 1998).  Granlund and Lukka (1998) argue 
that it is common for the headquarters‟ members to force its subsidiaries to adopt 
reporting systems similar to those used in the headquarters/parent company.   
 
There were to be new rules and routines of behaviour.  Activities were to be 
accounted by TFL members in economic and commercial terms instead of in 
terms of physical production while decisions about telecommunication services 
were colonized by accounting practices, including EVA and NPV calculations of 
the capital replacement decisions.  Institutional entrepreneurs in the form of the 
Finance Strategic Business Unit team and accountants, including the steering 
committee, were involved in crafting new commercial business accounting.  The 
steering committee was instrumental in implementing the business plan.  The 
emergent changes in commercial business routines evolved within TFL.  
Accounting changes emerged with the help of consultants and a management 
team comprised mainly of Finance division management and other senior 
managers.  The new accounting techniques helped change people‟s perceptions.   
For example, the concept of assets in the commercial sector is based on the 
assumption of private property which could be sold in the market place.   
 
The changes after corporatisation were deemed by the Fiji government, TFL 
management and the board to have brought about efficiency and effectiveness in 
the recording process.  The accounting change shaped people‟s perceptions of 
running TFL as a successful business.  Telephone subscribers were referred to as 
customers, and seen as a source of revenue.  Cost-cutting and efficiency allowed 
the revenue source to become sources of profit.   A consultant was hired to install 
and train employees with new commercial accounting system.  Over time, MACS 
practices were followed.   
 
The accountants acted as institutional entrepreneurs, working within existing 
(though evolving) institutional arrangements, and pursued the fulfillment of needs 
of managers to make financial decisions.  The management accountants in each of 
the strategic business units were closer to operation managers.  The management 
team and many accountants hired were instrumental in enacting and routinising 
new accounting techniques at TFL.  Eventually, the new accounting routines in 
the form of commercial accounting and computerized systems were reproduced 
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and routinised by TFL actors.  Apart from the head office, the computerized 
accounting system was tried out at the regional centres as well and was eventually 
adopted by TFL participants.   
 
The changes in accounting systems at TFL have been constantly evolving.  
Currently, the accounts are prepared using generally accepted accounting 
principals and the Fiji accounting standards.  The TFL Finance team made 
adequate progress towards switching to International Accounting Standards in the 
construction of accounting information at TFL.  Following a discussion of the role 
of accounting in the corporatisation and privatization of TFL in this chapter, the 
next chapter examines the introduction and routinisation of the managerial 























Chapter 9.0:   Routinisation of TQM practices within 
TFL 
 
9.1.0   Introduction 
 
In chapter 8, the role of accounting in the corporatisation and privatization of TFL 
was discussed.  The accountants were proactive, working within existing 
institutional arrangements and then gradually changing them to fulfill the needs of 
management to make financial decisions. 
 
This chapter draws on concepts from institutional theory (Barley & Tolbert, 1997; 
Beckert, 1999; Burns & Scapens, 2000; Seo & Creed, 2002; Dorado, 2005) to 
analyse MACS changes surrounding TQM practice implementation and the 
subsequent institutionalization by organizational members within TFL.  TQM is 
related to MACS in that incentive pay, for example, can have an impact on TQM 
practices on customer and quality performance (Sim & Killough, 1998).  Chenhall 
(2003) notes that TQM practice is associated with MACS including timely 
externally focused information and close interaction between strategy and non-
financial performance measurement.  TFL employees were granted quarterly 
bonuses on achievement of TQM related targets such as customer satisfaction.  
The introduction of TQM routines within the organization is part of a process 
used to enact and add authority to broader MACS changes within TFL.  The next 
few sections outline the narrative in relation to institutional theory.   
 
9.2.0  Institutional Contradiction 
 
This section outlines the institutional contradictions that were persistent at TFL 
and triggered TQM practice implementation.  There was a contradiction of 
technical inefficiency.  The civil service routines and commercial business 
routines operated side by side for a number of years.  With the co-existence of 
civil service routines, there was a concern amongst management about a lack of 
operational efficiency within TFL.  Despite privatization, TFL management and 
employees remained the monopoly supplier of telephone services to Fiji citizens.  
TFL management and employees acted to legitimize business operations but at the 
same time did not appear to legitimate or absorb the importance to the privatized 
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organization of customers‟ interests.  A failure to adjust to this new environment 
provides evidence of institutional contradiction/ inconsistency in the lack of 
adaptability (Seo & Creed, 2002).  As TFL employees were so embedded within 
public service norms, attempts to change to TQM routines were often resisted by 
the employees. Powell (1991) argues that efforts to change actors shared 
expectations are often resisted as “they threaten individuals‟ sense of security and 
disrupt routines” (p.194). 
 
The Fiji government‟s public sector reform policy produced a source of 
inconsistency in TFL participants‟ interactions.  Throughout the reform process, 
the organizational participants were encouraged to operate as if running a 
successful business.  However, they were slow and inconsistent in adopting a 
customer focus.  An institutional crisis was created in Fiji with the sudden change 
in government regulation in terms of public sector reform.  The reform policy 
appeared to be the consequence of interinstitutional incompatibilities unfolding in 
the larger institutional environment (see Seo & Creed, 2002).  The Fiji 
government was influenced by the donor agencies of the World Bank and the 
Asian Development Bank to introduce neo-liberal policies in public sector 
reforms.  The TFL was one of the forerunners of this reform and the first public 
sector organization to be fully privatized.   
 
Because people were so used to civil service routines, in the early stages of 
corporatization it was difficult for them to embrace commercial business routines.  
As some delays were experienced in organizational members adapting to 
commercial routines, TQM practices were considered by management and the 
board of directors to be an important innovation tool.  There are performance 
indicators such as customer satisfaction, delivery of services centred around TQM 
practices which have an impact on actors‟ commitment to TQM practices.  TQM 
practice could possibly make TFL employees more customer-conscious and 
improve both their efficiency and effectiveness. 
 
Interviewees provided some rationale for the introduction of TQM practices and 
the existence of contradictions within the organisation.  The following interview 
quotes illustrate this: 
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The civil service culture was quite common at TFL and there was a lack of 
customer focus.  Attempts to introduce business norms prior to TQM 
received strong resistance from management and workers. 
     (Interview with CE, 18 February, 2004). 
There were a lot of customer complaints about our services which created 
some concern for our performance. 
     (Interview with NMQ, 25 February, 2004). 
 
Previously we were a government department-we provide, you buy.  We 
were the only supplier of telephones.  The customer choice is taken as 
second level.  Our first approach was: this is what we have and this is what 
you have to buy because we‟re the only supplier of telephones.  For 
example, if we have the black phone, this is what the customers will have 
to take.  There wasn‟t much choice- no choice given to customers at all. 
    (Interview with QM, 25 February 2004). 
The above interview evidence suggests a contradiction of technical inefficiency in 
that customer consciousness was lacking in the employees from the government 
department days.  One of the possible reasons for this lack of customer focus was 
the absence of a TQM practice program.  The Fijian culture which appreciates 
silence also played a role in the TQM implementation process.  The management 
could use the culture to encourage workers to adopt TQM routines.  This is 
discussed in turn. 
 
9.2.1  Management commitment to TQM routines and the Fijian 
culture 
 
This section examines management commitment to TQM practices and how 
Fijian culture was used by management to encourage the implementation of TQM 
routines.  In order for TQM routines to be enacted and reproduced, there needs to 
be a commitment from top management (Laszlo, 1999).  However, Naqova, the 
then Managing Director who initiated the TQM program, passed away in a fire 
accident in the late 1990s and a replacement Managing Director, Winston 
Thompson, was hired.  Thompson was well known for his financial skills and had 
occupied some senior positions in the civil service.  His term in government also 
included appointment as Ambassador and Senator.  A Customer Service Manager 
expressed the view that Thompson was good at expense control and had been able 
to maintain earnings even in periods of falling revenues.  According to the 
Customer Service Manager, he (Thompson) was an advocate of TQM practices 
and was instrumental in setting up the National Quality Council and the Quality 
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Action Teams (QAT) to give momentum to the TQM process at TFL.  The 
National Quality Council and Quality Action Team will be discussed later in the 
chapter.  Thompson was very influential at TFL and was characterized as being 
strongly result-oriented and a firm believer in both customer consciousness and 
performance measurement. 
 
The interview quotes below illustrate the commitment of management to the 
TQM routines: 
A lot hinges on leadership; management commitment is important for 
TQM to be effective.  This has been shown by management at TFL.  
People generally have the desire to do good. 
     (Interview with QM, 24 January 2006). 
 
The involvement of management was there and workers gave the thrust 
into embarking into TQM.  It was not, only a management decision to be 
there, it was workers representatives too.  But when the workers were 
taught the gospel of TQM, then they were better able to understand.  
Workers were able to make decisions and were given empowerment and 
this motivated them to work harder. 
    (Interview with MCC, 25 February 2004). 
 
The above interview evidence suggests that management supported TQM 
practices and employees were encouraged to adopt TQM routines in their day-to-
day activity.  According to Laszlo (1999), gaining approval from the Chief 
Executive and obtaining his/her commitment is the first step towards the 
successful implementation of TQM practices in any organization.  According to 
an interviewee, there was a growing commitment from the Managing Director and 
his National Quality Council on TQM practices and some employees embraced 
the TQM routines.  With respect to this matter, Thaman (1999) notes that Fiji 
society is socially stratified and people have been socialized to respect persons 
because of their social ranks.  The Fijians are devoted to their communal social 
structures and obedient to their chiefs (Achary, 1998a, 1998b).  Fiji has a large 
power distance society that accepts a hierarchical order.  Fijians have extended 
family with strong allegiance to the chiefs in the village.  As a consequence, the 
Chief Executive and managers of TFL are generally regarded as people with 
authority.  Many employees would not express disagreement with their superiors 
because they have been brought up to believe that such behaviour is inappropriate.  
Thus, conformity to social norms is essential and deviant behaviour is frowned on.  
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Achary (1998a) notes that Fijian culture is one of silence, that is, the people will 
not normally speak up against their superiors or chiefs and readily accept their 
wishes.  The Indo-Fijians, who are a minority population in Fiji, hold similar 
beliefs.  Achary (1998a) points out that silence in Fiji is culturally patterned and 
embroiled in societal communicative behaviour.  While TQM practices require 
the involvement of TFL members, this has been made possible through an 
informal environment of Quality Action Teams.  A Quality Manager claimed that 
as soon as the meetings are formal, then silence is reproduced. 
 
The traditional Fijian socio-economic system, to a great extent, remains 
cooperative, communal and village-oriented.  The relationship between chiefs and 
subjects, although acknowledged as authoritarian, is portrayed as a two-way 
arrangement (Lloyd, 1982).  The chiefs take the responsibility for decision 
making on behalf of the people as a duty, and in return, receive loyalty and 
obedience to their authority from the people (Lloyd, 1982; Lawson, 1990). 
 
The cultural beliefs also play an instrumental role at the work place: there is a 
large power distance between management and workers possibly emanating from 
the tightly knit social framework and stratified Fijian societies headed by chiefs.  
A Quality Manager explained that with the introduction of TQM practices at TFL, 
the power distance between the CEO and workers was meant to be reduced.  
However, due to the cultural pattern of employees, the large power distance was 
still pervasive within TFL. The power distance did not have much impact on 
TQM practices as meetings were held informally on Quality Action Teams to be 
described later in the chapter.   
 
A Customer Service Manager also endorsed the notion that culture played an 
instrumental role within the TQM process.  The Quality Action Teams‟ meetings 
were conducted in an informal manner so that involvement of all members was 
enhanced.  The management tries to keep Quality Action Team meetings as 
informal as possible to overcome the silence problem of the culture.  Having 
discussed the Fijian culture which permitted TQM practices to be introduced at 
TFL, the next section illustrates the institutional entrepreneurs who were at play in 




9.3.0  Institutional Entrepreneurs in the TQM implementation 
process 
 
This section presents the role of institutional entrepreneurs (internal change 
agents) along with external change agents in the TQM practice implementation 
process.  The section demonstrates how institutional entrepreneurs and external 
change agents can introduce new institutions of TQM routines.  A number of 
writers (Beckert, 1999; Seo & Creed, 2002; Dorado, 2005) have identified the 
significance of such agents in providing impetus for change in the presence of 
institutional contradictions or inconsistencies.  Beckert (1999) points out that the 
notion of institutional entrepreneur introduces strategic agency into institutional 
organisation theory.  Beckert (1999) argues that a change agent‟s effects are to 
disturb the existing taken-for-granted routines by introducing new ideas and the 
possibility of change. 
 
TQM practice was introduced by the then Managing Director, Naqova who was 
an institutional entrepreneur.  He argued that the TQM initiative had brought 
considerable benefits to some of the public sector organisations he had visited in 
Australia and New Zealand and needed to be implemented at TFL.  A Quality 
Manager commented: 
The Managing Director used to read a lot of books on TQM and it was 
from there that he picked up the idea of TQM practice. 
     (Interview with QM, 31 January 2005). 
Thus, the Managing Director‟s in-depth knowledge of other organisation and his 
wider reading was used to lend support to the idea of TQM practices. 
 
In 1996 TFL employed consultants from Hawaii Pacific University to assist 
efforts to introduce TQM routines.  The consultants were hired by TFL 
management for three months.  The consultants coordinated six hours of training 
per week on TQM practices and their major task was to train management in 
TQM practices.  Initially TQM practice training took place in a group consisting 
of representatives of all departments and the management team of TFL, including 
the CEO.  The department representatives and managers relied on presentations 
by the consultants to help them understand TQM practices.  The consultants 
emphasised success stories about TQM practices from similar programs carried 
out in other organisations and convinced the employees to adopt TQM practice 
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implementation at TFL. According to an accountant, TFL employees took TQM 
practices seriously, in part as a result of the credentials and specialist knowledge 
of the consultants.   
 
The consultants provided training in the 11 steps to problem solving.  These steps 
encompass: 1. identify the problem, 2. identify and analyse issues, 3. identify the 
underlying cause, 4. data/assignment, 5. data collection, 6. data evaluation and 
analysis, 7. possible solutions, 8. solution analysis, 9. cost/benefit analysis, 10. 
action plans, and 11. measurement (TFL Quality Manual, 1998, p.12).  According 
to Granlund and Lukka (1998), consultants generally support mimetic processes 
and the trend of isomorphism.  Consultants generally support similar solutions 
such as TQM practices that overseas-based telecommunications providers may 
have adapted after privatization.  Irvine (2007) notes that consultant services can 
be considered as exerting normative institutional pressure.  TFL management and 
employees relied on consultants for their professional services. 
 
Apart from the consultants, there was also a management team within TFL that 
implemented TQM practices.  This management team was comprised of the 
Managing Director, General Managers and ten managers of the company.  The 
management team acted to embed TQM routines initiated by the consultants and 
the Managing Director within TFL.  Although at first the managers were aligned 
with public service norms, they later on became more conscious of customer 
responsiveness through TQM routines recommended by the consultants.  Many of 
the managers were receptive to TQM practices; some had previously acquired 
quality management diplomas from Hawaii.  A Quality Manual on TQM was 
introduced by the management team which outlined the TQM practice within 
TFL; this formed part of the “rule” within TFL.  The Quality Manual was made 
available to employees of TFL. 
 
At the organizational level, institutional entrepreneurs of the management team 
were able to envision alternative institutional arrangements and were able to 
develop them.  The institutional contradictions of undermining efficiency through 
a lack of customer focus led embedded agents to act as institutional entrepreneurs 
(e.g., Seo & Creed, 2002).  In TFL‟s case, the management TQM team that 
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included Quality Action Teams and the National Quality Council acted as 
institutional entrepreneurs. 
 
However, initially TQM practice was not accepted by all employees.  A Customer 
Service Manager stated that it took the management team almost two years of 
educating workers about the benefits of TQM practices before the practices was 
accepted by most workers.  A TQM structure was set up which is discussed in 
section 9.4.0.  Translating TQM into practice necessitated the creation of “TQM 
structure”, and Quality Action Teams and a National Quality Council were 
formed.  The National Quality Council was headed by the Managing Director.  A 
huge training initiative with almost all employees was run by the Hawaii-based 
consultants.  Initiating studies and setting up working groups can be seen as a 
process of embedding an innovation (Mueller & Carter, 2005).   
 
A Strategic Manager described barriers to the diffusion of TQM practices in this 
way: 
Some workers were with the company for over 30 years.  The majority 
were with the organization for 10 to 20 years.  A smaller percentage was 
with the company for less than 10 years and some were very new.  It was 
not a clear-cut acceptance since some felt the need for change was not 
there.  I think the awareness of TQM made a lot of difference.  We needed 
to speak to staff about the TQM philosophy/concept whenever the 
opportunity arose.  This made the adaptation easier. 
     (Interview with SPM, 6 August 2003) 
According to the above interviewee, the longest standing workers were most 
resistant to change.  An engineer mentioned that they possibly felt that they were 
a bit old to change.  For some others, the new practice of TQM was not making 
sense as FPTL had a monopoly in postal and telecom services and made adequate 
profits.  These employees questioned the need for TQM routines.  Other barriers 
to TQM diffusion were described by interviewees as: 
There were some who resisted adopting TQM.  It came from old 
employees.  We could say old horses take longer to understand the new 
race course. 
     (Interview with QM, 6 August 2002). 
 
Concept of total, if not understood can lead to problems.  Implementation 
has to be gradual rather than vigorous.  Then we have some conservative 
people in the organization who are unwilling to change. 




Any new thing that comes in, we need to go with it.  I can‟t say whether 
we are really happy with it.  There are drawbacks; a lot of paper work has 
to be undertaken. 
    (Interview with MCC, 18 February 2004) 
 
At the moment we still have people with a traditional approach and would 
not listen to customers that much when there has been a great step in the 
thought of the people‟s mind that customers have to be treated in a special 
way. 
    (Interview with NMQ, 25 February 2004) 
 
Over here we have a culture of silence and you don‟t know what silence 
means- whether they agree sometimes or disagree.  They go and talk at the 
back.  But creating that openness, having meetings in an informal situation 
which is more effective than formal has been more effective.  As soon as it 
is formal, they find they are somewhere like a court house or court room 
where one person speaks, everyone listens-you know. 
    (Interview with GMA, 31 January 2005) 
 
The above interview evidence suggests that the enactment of TQM routines was 
subject to resistance as these (TQM routines) challenged the civil service norms of 
the actors where treating customers as revenue units was unconscionable.  A 
Quality Manager commented: 
Some employees felt that they were a bit old to change.  There were 
others who were questioning the need for TQM as TFL had the monopoly 
in telecommunication services. 
    (Interview with QM, 25 February, 2004). 
However, according to an interviewee, once the key performance indicators 
(KPIs) were developed, which included customer consciousness as one of the five 
factors to be evaluated in terms of customer complaints, people‟s attitude changed 
and they gradually began to accept TQM routines.  Also, to have resisted TQM 
practice change would have been unhelpful for employees‟ career prospects.  
Those accepting TQM routines were rewarded in the form of quarterly bonuses 
which were not extended to those who opposed TQM routines.  Those who did 
not get bonuses were mainly people who received below 70% in their quarterly 
performance report.  Chenhall (1997) points out that an important concern in the 
implementation of TQM practice and its relevance to MACS is the extent to 
which TQM is developed together with a managerial performance evaluation 
system.  It is argued that TQM practice is enhanced once managers and employees 
are evaluated on the basis of non-financial measures such as customer satisfaction 
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(Chenhall, 1997).  The next section examines the enactment of TQM routines at 
TFL. 
 
9.4.0   The Enactment of TQM routines 
 
This section describes the enactment of TQM routines at TFL.  The discussion 
focuses on the formation of Quality Action Teams and a National Quality Council 
by the management team.  This section regards the introduction of TQM routines 
within the organisation as part of the processes which were used to enact and add 
authority to the broader changes in practices within TFL. 
 
The change to TQM practice was initiated by the Managing Director, Naqova, in 
1996.  Interviewees described the introduction of TQM practice by management 
as intentional and conscious.  During the enactment process, the CEO and the 
management team, who accepted the value of TQM practices, were able to 
convince others of their value.  The CEO and the management team began the 
TQM enactment process by defining the broad structure of a TQM program.  The 
support of the CEO and management team had been reinforced by the 
establishment of the National Quality Council within TFL that oversees the TQM 
process in the company.  The National Quality Council is the highest part of the 
hierarchy within the TQM administration structure; the next level is the Quality 
Action Team.  Through the administration structure, TQM practices were 
reproduced by TFL members (see Figure 6 for administration structure).  TFL 
members brainstormed solutions to TQM-related problems. 
 
A TQM manager, an institutional entrepreneur, was appointed in 1996.  He held a 
Diploma in Quality Management from Hawaii Pacific University and was 
sympathetic to customer needs, having been with the Customer Service division 
for a few years.  This person had been with TFL for over 30 years, having worked 
up from a junior position: he was a TFL line inspector and was with the Customer 
Services Division before he moved to the position of National Manager: Quality.  
He had also presented various papers at local conferences on TQM and had won 
best paper prize at the Training and Productivity Authority of Fiji‟s Quality 




A TQM administration structure (see Figure 6) was introduced by CEO at TFL.  
A Quality Manager explained: 
In 1996, this Quality Administration Structure and the National Quality 
Council emerged.  The National Quality Council consists of CEO, 
executive management, middle managers and union representatives.  
There are 10 Quality Action Teams at TFL.  The QAT is the next tier of 
the new quality administration that reports to the National Quality Council 
via team leaders. 
     (Interview with QM, 6 August 2003). 
The National Quality Council met on the third Monday of every month.  At the 
meeting, team leaders reported on key business processes such as service 
provisioning, restoration of telecommunication services after being affected by 
some fault in the line, risk management, recognition and rewards, billing and 
revenue assurance (see Appendix 10).  The Quality Action Teams report on 
specific quality projects that are presented at these monthly meetings.   
 
The National Quality Council meetings became part of the routine activity within 
TFL.  The work of the Quality Action Teams was monitored at the National 
Quality Council level.  The TFL Quality Manual (1998) pointed out that the role 
of National Quality Council is to: 
 monitor the quality of Telecom products and services 
 form a Quality Action Team to work on macro processes (cross 
functional) 
 monitor the work of action teams 
 liaise with organizations and institutions on quality development 
programmes 
 organize company quality conventions and award presentations 
 evaluate the effectiveness of the company‟s quality improvement 
processes, and 
 publicise the quality improvement undertaken by the teams. 
 
Operational workers who do the actual work are also included in the teams.  At 
the National Quality Council, the recommendations that emerge from the Quality 
Action Teams can be approved or further action may be required.  Once the 
changes to work processes, technical changes, new investments or customer 
service changes are approved, they are implemented.  A Quality Manager reported 
that the Quality Action Teams‟ responsibility is to follow through the 
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implementation process and report back to the National Quality Council within a 
certain time, say 3 months.  The Quality Action Teams follow through 11 steps to 
problem solving.  Once the problem is solved, it is documented and passed to the 
National Quality Council. 
 
A Customer Service Manager commented: 
At National Quality Council data improvement is discussed.  
Implementation of solutions to the problem is documented for us.  New 
process or improvement process is discussed.  This leads to awareness 
through all involved in the macro/micro process.  Some or all could be 
approved.  Those approved are minuted and implemented. 
     (Interview with MCR, 17 January 2006). 
The approved projects were implemented within TFL, thus giving credibility to 
the TQM process.  The TQM routines become taken-for-granted and the Quality 
Action Team is the instrument for the development of the routines.  In relation to 
TQM, an operations worker explained that TQM success stories are also 
communicated through the TFL newsletter which encourages employees to 
embrace TQM practices.  Individuals‟ participation in the various TQM teams 
routinises the concept of TQM at TFL.  Through team participation, TQM 
routines are reproduced over time and passed on to new members of the 
organisation. 
 
A Strategic Manager explained that the Quality Action Teams are cross-
functional.  The leader of the team is not from the same section of TFL where the 
quality problem exists.  The leaders of Quality Action Teams are appointed by the 
National Quality Council.  The team generally consist of people who can provide 
access to data necessary for testing potential solutions and who are critical for 
implementing the solutions developed (Hackman & Wageman, 1995).  If the team 
members (institutional entrepreneurs) are not familiar with a process like billing, 
then probing questions are asked for clarification before proceeding with the 
solution to the problem.  Hackman and Wageman (1995) point out that a cross-
functional team‟s main purpose is to identify and analyse the “vital few” problems 
of the organization (p.313).  The teams are created to diagnose the problems and 
to develop and test potential solutions to them.  Through team meetings, the 
institutional entrepreneurs shape changes in terms of new improved practices.  A 




Quality Action Teams go through the quality improvement process of 
problem solving.  They work on data collection and select a few main 
problems and leave out the trivial problems.  Data collection is needed 
which is done by the team members. 
    (Interview with QM, 17 January 2006). 
 














  (Source:  Telecom Fiji Limited Quality Manual, 1998, p.11). 
Referring to Figure 6, some of the Quality Action Team in operations at TFL 
under the Strategic Business Unit Management are “resolving complaints in 
providing and restoring telecommunication services, reducing costs on small and 
medium customers, developing customer focused attitude and reducing waitlist 
management” (TFL Quality Manual, 1998, p. 12).  The National Quality Council 
teams were established in the areas of debt management of customers, billing and 
customer value management.  Some of the Quality Action Team projects will be 
illustrated later in the chapter (from pages 187- 191). 
 
TFL employees made use of tools and techniques within the TQM programme 
which were new to TFL.  According to an interviewee, examples of these tools 
included “brainstorming exercises in the eleven steps, process mapping and the 
like.”  TQM institutionalisation takes place as repeated behaviors lead to 
reproduction of TQM routines.  This reproduction involves a conscious choice of 
TQM practices at TFL.  TQM practices were also viewed by interviewees as 













customers may mean increased revenue for TFL.  Before the introduction of TQM 
practices, the term “subscribers” was used for customers.  Thus concepts like cost 
savings and revenues from customers became important for TFL participants as 
asserted by a manager: “We made some savings through TQM practices and 
increased revenue through more efficient billing.”  Another interviewee claimed 
that “in the long-term we expect greater benefits from savings.”  The project 
improvements were symbolic of new ways of doing things at TFL.  A Quality 
Manager commented: 
 TQM is used, and at times we don‟t realize it is part of the culture… 
     (Interview with QM, 24 January, 2006). 
The above interview comments could be seen as evidence of routinisation: TQM 
practices became part of organizational activity and were taken-for-granted.  As 
TQM routines were enacted, they were reproduced by TFL members, who became 
disassociated from their historical origins of public service norms.  According to 
interviewees, TQM routines were “the way of doing things.”  While the 
consultants were involved in setting up new TQM routines in a short span of time, 
it was the management team members who were involved in setting up new TQM 
routines over time that would reproduce themselves and feed back to the 
institutional realm through reflexive monitoring.  The consultants introduced 
TQM routines during training at TFL and the management team implemented the 
TQM routines once the consultants left the organisation.  The TQM routines were 
reproduced through Quality Action Teams and the approval from the National 
Quality Council.  Examples of TQM routines that were reproduced through 
various Quality Action Teams are discussed in the ensuing paragraphs.   
 
The first example of reproduction of TQM routines is given by a manager in the 
Western division whose members faced many problems in restoring 
telecommunication services for customers around 1997.  The restoration was due 
to breakdowns, often after heavy rainfall.  Most telecommunication cables are laid 
underground and customers often face difficulties during rainy seasons as rain 
water interferes with the telephone cable, affecting telephone communication.  
The restoration may also be due to lack of preventive maintenance.  A Quality 
team, nominated by the Chief Executive Officer and other management, was 
formed.  It brainstormed to find reasons for delay in restoring services for 
customers.  At least 17 problems were listed in restoring services.  Out of the 
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many suggested problems, the team selected a vital few, and investigations were 
done to identify possible causes.  Data were collected for a month, a goal was set 
and solutions effected.  The Quality Action Team settled on five vital problems: 
delays in testing, statistics compilation, jumpering, passing of faults and delay in 
passing faults to the Network centre.  Of the five problems, the delay in testing a 
cable pair was the most problematic, because the department had only one 
subscriber line test device. 
 
Data collected indicated that out of a total 22 working days in the month, total 
tests were 131 a day-2,882 a month.  There were on average, 20 working hours of 
waiting for customers before services could be restored.  According to a manager, 
the company was spending on average F$612 every month on over-time to test 
and analyse faults.  It was decided that the best solution was to have another 
subscriber line test device to enhance the testing of cable pairs and numbers.  
According to an interviewee, once this was approved by the National Quality 
Council, it was implemented by the Quality Action Team.  After implementation, 
waiting time was reduced from 20 hours to 15; a 25 percent improvement.  An 
interviewee suggested that the subscriber test line costs approximately F$1,000.  
After the implementation, over-time was reduced from, on average, F$612 a 
month to an average of F$232 a month.  The implementation resulted in increased 
efficiency and supported a technical rationale explanation for the introduction of 
TQM.  A Quality Manager commented: 
The savings were huge and this was made from buying another subscriber 
test device.  The savings were made on a year by year basis. 
    (Interview with NMQ, 17 January 2006). 
This could also be seen as evidence of reproduction and routinisation within TFL 
as cost savings and thrift became a taken-for-granted activity and was enforced by 
the management team.  Hackman and Wageman (1995) highlight the cost savings 
that can be achieved by doing the work right the first time, as has been evidenced 
above with the cost savings from subscriber lines.   
 
One interviewee also spoke of a Quality Action Team which looked at delays in 
telephone application processing around 2000.  The team found that there were 
loopholes in the existing application processing.  There was some duplication of 
functions of the field people who had to carry out a physical survey before a 
phone was installed.  The team found that such a survey was unnecessary as 
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information was available on TFL‟s system (Integrated Customer Management 
System).  According to an interviewee, the Quality Action Team enabled the 
waiting time for telephones to be reduced from four to six weeks prior to 2000 to 
about seven days post 2000; as a result, customers were delighted.   
 
A member of the engineering staff also reported on a quality team which in 2001, 
looked at the issue of micro wave link between Viti Levu (the main island) and 
Vanua Levu fading due to atmospheric changes and the distance.  This problem 
was brainstormed by the team and ultimately resolved.  According to 
interviewees, the original path was South Ridge (Nadarivatu, which is the centre 
of Viti Levu) to Deleikoro.  This was changed to South Ridge-Ellington-
Nabouwalu-Deleikoro-Labasa, reducing the distance and remedying the fading 
issue.  The customers in Vanua Levu were generally delighted with this service, 
another example of efficiency emerging from employees TQM practices. 
 
An interviewee informed that the Customer Care Centre was established in 2002 
as a consequence of TQM practices.  According to the interviewee, customers 
from anywhere in Fiji who required information on TFL products and services, 
billing enquiries, lodging faults and complaints, and general information simply 
called on the centre‟s free call number 11 22 33 and were assisted by the centre 
staff.  It became a single point of contact for customers and calls were answered 
efficiently.  A Customer Service Manager outlined the situation prior to the 
establishment of the Customer Centre: 
There were problems faced by customer for a long time despite a 015 free 
call number.  For example, if a complaint was lodged, customers may also 
call up their relatives or friends in other sections for the problem to be 
fixed.  While complaints people deal with the problem, there were others 
who were also involved, causing resource overlaps. 
    (Interview with MCR, 24 January 2006). 
 
According to the interviewee, there was no standard way of answering queries or 
even telling customers when the fault would be repaired, for example.  A Quality 
Manager said that, through centralization, those answering the calls would deal 
with the customer issue immediately.  A Customer Service worker also mentioned 
that there were instances of rude and angry customers.  One caller rang to 
complain about his disconnected phone; the staff checked and found his account 
was unpaid due to a dispute.  The Customer Service worker commented: 
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Although we apologized and explained what the real problem was, he 
continued to abuse us over the phone, bringing TFL down and 
complaining about the customer service.  There was nothing to be done 
but just listen to him.  I did not feel like putting the phone down as it 
would mean a bad service for TFL.  When he finished I asked him politely 
whether he has finished and he said yes and hope you do something about 
it. 
     (Interview with CSO, 24 January 2006). 
The above interviews suggest that TFL members became more customer 
conscious; their aim was to reduce customer complaints through the setting up of 
Customer Care Centre. 
 
Another Quality Manager mentioned that there was a Quality Action Team on 
billing errors in 2003.  “We had billing errors in the past,” claimed the 
interviewee.  The call errors meant a loss of revenue for TFL.  This was so as, 
when a new phone was installed, customers may have used the phone without the 
TFL‟s system actually registering the phone.  That is, in the past there was a gap 
between connection and TFL‟s system.  This problem was tackled in a Quality 
Action Team and it was decided to have a system in place whereby the new phone 
connection is tested and registered in the system before the customer can have 
access to the phone.  According to an operations worker, this prevented a loss of 
revenue for TFL. 
 
Another example of Quality Action Team operation at TFL was billing services.  
According to one manager, as late as 2002 the billing function was seen by 
management as a major problem area for TFL.  The problem was evidenced by 
increasing customer complaints, adverse articles in the press, and the increasing 
volume of calls received by TFL‟s customer service division on billing.  The 
problem persisted even though TFL had TQM practices and a corporate vision 
which had stressed “service first and first in service” for several years.  A 
customer satisfaction survey conducted by consultants Forum Corporation of 
Australia confirmed poor performance in this area as well.  A Quality Action 
Team was formed to improve this service.  It was resolved to provide reminders to 
customers if the payment was late, and this was approved by the National Quality 
Council.  A Customer Service Manager remarked: 
The customer survey revealed that TFL employees were not reminding 
customers of due date and were just cutting them off. 
     (Interview with MCR, 17 January 2006). 
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With approval from the National Quality Council, it was decided to remind 
customers over the phone with a bill due announcement.  The results obtained 
through data collection by the Quality Action Team reveal that customers were 
appreciative; cut offs were reduced and bill payment by customers was improved.  
A Quality Manager also informed that around 2004, that is after two years of the 
bill due reminder, there was a great reduction in customer complaints, negative 
articles in the newspaper and the volume of calls for billing enquiries.  According 
to a Strategic Manager, a further customer satisfaction survey conducted by TFL 
management also showed improvement in services provided by them.   
 
TFL‟s Quality Manager reported on a Quality Action Team in the „operations and 
maintenance‟ area in 2005.  Using data collected from the system (integrated 
customer management system); the team identified the problem as different types 
of faults in the operations and maintenance area.  The problems identified were 
overhead line faults, cable breakdowns and exchange faults.  The cable faults 
were considered to be the main problem that inhibited TFL members from 
operating efficiently in the operations and maintenance area.  Data collected by 
the Quality Action Team illustrated that cable faults were contributed to by faults 
in cable joints.  The Quality Action Team decided on preventative maintenance on 
all underground joints, which were subsequently renewed.  Through the Quality 
Action Team, a team was set up to work on faults on a daily basis and, once the 
faults were discovered, it was necessary to renew joints.  According to the Quality 
Manager, through the above Quality Action Team, joint faults were reduced by 50 
percent in 12 month in 2005 and customers were generally delighted.  The next 
section examines the institutionalisation of TQM practices. 
 
9.5.0  Evidence on the Institutionalisation of TQM practices 
 
This section discusses the institutionalisation of TQM practices within TFL.  
During the reproduction process, TFL members went through TQM training and 
participated in Quality Action Teams, experiencing clear outcomes from TQM.  
These experiences assisted in institutionalising TQM practices.  Organisational 
members use their experiences to update their “reservoir of beliefs” (Weick, 1979, 
p.187) about TQM and integrate TQM with their ongoing everyday reality 
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(Zbaracki, 1998).  This section aims to show how TQM practices were 
institutionalised by TFL management and employees. 
 
The experiences TFL people had with TQM shaped new understanding and 
beliefs about TQM practices.  A Quality Manager commented: 
We got some excellent solutions from the Quality Action Team.  The areas 
we‟re happy about are the testing cable line team which reduced customers 
waiting time should the line become faulty.  The team achieved a really 
substantial cost savings.  And they were recognised at the Fiji Quality 
Award ceremony where they won prizes for best quality team in the 
country. 
     (Interview with QM, January 17, 2006). 
The above interview suggests technical reasons for the use of TQM practices: the 
practices were beneficial to the employees and improved their perception of being 
customer-oriented.  The interviewee perceived that there was improvement in 
efficiency through cost reduction and service provision as part of commercial 
business routines.  Savings were made “year on year” as result of quality projects.  
The savings could be mooted as evidence of some routinisation.  For the most 
part, the project improvement was small and delivered modest savings.  
Cumulatively, however, this may build up to substantial savings. 
 
An accountant commented: 
 
TQM practices were so much used at TFL that it became part of our work 
here. 
    (Interview with ACT2, 24 January 2006). 
Routinisation could also be viewed in terms of the conduct of meetings and the 
approach to problem solving.  A Quality Manager commented: 
TQM practices had an impact on how we approach issues…we never start 
a meeting without a brainstorm.  This did not happen before TQM 
practice. 
    (Interview with QM, January 17, 2006). 
According to Mueller and Carter (2005), changed conduct at meetings hardly 
constitutes a managerial revolution but it does constitute a routinised practice that 
no longer requires explicit legitimation.  Routinisation may continue for a long 
time, thus becoming recursive.  TQM practices became part of the “habit” set of 
management and employees and were reproduced and expected within TFL.  




At the institutionalisation stage, many organisation members at TFL had some 
TQM experience.  According to an interviewee, TQM practice has become part of 
the organisation and is so much used that it has become a routinised activity.  
According to Zbaracki (1998) TQM practices are expected to become part of the 
everyday habits of managers and employees.  However, there were some 
exceptions, as evidenced by an accountant who expressed some scepticism about 
the TQM process: 
Although TQM was meant to make us customer conscious, everyone 
agreed to it in the introduction phase.  On application time, approximately 
70% of workers were customer conscious.  One of the problems is 
customer billing which customers complain about over the phone: there 
are some employees who don‟t give a hack to it, while others will try to 
attend to the complaint. 
    (Interview with ACT3, January 17, 2006). 
TQM practices seem to have not become routine for some employees, possibly 
owing to the monopolistic and uncompetitive nature of Fiji‟s telecom market.  
Similarly, a survey carried out by consultants Forum Corporation of Australia 
(2001) on TFL customers noted that there were gaps in the areas of service faults 
and repairs carried out by TFL employees.  The report further argued that the 
responsiveness in customer service was not up to the level of customers‟ 
expectations and some customer requests were handled inefficiently.  Customers 
were expecting personal and effective service from all TFL employees and not 
just from customer care staff.  The report noted that there were some very satisfied 
customers, but some customers were dissatisfied with TFL‟s services. 
 
There are two means of looking at the TQM practices during the 
institutionalisation stage (Zbaracki, 1998).  One is the outcome emerging from the 
TQM teams.  These outcomes shape the perceptions of TQM participants.  For 
example, if outcomes from TQM teams are to be successful, then the team, 
through brainstorming, identifies a solution to the problem or an improvement 
which makes some valuable contribution to TFL.  According to a Quality 
Manager, many of the employees taking part in TQM were pleased with the 
contributions they made. 
 
Conversely, if the recommended TQM process changes fail, team members may 
lose confidence in the TQM process.  Based on an informant‟s description, it 
appeared that TQM practices had been routinised at TFL, as can be seen from the 
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previous section where QATs brought in efficiency gains for TFL.  Of the success 
stories told, some had achieved some sort of notable outcome.  On the other hand, 
some TQM practice outcomes were insignificant; for example, interviewees 
mentioned customer satisfaction emerging from electronic queuing which 
appeared to emanate from technology rather than from TQM practice.  The 
advances in technology were presented to the researcher as if they were TQM 
practice success stories.  Itemised billing, for example, has emerged from 
technology rather than from TQM changes. 
 
For institutionalisation of TQM practices, there are also the tools that the team 
members use and discuss.  The TQM tools include brainstorming and 11 steps to 
the TQM problem solving process used by the various Quality Action Teams.  
Some examples of TQM problem solving and brainstorming, as discussed 
previously, were in the areas of restoring telecommunication services due to some 
faults in cable pairs, billing services, overcoming faults in the operations and 
maintenance area, telephone application processing, and establishing a Customer 
Care Unit.  Once the problem has been resolved, it is then passed to the National 
Quality Council which endorses the recommendations; these are then 
implemented and evaluated on a monthly basis by the Quality Action Team and 
reported to the National Quality Council.  The improved work processes emerging 
from TQM practices become routines and are subsequently institutionalised by 
Quality Action Teams and TFL members.  Zbaracki (1998) asks whether such 
tools mainly parrot the language of the TQM problem solving process, or whether 
the tools manifest a new social reality (for example, 11 steps to TQM problem 
solving) (Zbaracki, 1998).  TQM practices may provide employees with improved 
performance ability (Hackman & Wageman, 1995).  The use of such tools by TFL 
employees demonstrates the operation and depth of TQM routinisation within 
TFL.  An operations staff member commented on TQM practice as:  
I have seen so many changes over the past years and I have noticed a 
definite improvement in the working environment.  When I first started 
with the company there was no real interaction between the staff and 
„bosses.‟  Before, if a Chief Engineer or Permanent Secretary came on 
inspection visit to the division we never got to meet them.  Now the 
Managing Director even talks to the cleaner.  Total Quality Management 
principles are followed. 
     (Interview with OS, 11 January, 2006). 
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According to the above interviewee, TQM practices improved the flow of 
communication and were instrumental in employee empowerment.  The 
interviewee noted an improvement in work environment through an increased 
interaction between the management and employees.  Before TQM practices were 
implemented, there was little interaction between employees at different levels 
and the cultural pattern of society was reproduced: there were large power 
distance between the management and the subordinates.  A Human Resource 
Manager commented: 
There is now more interaction between managers and the workers.  The 
organisation chart has been flattened and this means a better 
communication between superiors and the workers at the ground level. 
    (Interview with MHR 19 January, 2006). 
TQM practices were instrumental in reducing the power distances between 
management and employees.  Interviewees at TFL reported greater use of the 
more technical tools of TQM practice to the extent that it became institutionalised 
within TFL.  When asked for copies of TQM literature, the managers were able to 
supply some literature.  The interviewees confirmed that technical elements of 
TQM practice have been infused within TFL.  Interview evidence suggests that 
TQM practice tools are part of the everyday reality of TQM for the organisation‟s 
members and that the most commonly used tool was brainstorming.  The purpose 
of brainstorming is to tap the creativity of group members by encouraging them to 
contribute to the building of a list of ideas.  An accountant commented on 
brainstorming: 
  We don‟t start a meeting without having a brainstorm; everyone gets an  
 opportunity to speak. 
     (Interview with ACT4, 17 January 2006). 
These meetings constituted a routinised practice and became a taken-for-granted 
part of organisational life.  Hackman and Wageman (1995) also identify 
brainstorming as one of the techniques most commonly used by quality teams to 
improve quality.  Brainstorming is used by teams to generate a list of ideas about 
such matters as potential causes of a problem, possible solutions, and issues likely 
to be encountered in implementing those solutions (Hackman & Wageman, 1995).   
 
As an impetus to institutionalise TQM practice, key performance indicators 
(KPIs) were developed around 1998 which embody customer satisfaction 
indicators for TFL members.  Such measures as customer satisfaction fuelled the 
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institutionalisation of TQM practices.  Managers use MACS practices such as 
performance indicators to track the performance of employees against targets.   
 
As a movement towards performance management system (PMS) exercise, TFL 
management established in-house and external training programmes for all its 
employees which included commercial awareness courses.  The following 
interview quotes illustrate this: 
We develop our staff.  We send them for training and further studies at the 
University of the South Pacific, the Fiji Institute of Technology and the 
Training and Productivity Authority of Fiji. 
    (Interview with SPM, January 17, 2006) 
We gave our people a lot of in-house training including customer service 
training which is conducted by external consultants.  This makes 
employees more sort of responsible in the manner they deal with 
customers.  We also depend a lot on information systems that provide 
reports so that we can give quick answers to our customers. 
     (Interview with QM, January 24, 2006) 
Through the PMS practices, individual performance is evaluated, based on routine 
tasks and current year work plans which are derived from the company‟s broader 
action plan and the operational KPIs, which are used for staff evaluation (see 
Appendix 8).  A Strategic Manager commented: 
The performance targets we have at workplace are: customer satisfaction, 
training skills, knowledge/ attitude, professional development and 
motivation.  We recognise effort.  There is a positive attitude toward 
subordinates. 
     (Interview with SPM, January 17, 2006) 
The individual workers are assessed by their superiors on a quarterly basis and are 
allocated marks out of 100 on KPI achievement.  A manager at a regional office in 
Nadi commented: 
PMS practice is measured on individual accountability.  Individual 
workers are allocated marks out of 100 by their respective supervisors.  
Some of the key performance measures at the regional centres are: 
punctuality, maintaining error free work and disputes in terms of customer 
complaints. 
    (Interview with RMN, January 11, 2006). 
. 
An interviewee stated that amongst some of the common accountability areas in 
which people are evaluated are profitability and staff development.  The staff 
development encompasses expected versus actual performance in terms of 
training undertaken.  As for customer perspective, the key accountability factor is 




 80% of customer line repairs to be done in 24 hours after receiving 
a complaint; 
 95% of customer line repairs are to be done in two working days 
after receiving a complaint; 
 100% of residential customers‟ line repairs are to be done in five 
working days after the receipt of a complaint. 
For corporate customers, 80% of the line repairs were to be done within two hours 
of receiving complaints.  According to an engineer, once a complaint (fault in 
line) is received, it was logged in the computerised Integrated Customer 
Management System and had to be cleared within a specified time limit.  TFL 
managers and employees are result-oriented.  The use of new PMS practices 
allows employees to be rewarded for bonuses if they exceed 70% in their 
quarterly PMS report.  A Human Resource Manager commented: 
There are a number of rewards in the company.  If one performs one gets a 
bonus.  If the company performs better than budgeted amounts, you get 
extras, and also on top of that is the Cost of Living Adjustment rewards. 
     (Interview with MHR, January 19, 2005). 
Another Strategic Manager stated: 
On every quarter, assessment is done. Every individual‟s assessment is 
done.  Percentage rating is done which measures the amounts of bonuses.  
If one doesn‟t meet target in the first quarter, one can catch up in the 
second quarter. 
     (Interview with SPM, February 2, 2005) 
 
A Quality Manager commented: 
The KPIs are within the reach of employees and encompass both financial  
and non-financial indicators and are a fair system. 
     (Interview with NMR, February 8, 2004). 
There is the view that non-financial performance measures of employees are 
better indicators of management effort (Ittner & Larcker, 1995, 1997; Banker, 
Potter & Srinivasan, 2000).  Non-financial measures need to supplement financial 
measures to provide support for TQM practices (Hoque, 2003).  The non-financial 
performance measures can provide feedback to decision makers on the outcomes 
of their efforts (Chenhall, 1997).  The feedback from PMS provides information 
to enhance managers and employees to achieve performance goals. 
 
Through the PMS of TFL participants, TQM practices became routinised within 
TFL.  Employees were rewarded with bonuses on achievement of 70% and above 
on their quarterly PMS assessment.  This bonus reward would be equivalent to a 
fortnight‟s pay for an employee.  The TQM and PMS practice regimes create and 
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demand systems of surveillance and trigger discipline amongst TFL employees.  
The employees perform to achieve desired outcomes and receive a bonus, which 
is a motivational instrument.  According to an interviewee, PMS practice is used 
as a form of “discipline”, a way of making TFL workers more efficient, focused 
and compliant.  That is, they are institutionalised as part of shared norms of 
“discipline” and result-oriented.  Interviewees claim that, through PMS 
techniques, workers are disciplined to adapt TQM routines to achieve expected 
results in their quarterly PMS report.  An interviewee claimed that self-interest by 
participants in the form of bonus payments motivates them to adapt to TQM 
routines.  PMS practices were instrumental in shaping TQM routines to be 
institutionalised within TFL.  The next section brings the narrative together by 
discussing and summarising the findings. 
 
9.6.0  Discussion/ Summary 
 
The enactment and reproduction of TQM practices by TFL members illustrate 
TQM routinisation.  The introduction of TQM routines within the organization is 
part of a process which were used to enact and add authority to broader MACS 
changes within TFL.  The institutional theory framework describes the process 
through which TQM routines are implemented at TFL and the organizational 
members‟ use of TQM routines.  According to interviewees, TQM practices were 
introduced at TFL in order to do things differently: to be customer conscious.  
Tolbert and Zucker (1983) point out that managers and employees may adopt an 
innovation in the belief that innovation improves internal processes in line with 
technical-rational arguments.  TQM routines were introduced by consultants and 
managers and promoted by consultants globally exhibiting mimetic isomorphism.  
Granlund and Lukka (1998) point out that consultants promote “same standard 
solutions” globally (p.167).  Consultants were instrumental in bringing the global 
institution of TQM practices into TFL, after the Managing director asked them to 
provide training to TFL employees on TQM practice.  Granlund and Lukka 
(1998) note that consultants mediate the pressure of global change into their client 
companies by promoting the same idea as a response to global pressures.  Irvine 
(2007) notes that consultants‟ services can be considered as normative 
institutional pressure.  Consultants are change agents and valued not only for the 
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knowledge and technical advice they provide, but also for the legitimacy they 
bestow (Irvine, 2007). 
 
Interview comments suggest that TQM practices are seen as part of a process of 
deinstitutionalizing public sector templates and institutionalizing private sector 
templates, which is continually evolving.  Johnson et al. (2000) emphasise that 
actors will not necessarily align themselves with the new institutional templates; 
rather, they carry forward routines from the public sector and differentially adopt 
TQM practices at different paces.  TQM practices gain institutional value over 
time as they become the accepted way of doing things (Zbaracki, 1998; Hoque & 
Alam, 1999; Mueller & Carter, 2005).  TQM routines were reproduced at TFL 
through Quality Action Teams and approval from the National Quality Council.  
TQM practices became part of the “habit” of management and employees and 
were enacted and reproduced; for example, the Quality Action Team meetings 
became a routinised activity.  The processes and associated practices of the 
Quality Action Team meetings became taken for granted at TFL. 
 
Institutional contradictions play an instrumental role in the change process as 
depicted in the model presented in Chapter 3, Figure 2, section 3.6.0.  There was a 
concern amongst management about a lack of operational efficiency within TFL.  
This contradiction of lack of efficiency versus demand for efficiency by 
management was reproduced by organizational participants. Despite privatization, 
TFL management and employees remained the monopoly supplier of telephone 
services to Fiji citizens.   
 
Institutional entrepreneurs and external change agents played an instrumental role 
in effecting changes in TQM routines stemming from institutional 
contradictions/inconsistencies.  The Managing Director, the management team, 
Quality Action Teams and the National Quality Council were the institutional 
entrepreneurs at TFL that were involved in the introduction of TQM practices.  
The institutional entrepreneurs of management team introduced a Quality Manual 
on TQM which outlined TQM practices within TFL; this formed part of the “rule” 




Thus, at the organizational level, the problem of “embedded agency” can be 
overcome by institutional entrepreneurs as they are able to envision alternative 
institutional arrangements and are able to develop them.  The institutional 
contradictions/inconsistencies within the existing “rules” and “routines” can shape 
embedded agents to act as institutional entrepreneurs (Seo & Creed, 2002). 
 
At TFL, the managers, consultants, Quality Action Teams and National Quality 
Council extolled TQM practice as a “new way of working.”  The exhortation from 
management was to strip away the civil service and engineering routines that had 
been firmly protected under the public sector regime.  The stripping away of these 
routines reflected management confidence that new ways needed to be adopted 
and that the existing mode of operating without thought for customers was 
without prospects. 
 
With the assistance of consultants, TFL management infused the technical base of 
TQM practices with institutional value.  Tolbert and Zucker (1983) argue that 
once management practices are well established, they may be more for societal 
legitimacy and may constitute a “myth and ceremony.”  There is a possibility that 
TQM practices may not bring efficiency gains for organizations.  Institutional 
theorists claim that as TQM practices spread from organization to organization, 
they garner legitimacy and also technical value.  The specific problem solving by 
Quality Action Teams at TFL exhibits legitimacy as well as technical value.   
 
However, TFL management and employees still have some unsatisfied customers 
and very low service penetration rates in rural areas.  Zbaracki (1998) claims that 
if the ultimate success of TQM practices follows some random choice- say one in 
six - then the managers often use the success stories and ignore failures to sustain 
for themselves and others a myth of TQM practices‟ influence on organizations.  
As managers experience success with TQM practices, they seek outlets for those 
claims, generating the need for a structure that supports their claims of success 
and expertise.  For this reason, the National Quality Council and Quality Action 
Teams were formed at TFL by the management team.  TQM practices became 
part of TFL‟s everyday routine.  Institutional arguments have suggested a 
ceremonial adoption of TQM practices for legitimacy purposes.  The use of a 
performance management system further reinforced the routinisation of TQM 
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practices at TFL.  TQM practice is related to MACS in that incentive pay, for 
example, can have an impact on TQM practices on customer and quality 
performance (Sim & Killough, 1998).  The evidence suggests that the institutional 
value of TQM practice at TFL remains firmly rooted in offering technical 
efficiency benefits.   
 
Following the discussion of the routinisation of TQM practices within TFL, the 
next chapter discusses the findings of the results and outlines the expected 
contribution the study makes to the literature.  The chapter concludes the thesis 
and identifies limitations and potential future research studies on management 







































The thesis aims to contribute to research in a developing country, that of Fiji.  It 
seeks to gain a theoretical understanding of how MACS reflect the social and 
political contexts in which they operate by using a case study of TFL.  The thesis 
draws on institutional theory while raising questions as to how to refine and 
extend institutional theory which has often been associated with institutional 
embeddedness (stability).  The social constructionist approach helps to 
incorporate agency and cultural issues normally missing in conventional 
applications of institutional theory to accounting change. 
 
This chapter discusses the findings of the research and outlines the contribution 
this thesis makes to the literature.  The chapter concludes the thesis and identifies 
limitations and potential future research studies on MACS changes.  The research 
stemmed from an interest in MACS changes in developing countries, especially 
Fiji.  The thesis raises a question that if institutions are defined by their stability, 
how is it possible to explain changes in MACS rules and routines?  The paradox 
of “embedded agency” may be resolved by institutional entrepreneurs who are the 
internal change agents in organizations.  Institutional contradictions are driving 
forces for institutional change (Seo & Creed, 2002).  The next section discusses 
reflections on the research process. 
 
10.2.0  Reflections on the research process 
 
From the research process, I learned to do interpretive research whereby the 
researcher interacts with the researched and attempts to capture their subjective 
understanding of their reality.  The interpretive research was a somewhat 
challenging task personally.  I had been brought up in an environment where 
accounting was treated as part of an objective reality.  There was an assumption 
that there was an objective world separate from the researcher whose job was to 
record or capture that reality.  It was on such understanding that interpretations of 




It was, nevertheless, not an easy endeavour to accomplish interviewees‟ subjective 
understanding of reality.  The interviewees spoke about past events that had 
occurred some years ago.  Possibly they talked of them differently during the 
interviews than they may have done at the time of MACS implementation.  The 
interviewees had time to rationalise and make sense of MACS changes after 
MACS had become embedded. 
 
Through interpretive research, I was able to construct a subjective reality by 
interpreting interviewees‟ interpretations.  Sometimes interviewees had different 
ways of seeing reality as they were in a particular position and had a particular 
view.  For example, management spoke of MACS changes with optimism while 
interviewees, particularly the trade union representatives, were sceptical of the 
changes.  I had to step out of the agents‟ frame of reference and take a critical 
view of agents‟ definitions of the situation.  The agents‟ subjective interpretation 
was transcended. 
 
As actions were intrinsically endowed with subjective meaning by the 
interviewees, they were understood with reference to their meaning.  The 
interviewees gave their interpretation of events and I had to put such 
interpretations into a context.  Meanings are built on other meanings and social 
practices.  The institutional theoretical construct was used to explain action and to 
understand how MACS is produced and reproduced by agents. 
 
Some difficulties were experienced with access to the case organisation.  At 
headquarters, TFL had some security checks in place.  At the initial phase of 
interview in 2002, I faced some anxiety as a Fiji Military Forces soldier with a 
gun was present with the security guard at TFL.  Interviewees mentioned that this 
was a security measure to prevent supporters of the 2000 coups from sabotaging 
TFL cables within the building.  However, the soldier was removed from 2003 
onwards when the political situation stabilised in Fiji.   
 
Interactions with interviewees were informal and often coffee was served at the 
meetings.  The interviewees often requested their names not to be revealed in the 
research process and confidentiality was assured to them.  Sometimes 
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interviewees paused and requested tapes to be switched off during discussion of 
sensitive political and cultural issues and sought reassurance that their names 
would not be revealed.  Some interviewees, when contacted for interviews 
claimed that they were busy meeting work deadlines and it was necessary to wait 
for up to a week before they could be interviewed.  Nevertheless, despite the 
difficulties, the interactions were typically enjoyable and will be missed as I 
managed to build close acquaintance with staff through the research process over 
time. 
 
For someone starting a new research project, my advice is that a great deal of 
patience and perseverance is needed for the research project to continue and for its 
eventual completion.  There is tension involved in the data gathering process: 
people may not always be cooperative as they may be occupied with their busy 
schedules.  There may also be problems in telling a coherent story within the 
theoretical basis developed.  It may involve much time and energy.   
 
It may be a good idea to present some working papers from the thesis at academic 
conferences where some useful feedback can be obtained.  Personally, this was 
rewarding to me after my working papers were presented at international 
conferences such as the Asian Academic Accounting Association, the Auckland 
Regional Accounting Conference, the Accounting and Finance Association of 
Australia and New Zealand Conference, the Fifth Asia Pacific Interdisciplinary 
Research in Accounting Conference and the Global Accounting and 
Organisational Change Conference.  There is much learning, sharing of ideas and 
networking offered at such fora.  The next section briefly discusses the research 
findings. 
 
10.3.0  Research Findings 
 
There was incremental change to commercial MACS rules and routines as a 
consequence of the Fiji government‟s policy on public sector reforms which was 
incompatible with FPTL‟s actors‟ public service way of doing things.  For FPTL 
actors, there was a dramatic change in institutional arrangements.  FPTL actors 
were extolled to run FPTL as a “successful business,” selling their product and 
services at a profit.  A Board of Directors and Chief Executive were appointed to 
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effect change.  Preferences in such appointments were for people who had been 
successful in the private sector in order to inject a new type of MACS to TFL.  
One example of MACS change was subjecting on most projects to EVA and NPV 
analysis.  It was intended that TFL management and employees would be more 
accountable for their use of resources and money.  Management accountants were 
appointed in each division and were responsible directly to the accountable 
Strategic Business Unit manager.  As accountants and the accounting function 
became a day-to-day part of organizational practices, commercial business 
routines were put in place and became accepted.  The Strategic Business Unit 
managers used their management accountants and demanded information for their 
managerial duties.  One example was the subjecting of most projects to DCF and 
EVA analysis. 
 
The tensions between the contrasting ethos of public service and commercial 
business routines were evident at FPTL.  A new interpretive scheme with a 
different language had been introduced.  The aim was to replace the public service 
with the goal of maximizing shareholder value.  There was a clash between the 
two institutions and people were mobilized to effect or resist the new language of 
accounting and economics taking over from what used to be seen as technical 
issues and expressed in engineering terms. 
 
The Fijian interim government, on the advice of donor agencies, was instrumental 
in creating a situation of conflict.  New business routines were introduced that 
challenged the existing public service ethos.  In FPTL‟s case, the assimilation of 
new MACS routines was slow.  The change was resisted, resulting in industrial 
disputes and in the sabotage of cables.  Management responded with the 
introduction of a widespread education process to explain the changes.  In 
addition, with the appointment of a new Board that was more sympathetic to 
employees needs‟, the MACS change proceeded.  Employees were reassured that 
no redundancies would be made.   
 
The Fijian government reformed its public sector amidst the political chaos that 
Fiji faced.  Fiji‟s continuing political tensions are multilayered.  Apart from the 
much explained inter-ethnic conflict between the Fijians and Indo-Fijians that 
emerged as part of Fiji‟s colonial legacy, there are other struggles such as tribal 
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rivalry among Fijians (Lawson, 1990; Durutalo, 2005).  In the early stages of 
corporatisation, there was some uncertainty.  Political and cultural issues specific 
to Fiji were pivotal in explaining the resistance to new MACS that occured.  
Communitarian values and tribal obligations in the form of personal relationships 
at the top management level triggered resistance and it was years before the Fiji 
government could stabilize the company through the appointment of a new Board 
which introduced new business MACS routines.   
 
The accounting system changed from a cash basis to accrual accounting.  TFL 
management acted to legitimize business operations but met with some resistance 
in the early stages of corporatisation.  A failure to adjust to this new environment 
is evidence of institutional contradiction/inconsistency of lack of adaptability (Seo 
& Creed, 2002).  Powell (1991) argues that efforts to change actors‟ shared 
expectations are often resisted as “they threaten individuals‟ sense of security and 
disrupt routines” (p.194).  Informal Quality Action teams encouraged 
participation amongst employees.  Following this reflection on the reforms, the 
next section outlines the process of institutionalization of MACS rules and 
routines. 
 
10.3.1  The Process of Institutionalisation 
 
The initial stages of corporatization of FPTL marked a period of uncertainty 
which triggered tensions and workers resisted the adoption of commercial 
business routines.  The model of institutional contradiction, institutional 
entrepreneurs and the process of institutionalization described in Chapter 3, 
section 3.6.0, (see also Figure 2), shows how managers may be able, in time, to 
reduce uncertainty created by the destruction of old institutions by creating a 
sense of stability through the process of enacting and reproducing new practices. 
 
After the difficulties of 1991/1992, the top-level management and the accountants 
began a process of education and training which involved the introduction of new 
techniques based on Total Quality Management (TQM) principles in 1996 and on 
new accounting techniques.  The introduction of TQM routines within the 
organization is part of a process which were used to enact and add authority to 
broader MACS changes within TFL.  The top-level management team consisted 
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of the CEOs, five general managers and ten managers of the company.  The top-
level managers through providing training and their social skills were gradually 
able to gain the cooperation of other actors to accomplish commercial business 
routines.  Staff were involved in the change process and the advantages of new 
stabilized procedures were slowly incorporated into daily routines.  Jacobs (1998) 
observes that systems of accounting and accountability introduced to anchor a 
reform process will encounter minimal resistance if the whole process is well 
communicated to organizational participants.   
 
The introduction of new techniques such as strategic planning, EVA, NPV and 
ROI were aimed at changing the traditional culture of a public service ethos.  
There were to be new rules and routines of behavior.  Activities were to be 
accounted by TFL members in economic and commercial terms.  The accounting 
change shaped people‟s perception of running TFL as a successful business.  Over 
time, commercial accounting practices were followed and, with further 
restructuring, a great deal was demanded from the subsidiary (TFL) by the parent 
company, ATH, in terms of reporting subsidiaries‟ results.  Granlund and Lukka 
(1998) argue that it is common for the headquarters members to force its 
subsidiaries to adopt reporting systems similar to those used in the 
headquarters/parent company.  The accountants‟ role became central to TFL‟s 
operations.  The management team and the Finance Strategic Business Unit team 
were instrumental in enacting and routinising new MACS techniques at TFL.   
 
As for the TQM practices, as part of MACS, during the reproduction process TFL 
members underwent TQM training and experienced clear outcomes from TQM.  
These experiences assisted in institutionalizing TQM practices.  Organisational 
members use their experiences to update their “reservoir of beliefs” (Weick, 1979, 
p.187) about TQM.  Consultants were instrumental in bringing about the global 
institution of TQM practices at TFL.  Granlund and Lukka (1998) note that 
consultants mediate the pressure of global change into their client companies by 
promoting the same idea, such as quality management as a response to the global 
pressures.  Irvine (2007) notes that consultant services can be considered as 
normative institutional pressure.  Consultants are change agents and valued not 
only for the knowledge and technical advice they provide, but for the legitimacy 




At the institutionalization stage, many organization members at TFL had some 
TQM experience.  According to an interviewee, TQM practice became part of the 
organization and was used so much that it became a routinised activity.  
According to Zbaracki (1998), TQM practices are expected by organizational 
agents to become part of the everyday habit of managers and employees.  
Interview evidence suggests that TQM practices are part of the process of 
deinstitutionalizing public sector templates and institutionalizing private sector 
templates, a process that is continually evolving.  Johnson et al. (2000) emphasise 
that actors will not necessarily align themselves with the new institutional 
templates; rather, they carry forward routines from the public sector and 
differentially adopt TQM practices at varying paces.  TQM practices gain 
institutional value over time as they become the accepted way of doing things 
(Zbaracki, 1998; Hoque & Alam, 1999; Mueller & Carter, 2005).  TQM routines 
were reproduced at TFL through Quality Action Teams and with approval from 
National Quality Council.  TQM practices became part of the “habit” of 
management and employees which were enacted and reproduced, for example, the 
Quality Action Team meetings became a routinised activity, their processes and 
associated practices becoming taken-for-granted at TFL.  A Quality Manual 
which outlined TQM practices was introduced by the management team; this 
formed part of the “rule” within TFL and was made available to employees of 
TFL.  Performance measures in form of customer satisfaction and on-time 
delivery services reinforced TQM practice institutionalization at TFL.  The TQM 
practice institutionalization also shaped new accounting procedures such as EVA, 
payback period, NPV which helped managers in decision making.  The 
performance management system further shaped TFL actors behaviour in line 
with new commercialized MACS rules and routines.  After this discussion of the 
institutionalization process, the next section concludes the thesis. 
10.4.0   Conclusion 
 
The thesis makes an attempt to contribute to research on MACS in a developing 
country context- Fiji.  Cultural and political forces are relevant to accounting in a 
developing country.  The case study is on a Fijian Telecom company which was 
initially a government department and was subsequently corporatized and 




The research argues that a study of institutionalism via isomorphism has 
limitations in the range of its explanatory potential: the emphasis of traditional 
institutional theory is on stability rather than change.  There was an over-reliance 
on isomorphism by earlier institutional writers which appeared to ignore agents 
and their interests (Burns & Scapens, 2000; Lounsbury, 2008).  The traditional 
institutional theory has been criticised for taking a macro focus approach and 
being insensitive to the role of organisational actors, and their power and interests 
(Carruthers, 1995).   
 
Burns and Scapens‟ (2000) model has been used in the thesis to introduce human 
agency into institutional theory.  The theory proposed by Burns and Scapens 
(2000) was, however, not so clear about when and how the agents may change the 
MACS rules and routines.  Thus, to better explain MACS changes, Burns and 
Scapens‟ (2000) model needed further refinement.  Beckert‟s (1999), Seo and 
Creed‟s (2002) and Dorado‟s (2005) theorisation is used to refine institutional 
theory.  There is a problem of “embedded agency” (Seo & Creed, 2002).  If 
institutions are defined by their stability, how is it possible to explain change in 
MACS rules and routines?   
 
The paradox of “embedded agency” is overcome by institutional entrepreneurs 
who are the change agents in organisations.  Institutional contradictions are 
driving forces for institutional change (Seo & Creed, 2002).  The institutional 
contradictions may provide an opportunity for the institutional entrepreneurs to 
disrupt the existing MACS rules and routines within an institutional arrangement 
and to create new institutions.  The institutional theory utilised in the thesis has 
been considered to be a useful tool for achieving a richer understanding of the 
phenomena being studied.   
 
MACS are located in the everyday, common-sense language of the participants.  
The aim was to study MACS through the TFL agents‟ definition of the situation.  
The focus was on exploring how MACS change was created and on how the TFL 
members constructed common understandings of MACS changes.  These 
common understandings became the structure which is produced and reproduced 
by individuals in their daily interactions.  TFL agents became socialised into 
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behaving in particular ways and conducted their day-to-day activities within the 
socially constructed MACS rules and routines.  These MACS rules and routines 
became institutionalised, taken-for-granted and used to typify experiences of 
actors. 
 
Seo and Creed‟s (2002) theorisation of institutional change was followed.  
Institutional theory as a theory of isomorphism was revised as institutionalists 
have shifted towards the study of MACS change (Burns & Baldvinsdottir, 2005; 
Burns & Neilson, 2006; Lounsbury, 2008).  In the thesis, the new MACS rules 
and routines were subsequently stabilised by management after the work of 
institutional entrepreneurs, thus giving rise to new institutions on an ongoing 
basis.  Through the ongoing conflicts/ struggle in social interactions, institutional 
entrepreneurs are prompted to disrupt the existing MACS rules and routines and 
to create new ones.  As such, new directions in institutional research have been 
highlighted by the case study. 
 
The thesis elaborates on the importance of human agency in institutional theory 
which has traditionally been a theory of isomorphism.  At the same time, the 
portrayal of political and cultural influences specific to Fiji is outside the 
isomorphic tendencies of institutional theory.  Burns and Scapens‟ (2000) model 
is insightful in conceptualising agency within institutional theory.  However, what 
is lacking in Burns and Scapens‟ (2000) model is the sources of change; are they 
from endogenous or exogenous forces?  Burns and Scapens‟ (2000) 
conceptualisation of sources of change is somewhat silent in their theorisation.  
Beckert‟s (1999), Seo and Creed‟s (2002) and Dorado‟s (2005) notion of 
institutional contradiction and institutional entrepreneurs is followed to refine 
institutional theory and to extend literature on institutional entrepreneurs and 
institutional theory in management accounting. 
 
The study reveals that the external jolts stemming from external aid agencies and 
the state were major influences in creating changes to the management control 
system.  As in Alam‟s (1997) study, this research reveals that culturally specific 
influences in a developing country are different from those that prevail in Western 
countries.  For example, Busco et al‟s., (2006) Italian research examined how 
Nuovo Pignone (NP) was taken over by US multinational, General Electric (GE), 
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and managed in the “GE way.”  There was little resistance to change; people were 
anxious at NP but looked forward to coping with change.  Soin et al‟s., (2002) UK 
study on implementation of ABC in a bank identified tension between the need to 
establish ABC as an organisational routine with the less routinised but 
evolutionary aspirations of ABM that identified new links between costs and 
products.  Burns and Baldvinsdottir‟s (2005) UK study showed the changing role 
of accountants in a pharmaceutical company.  The previous role of research and 
marketing was questioned and new commercial business routines were crafted by 
accountants.  The accountants began to play a multifaceted role within the 
organisation and the changes in commercial business routines were gradually 
accepted by organisational agents without much resistance.   
 
In the literature dealing with MACS change, this has mostly been portrayed as 
occurring with little resistance and has ignored cultural and political influences 
(e.g., Abernethy & Chua, 1996; Soin et al., 2002; Busco et al., 2006).  However, 
MACS changes at TFL took some three to four years to be institutionalised 
because of cultural and political factors specific to Fiji.  The thesis adds to the 
developing country literature by showing that resistance to MACS change could 
be attributed to Fiji‟s specific cultural and political context. 
 
Previous research on MACS change has been undertaken at either an 
organisational field level or at an organisational level (Dillard, Rigsby & 
Goodman, 2004).  This research uses institutional theory and attempts to integrate 
changes at both levels.  The thesis depicts the central role of agents in MACS 
changes, which appeared to be a neglected area as identified by Granlund (2001).  
Scott and Bruce (1994) also elaborate on the importance of agents, noting that 
innovations cannot be understood without attention to the personal and 
environmental influences.  Burns and Scapens (2000), Burns (2000), Soin et al. 
(2002) and Scapens (2006) have posited that scholars have paid little attention to 
the micro process of institutionalisation.  This thesis investigated the micro 
process of institutionalism within TFL.  In doing so, the thesis examined the 
institutional contradictions that were in play at TFL and how institutional 




The thesis extended the institutional theory literature in management accounting 
literature using the notion of institutional contradictions and institutional 
entrepreneurs to demonstrate how embedded actors can become institutional 
entrepreneurs and shape MACS changes in organisational setting.  The study has 
practice implications as it shows that management accountants can act as 
institutional entrepreneurs in organsations, shaping new accounting technologies 
in reformed entities, and changing actors‟ interpretive schemes.  The study has 
implications for policy makers, consultants and other stakeholders in terms of 
promoting a need for better understanding the sensitivity of cultural and political 
circumstances in LDC‟s such as Fiji in relation to the introduction of MACS 
changes.  The study has implications for other recently corporatized/ privatised 
and state-sector organisations in Fiji and elsewhere.  It has implications for other 
researchers as institutional theory can be refined on the basis of new empirical 
evidence. 
 
All case studies represent interpretations by the researcher as to the nature of 
social reality (Humphrey & Scapens, 1996).  Case study research has limitations 
in regard to the generalisation of its results.  However, generalisation with respect 
to a theoretical framework is possible. The generalisation to theory has been 
made, reflecting on institutional theory. 
 
Future research could be aimed at making a comparative study of MACS changes 
in public sector organisations in developing countries.  The object of such 
multiple case studies would be to support theories capable of interpreting the 
various observations which have been made (Humphrey & Scapens, 1996).  
Future research adopting a multiple site study may provide more findings in 
MACS changes in organisations.  This would add to the current literature on 
MACS.  Future research could be undertaken to compare the findings in this study 
with findings that relate to (1) international telecommunications institutions 
abroad, (2) privately or publicly traded manufacturing firms, and (3) firms in other 
countries (e.g., Hoque & Alam, 1999).  Such an endeavour may improve 
understanding of ongoing conflicts/ struggle in the social interaction of agents and 
of how institutional entrepreneurs and external change agents bring about MACS 





There is a need for more studies on MACS changes in less developed countries as 
the context of less developed countries is different from western industrialised 
countries.  Researchers need to address issues of culture and politics and how 
accounting is intertwined with these influences (see Alawattage et al., 2007).  It 
may also be necessary to complement institutional theory with theories of power 
(Burns, 2000; Collier, 2001; Tsamenyi et al., 2006) or actor network theory (see 
Lounsbury, 2008) in future research on MACS changes.  These complementary 
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Appendix 2:   Interview Questions 
 
Questionnaire prepared as a guide for discussion with managers of Telecom 
Fiji Limited on background of Telecom Fiji Limited. 
 
1. Why was Telecom Fiji Limited formed? 
2.  Who controls the running of Telecom Fiji Limited?  Can you provide an 
organisation chart? 
3.  What are its mission and vision statement? 
4. What are some of the changes that have come about in the organisation since its 
inception? 
5.  Why did the change take place? 
6.  What was the organisation like prior to these changes in terms of working 
environment and organisation culture? 
7.  Who influenced these changes and why? 
8.  Has TFL‟s function changed overtime?  Explain. 
9.  How would you like to see Telecom Fiji developing in future? 
10.  Are there any problems TFL faces? 
11.  How did the workers react to so many changes?   
12.  Did anyone leave the organisation? 
13.  Can you describe how Telecom Fiji was when it was government owned as 
against today‟s privatised organisation? 
14. Did you support the public service way of doing things?  Explain. 
15. Did the trade unions pose any problems for the corporatisation to occur?  
Explain. 












Questionnaire prepared as a guide for the discussion with managers and 
operational workers on the separation of Post Fiji from Telecom Fiji Limited. 
 
Topic:   Separation of Post Fiji from Telecom Fiji Ltd. 
 
1.  What were the reasons for the separation of Post Fiji from Telecom Fiji 
Limited?  Describe the processes of separation. 
2.  Who were the actors who created this?   
3.  Are you happy with the change? 
4.  How did people react to the change? 
5.  Were there any resistance to the change?  Elaborate. 
6.  What is the role of Telecom Fiji and Post Fiji in the socio- economic 
development of the country? 
7.  How do you want Telecom Fiji and Post Fiji to develop in the future? 
8.  Have you been able to fulfil the vision and mission after the separation? 
9.  How was the organisation like prior to the separation? 
10.  How is it now? 
11.  Why is it different now with the privatisation? 
12.  Do you feel that Post Fiji and Telecom Fiji are fulfilling their role effectively?  
How?  If not, then why not? 
13.  Do you see the role of Telecom Fiji changing after privatization and in the 
process neglecting its more traditional role- “providing a means of communication 
to all in need”? 
14.  What changes do you see in your daily routine after the separation? 
15.  Was Telecom Fiji able to achieve what it wanted to after the separation? 
16.  What sort of relationship does Telecom Fiji have with Post Fiji Limited? 
17.  What sorts of problem was TFL facing when the postal element was part of 
it? 









Questionnaire prepared as a guide for discussion with managers and other 
staff on the role of accounting in the corporatisation and privatisation of 
Telecom Fiji Limited 
 
Topic:  Role of Accounting 
 
1. How were accounting information kept in government days? 
2.  Were there any problems with accounting information system in government 
days? 
3.  Were any changes in accounting system observed after corporatisation? 
4.  Did the accountants‟ role change?  Did they become more proactive?  Discuss. 
5.  What techniques do you use to evaluate capital projects?  Give an example. 
6.  Do you have a strategic business plan?  Explain some of its contents. 
7.  Are accountants involved in training other staff with financial matters? 
8. What sort of demands is imposed by the parent company of Amalgamated 
Telecom Holdings Limited? 




















Questionnaire prepared as a guide for discussion with managers and other 
staff of Telecom Fiji Limited on Total Quality Management 
 
Topic:  Total Quality Management 
1. Can you tell me what you understand by the term “Total Quality 
Management”?  
2.  Why was TQM introduced? 
3. What external forces influenced the introduction of TQM? 
4. Can you provide some historical information on the introduction of TQM? 
5. What was the organisation culture/ patterns of behaviour like prior to the  
      introduction of TQM? 
6. What is the organisation culture like after TQM‟s introduction? 
7.  Do you see any benefits of TQM in the organisation? 
8.  How do you feel about the organisation now?  Is there any changes in the 
organisation? 
9.  How has TQM been implemented, i.e. what processes were involved? 
10.  Which actors were involved in the introduction and why? 
11.  Were there any costs involved with TQM implementation? 
12.  Is there any particular pattern of behaviour from workers before TQM 
implementation? 
13. How has TQM helped to achieve the vision and mission of the organisation? 
14.  How did the workers react to the concept?   
15.  What are your views on the system? 
16.  Can you see any problems with TQM? 
17. Has there been any change in employees‟ morale after the introduction of 
“TQM”? 
18. Have there been any problems in the implementation of TQM? 
19. Have there been any changes in the management/ employee relationship since 
the introduction of TQM? 
20. How do you view the role of Telecom Fiji Limited in the socio- economic 
development of the country? 
21. How do you like to see quality initiatives developed in the future? 




23.  Were there any changes in responsibility after the introduction of TQM from 



































Questionnaire prepared as a guide for discussion with managers and other 
staff on Telecom Fiji Limited on performance measurement at the Company 
 
Topic:  Performance Measurement 
 
1. Can you describe your management contract system? 
2.. What was the work environment like prior to the introduction of performance 
measurement system? 
3.  Which actors introduced this? 
4.  How has the work environment changed with the introduction of performance 
measurement system? 
5.  How do you think this performance measurement system contributes to the 
goal of the organisation- providing improved communication to its citizens? 
6.  What did Telecom Fiji Ltd want to achieve with performance measurement 
system?   
7.  What are the processes involved within the performance measurement system? 
8. Does performance measurement system cater for non- financial performance 
measures like professional development?  Elaborate. 
9. .What were the reactions of people once the scheme was introduced? i.e. how 
did they behave? 
10. Did anyone leave the organization? 
11.  How were you successful in implementing performance measurement 
system? 
12.  Do you want to see some improvement made to performance measurement 
system?  Which areas do you think improvement needs to be made? 
13.  Are employees consulted whilst setting targets?  Describe the processes. 
14.What were the reactions of unions to performance measurement system?  Were 
there any resistance?  Elaborate. 
15.  Which actors were responsible for the introduction of performance 
measurement system and why? 
16.  What is your overall view of the system? 
17.What kind of performance indicators do you have and how do they work?   
18. Who sets the performance measures?  Who records them?  




20.  Have people lost jobs after the performance measurement system or 
restructure of organization?  Explain. 
21.  How do you expect to see the future development of performance 
measurement system? 
22. What were the patterns of behaviour of people before performance 
measurement system? 






































Duration of each 
interview 
Chief Executive CEO 1 1 hour 
Manager, Human 
Resources 
MHR 1 1 hour 
Strategic Planning 
Manager 
SPM 4 4 hours 
National Manager Quality NMQ 3 3 hours 
Accountant 1 ACT1 2 3 hours 
Accountant 2 ACT2 1 1 hour 
Accountant 3 ACT3 2 3 hours 
Accountant 4 ACT4 2 2 hours 
Chief Finance Officer CFO 1 1 hour 
Manager, Customer 
Relations 
MCR 1 2 hours 
Customer Service Officer CSO 1 2 hours 
General Manager Access GMA 2 2 hours 
Regional Manager, Nadi RMN 2 2 hours 
Technicians TEC 2 2 hours 
Finance Manager FM 1 1 hour 
Corporate 
Communications Officer 
CCO 1 1 hour 
Regional Manager- 
Lautoka 
RML 2 2 hours 
Quality Manager QM 2 2 hours 
Regional Manager, Ba RMB 1 1 hour 
Regional Manager, Tavua RMT 1  1 hour 
Operations Staff OS 2 3 hours 
Engineer ENG 2 2 hours 
Manager, Corporate 
Communications 
MCC 1 1 hour 
Senior Economists, 
ministry of Public 
Enterprises 
SEP 1 1 hour 
Accountant- Ministry of 
Public Enterprises 
ACP 1 1 hour 
Senior Accountant- Post 
Fiji Limited 
SAP 1 1 hour 
Manager, Post Masters 
Business Account 
MPB 1 1 hour 
Fiji Posts and Telecom 
Union Secretary 




CSATH 1 2 hours 
Project Officer, 
Commerce Commission 
POCC 1 1 hour 
Board member- Telecom 
Fiji Limited 
BMTFL 1 2 hours 











Appendix 5:  Population Census of Fiji 
 




Appendix 6: Profitability of commercialised government 
entities 















































Appendix 9:  Existing Business Line Rental Comparison 
The graph shows monthly business line rental charges in various countries.  According to TFL 
management, some countries appear multiple times in the graph as there are a number of 



















Appendix 10:   National Quality Action and Quality 
Action Teams 
 
 
 
 
